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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers to analyse the effect of migration dynamics on open
economies. Each study examines a different topic of migration in a macroeconomic
context using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
The first paper analyses the effect of an increase to migration on the macroeconomy
and to native citizens. The analysis employs a structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
and a DSGE model to analyse the effect of a migration shock on the macroeconomy
and fiscal budget in per native terms. Analysis features a constructed dataset for the
native population using population and net migration statistics for Germany. The
DSGE model diverts from the standard per capita terms to have variables for the
macroeconomy and native household in per native terms and the variables specific
to the migrant household in per migrant terms.
The second paper features a DSGE model of a small open economy with asym-
metric search and matching frictions to study brain waste and increased migration
following a relaxation of migration policy. To show the gains from eliminating brain
waste, the differences between natives and migrants are eliminated. A SVAR provides
empirical analysis of the effects from a migration shock. These models use data from
Canada, a country that has recognised brain waste on a microeconomic level.
The final paper analyses the effect of migration policies in a two-country DSGE
model. The two countries are asymmetric, beginning with their profiles as an oil-
producer country and an oil-consumer. The migration decision for agents in the
resource cursed country is endogenous and depends on the job finding probabilities
net of migration costs. The model uses occasionally binding migration constraints
to evaluate the role of migration policies. The model is estimated using data from
Venezuela and the United States.
The results presented in each of the papers show that immigration has a small but
statistically significant positive effect for an economy empirically and theoretically.
For the final paper, migration policies had negative effects in both countries by
preventing the oil-consumer from maximising the labour force and the sending
country by keeping unemployment high and draining fiscal resources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past twenty years, the number of international migrants residing in developed
economies has increased significantly, creating economic and political discussions. The
relevance of migration has opened up opportunities for research on the reasons and
implications behind migration. Several theories behind the reasons for international
economic migration are put forth by Massey et al. (1993) using neoclassical economics,
dual labour markets, and world systems theory. The neoclassical macroeconomic
theory on migration assumes that international economic migration is caused by:
wage differentials, returns on human capital, labour markets being the main driver of
international labour flows, and governments can control migration by influencing the
labour markets. Whereas the neoclassical microeconomic side considers differentials
in earnings, participation, and unemployment rates, the specifics of human capital
characteristics, social conditions, expected net returns to migration, psychological
factors, and that governments can control immigration using policies to influence
expected earnings net of migration costs. Economic dualism arises from imperfect
substitutability of workers in highly developed economies, where workers with a
high degree of capital-skill complementarity hold relatively stable jobs, and the
labour intensive sector is less secure. The associated characteristics with low-skilled
work is less attractive to natives, therefore, employers turn to immigrants to fill
the gaps. The driver of international migration in world systems is the location of
markets that are local to the sources of capital and the exact directions can relate
to former colonies. The wage and employment gaps between the host and sending
country is most commonly used in these theories as to what drives international
economic migration. However, there is no theory that can explain or help predict
migration flows (Arango, 2000). The microeconomic research on economic, social,
environmental, and political international migration is extensive while the literature
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examining the effects of migration in a macroeconomic context, particularly dynamic
general equilibrium business cycles, is minimal.
This thesis answers some of the questions on migration that are unexplored
within macroeconomics. The macroeconomic questions on immigration can only be
answered by studying the different migration profiles of host countries. The first
consideration is to analyse the relative (and absolute) size of net migration flows and
the immigrant population. The United States of America has the highest stock of
international migrants globally, however the foreign born residents account for less
than 14% of their total population. In contrast, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand
have excess of 25%. Annual net migration flows exceed 1% of the population in
Canada and New Zealand but less than 0.4% in the United States. For countries with
a higher relative size, net migration is of greater significance to the macroeconomy.
Of the existing research, there is a great focus on the Mexico to United States path
which can be traced back to Jerome (1926), in part due to its persistently large
absolute size and migration policies dating back to the 1920s.
A second factor to profile, is the average age and qualification or human capital
levels of the immigrant and how they compare to natives. Some countries such as
the United States and Germany are host to a large number of low-skilled migrants
whereas Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are host to
high-skill migrants. This is not entirely due to the demand of a nation as resulting
from shortages but the supply of migrants. Using Germany as an example, there is
significant shortage of high-skilled workers but a large supply of low-skilled workers
from Poland and the other Eastern European countries that are a part of the
common labour market in Europe. The qualification level has significant effects
on the participation and unemployment rates of migrants. This area extends to
the substitutability of native and immigrant workers. The existing macroeconomic
literature leans towards perfect substitution of workers whilst the microeconomic
implies imperfect substitution (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
Thirdly, migration analysis should consider the requirements for the immigrant
to work in the host country. International migration in a common labour market,
such as the one in Europe, is much simpler than requiring a (temporary) visa. Visa
systems differ too, for example a country’s visa system can be dependent on securing
employment before application. Research by Klein and Ventura (2009) looks at the
role of barriers to labour mobility in output and welfare when productivity differs
between countries. By considering an expansion of the European Union and creation
of a hypothetical common labour market in North America, the authors found that
there are large gains in both. Chassamboulli and Peri (2015) examine the labour
market effects of reducing the number of illegal immigrants. Their research shows
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that legalising immigrants has a positive effect on the low-skilled labour market for
natives and immigrants, whereas increasing deportations worsens the low-skilled
labour market for both.
From a longer term perspective, what percentage of population growth is at-
tributed to migration? For countries such as Germany and Japan, migration is the
only source of population growth due to the long-term negative natural population
change. Whilst in Canada, the forecast is expected to be the same by 2030. These
are some of key factors in consideration for meaningful macroeconomic research
applicable to a country and for linking it to the research in microeconomics. The
existing theoretical macroeconomic literature of immigration in open economies is
limited, even more so the estimation of the models of those focusing on immigration.
The existing works on immigration include Canova and Ravn (1998), Canova and
Ravn (2000), Ben-Gad (2008), Mandelman and Zlate (2012), Kiguchi and Mountford
(2017), Braun and Weber (2016), Hauser and Seneca (2019), Lozej (2019), and Smith
and Thoenissen (2019). The research generally gives a positive or insignificant results
from immigration. Empirical macroeconomic research on immigration is somewhat
limited due to the small number of countries who keep detailed net migration data
over an extended period of time. Two papers to use quarterly net migration time
series data are Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) and Smith and Thoenissen (2019) who
examine Norway and New Zealand respectively. Kiguchi and Mountford (2017) and
Weiske (2019) use constructed migration series for the United States. Weiske (2019)
estimates a time series for migration flows using working age population using data
based on the Current Population Survey. d’Albis et al. (2016) uses a constructed
dataset from long-term residence permits in France.
When emigration is considered, if immigration is positive for the host country
does that make it negative for the sending county? Immigration shocks can be
identified as a relaxation of immigration policies, an expansion of a common labour
market, or an unexpected change in migration such as a refugee influx, for which
there is no comparable policy for emigration; beyond the limited scenario of entering
into a common labour market with a developed country. Something is required to
cause the change in emigration flows which is not as simple to model because there
is not an opposite of relaxation of immigration restrictions; or at least one that is
replicable across migrant sending countries. Massey et al. (1993) showed that the
wage gap was one of the main factors of migration amongst many labour market
factors. As migration occurs between highly developed nations, the neoclassical
macroeconomic assumption that eliminating the wage gap will stop migration is
unrealistic as the gap would be negligible or insignificant once migration costs are
accounted for. The analysis of a positive or negative effect of emigration depends
3
Introduction
on the driver of the emigration decision, the condition of the sending economy,
and for whom are the effects being considered? This thesis focuses on economic
migration rather than environmental or political. The loss of human capital, or brain
drain, and whether it is beneficial is analysed in Beine et al. (2001) and Beine et al.
(2008). There is a gain for countries that have a low level of high skilled workers
and low migration rates, however when there is a higher proportion of high-skilled
workers and a high migration rate then there are losses. From their cross-country
study (Beine et al., 2008), there are more losers than winners. The examination of
refugees has been studied in the host country by Stähler (2017). A topic that became
relevant following the European migration crisis of 2015-2016. There is research
on labour mobility in currency unions, particularly the United States and less so
the Eurozone, these works include Farhi and Werning (2014), Hauser (2014), Braun
and Weber (2016), Hauser and Seneca (2019), and Bandeira et al. (2019). Two
papers to examine migration in the European Union and removal of trade barriers
are Iranzo and Peri (2009) and Kennan (2017). Iranzo and Peri (2009) analyse trade
and migration flows in a two country model. Kennan (2017) looks at the effects of
an enlargement of the European Union with the focus on the elimination of barriers
to labour mobility. The results show that effects on real wages are small and there
are significant gains to be experienced from the removal of migration restrictions.
An area related to immigration and emigration that has been researched in the
macroeconomics is remittances. The analysis of risk sharing using migration and
remittances in sending countries by Mandelman and Zlate (2012) is a key contribution
to the literature on migration and business cycles. Other studies include Durdu and
Sayan (2010), Mandelman (2013), and Finkelstein Shapiro and Mandelman (2016).
This pre-existing research on remittances, allows this thesis to focus on immigration
and the macroeconomy of the host country and the introduction of migration policies
from a country that remittances have not been a significant contribution to GDP
(until recently).
This thesis presents three papers that examine the effects of migration on the
macroeconomy by answering some of the questions related to immigration and
emigration. The main contribution of each paper is the estimated dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The first two papers focus on the effects of
immigration on the macroeconomy following a migration shock, each using a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) and a DSGE model. The third paper studies migration
policies and the business cycles of a developing economy.
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1.1 A Native Perspective of Immigration
Is migration more than population growth in the Solow model, and does it do more
than dilute per capita stocks of assets in the short run? What is the effect of
immigration on natives and the macroeconomy? This chapter is motivated by the
research on the effect of immigration natives in the microeconomics which shows net
immigration to be mainly positive or insignificant for natives. For instance, D’Amuri
et al. (2010) shows the imperfect substitution of native and migrant workers in
Western Germany and Glitz (2014) who concludes that segregation in present in the
German labour market through ethnicity and most prevalent in low-skilled labour
markets. Additionally, Dustmann et al. (2010) show that migrants are more likely to
be made unemployed than natives following an economic shock. Depending on the
country's type of migration, the long run effect on wages can be zero as in Kennan
(2013). Further, the Solow model implies that if migration were simply an increase
in population growth rate, this would have contractionary effects in per capita terms.
As an increase in the population would dilute the per capita value of stocks making
the capital less intensive without a change in the savings rate.
To answer these questions, chapter 2 uses an empirical and a theoretical model.
The first part of the paper features a SVAR using data from Germany to assess the
effects of a migration shock to the macroeconomy in per native and per capita terms.
To contrast the effects of a per capita and per native immigration shock, chapter
2 employs a time series created using the working-age native population to allow
analysis in per native terms and use working-age total population data for a per
capita time series. Taking these population figures to a macroeconomic dataset using
components of national accounts, including fiscal spending. The empirical analysis
evaluates the effects of net immigration to the macroeconomy in per capita and per
native terms.
The main contribution of this paper is the DSGE model that features heteroge-
neous households, perfectly competitive firms, and an active fiscal authority. One
household consists of natives and long-term migrants, and the second is a collection
of migrants. DSGE models usually have variables in per capita terms, however, to
analyse whether migration is more than population growth, the model uses variables
specific to the native household and macroeconomy in per native terms and variables
specific to the migrant household in per migrant terms. The active fiscal authority
uses countercyclical fiscal policy that includes: investment in public capital that is
employed by the firms, consumption, provision of household transfers, and collection
of taxes. Some of the model parameters along with the autoregressive parameters
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and standard deviation of shocks in the log-linearised model that are estimated with
Bayesian methods, using the per native dataset.
The results from the SVAR shows positive results for the macroeconomy following
a migration shock in per capita and in per native terms. Interestingly, the per
capita and per native impulse responses give the same directional response but the
persistence and peaks differ. The DSGE model shows positive responses for the
macroeconomy, for the native household, fiscal authority, and negative effects for the
migrant household. However, responses from both models are small and insignificant
for some variables.
1.2 Brain Waste in the Canadian Macroeconomy
Why do immigrants experience different labour market conditions to natives and what
effect does this difference, as well as skill-downgrading, have on the macroeconomy?
How would the economy change if the labour market differences were eliminated and if
immigrants were assimilated into the macroeconomy? The labour market differential
between natives and immigrants, in particular wages and unemployment, has received
a microeconomic focus but there are important implications for the macroeconomy.
Differences in participation rates relate to the demographics of migrants relative
to natives (Hilgenstock and Koczan, 2018). More productive workers offer greater
returns, but if their skills are under-utilised, there is a loss of a potential gain to
the economy. Lewis (2011) provides positive support the effect of immigration and
degree of capital-skill complementarity in the United States is analysed using OLS
and IV methods when immigration changes skill ratios. Brain waste occurs when
(high-skilled) migrants face poorer labour market conditions then natives, which
includes higher rates of involuntary unemployment, higher labour market frictions,
or underemployment. Underemployment includes skill-downgrading and working
part-time when full-time is desired. The Canadian government has recognised brain
waste as an issue following the microeconomic research, however, there is a gap in
the dynamic business cycle literature for analysis of brain waste.
Chapter 3 answers these questions, using data on participation rates, unemploy-
ment rates, and wage differences in a model of capital-skill complementarity with
asymmetric search and matching frictions to analyse the role of brain waste to the
macroeconomy. The recent Canadian policies to increase migration, and in particular
a visa system that does not require the migrant to have a job to be granted a work
visa, allows us to use this microeconomic data to calibrate this DSGE model. The
model features three households, perfectly competitive firms, and a passive fiscal
authority. To evaluate the potential gains to the macroeconomy from eliminating
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the labour market problems caused by brain waste, the model is adjusted so that
high and low-skill migrants have the same labour market conditions as their native
equivalents. This shows that there are statistically significant gains to be had from
eliminating brain waste. Also presented is a small extension to the model that
assimilates high-skilled immigrants into the macroeconomy by enabling them to
invest in the firms. Using Bayesian estimation methods, the persistence parameters
and standard deviations of the six model shocks, and three model parameters of the
non-linear DSGE model are estimated. To complement the DSGE model, a SVAR is
presented to analyse the empirics of a migration shock to Canada. The responses
to the macroeconomic variables show that there are small but positive responses to
migration.
1.3 The Resource Curse and Migration Policies
How do migration policies affect the host and sending economies? In developed
countries that are migrant hosts, immigration is largely procyclical in relation to the
business cycle. What about sending economies? It would be assumed that emigration
is mostly countercyclical, and originates in the actual or expected wage premium and
labour market conditions. However, if immigration is procyclical and immigration
policies are imposed, what drives the business cycle of developing economies to follow
this pattern of migration? To what extend do non-risk sharing shocks matter?
In this two-country model presented in chapter 4, with asymmetric search and
matching frictions, one country is a developing resource cursed country and the other
a developed country. The former is an oil-producer, and latter an oil-consumer. The
resource curse refers to commodity dependent economies who have not, despite the
abundant wealth that comes from oil especially, become a developed nation and links
closely to macroeconomic populism. The agents in the resource cursed country have
an endogenous migration choice that depends on the probability of finding a job,
net of migration costs. The wage premium of the developed country sets migration
of natives in the developed to the resource cursed country to zero. The model uses
occasionally binding migration policies to reflect current migration policies that limit
migration, the only example of OBCs being used in the migration literature is by
Mehra (2017) who focuses on the effects of immigration in the host country. The
model is taken to annual data from Venezuela and the United States for 1920-1995
which covers multiple business cycles. Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of oil
globally, and its economy is strongly linked to the oil price, yet there is an absence
of business cycle analysis. During this period, the majority of Venezuelan oil exports
were to the United States, at approximately 75%. The results focus on migration
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and the effect of migration policies analyse the following an oil-price shock, which
does not have an element of risk-sharing as some of the typical business cycle shocks
do. The results show that (strong) migration policies have negative effects on both
economies.
Developed countries usually employ immigration policies that ‘protect’ their
labour markets from what they perceive to be too much immigration. In analysing
the effect of migration policies, the analysis begins with a baseline model that has
no barriers to labour mobility in the spirit of Iranzo and Peri (2009), who showed
how a hypothetical NAFTA labour market would benefit the United States.
The first migration policy introduces a visa system whereby migrants have
an endogenously determined probability of acquiring a work permit. If this is
unsuccessful, they enter the labour market as an illegal immigrant. The second
policy increases the efficiency of the border force and migration agency, which results
in a lower probability of a successful employment match and increased migration
costs. The final policy is by way of an exogenous job destruction, whereby the
border force stops a new employment match and deports existing illegal immigrants.
These policies reflect the ongoing situation faced by migrants. Kennan (2013) shows
significant gains if there were opening up borders where wage differences result from
productivity of workers and there is factor price equalisation.
The business cycle analysis contribution of the paper examines the role of the
oil price and the endogenous demand and supply of oil. Using data on production
in Venezuela and the elasticities of oil in production for production in the United
States, the non-linear model is calibrated and estimated. Results show that there is
a large contribution of oil price and production to the business cycle in Venezuela.
Both theoretical and empirical research has tried to explain the business cycles
of developing economies. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argued that non-stationary
productivity shocks were the source of fluctuations whereas research by Garcia-Cicco
et al. (2010) explain that stationary productivity shocks and interest rate shocks
were the main drivers. For the developing countries dependent on commodities,
terms of trade has been shown to have a significant impact on their economy and the
dollarisation of external debt for the government. As a general fact on the resource
curse, Sachs and Warner (1995) show that resource abundant countries usually have
low growth rates in the analysis of 1971-1989; a period of high volatility including
the energy crisis, oil crisis, and oil glut. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) extend this
analysis with debt overhang as the resource wealthy countries borrowed highly which
caused their debt crises in the 1980s following the fall in commodity prices rather
than a resource curse stagnating their growth.
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1.4 Organisation of this Thesis
The following three chapters employ DSGE models to analyse immigration and
emigration. Chapter 2 introduces the topic of immigration as a political as well as an
economic issue with a literature review followed by a discussion on immigration in
Germany. The aforementioned SVARs and a DSGE model using data from Germany
follow. The Bayesian estimation results of the persistence parameters and standard
deviations of shocks, and selected model parameters of the log-linearised small open
economy DSGE model follow. The results from Bayesian estimation are used in
the analysis of an exogenous migration shock to present the results of the DSGE
model. To finish, there is a conclusion to this analysis of immigration from a native
perspective.
Chapter 3 begins with an introduction of brain waste as a concept that is applied
to this macroeconomic model, followed by a review of relevant existing literature
on immigration, and discussion on the importance of immigration in Canada. The
analysis begins with the SVAR and setting out the DSGE model. The non-linear
small open economy DSGE model is estimated using Bayesian methods. The results
from the DSGE models with and without brain waste are presented, followed by a
conclusion.
Chapter 4 includes an introduction to the resource curse and macroeconomic
populism, followed by a discussion of the literature on commodities, emerging
economies, and emigration. After setting out the DSGE model, the algorithms of
the occasionally binding constraints used to simulate migration policies are detailed.
The two country non-linear DSGE model is estimated using data from Venezuela
and the United States, followed by analysis of the role of oil price and production in
the business cycles of both countries. The next section presents the results from a
positive and a negative oil price shock, to evaluate the asymmetries and effects of
the migration policies. To conclude, there is a discussion of implications of migration
policies, and those of business cycles in resource cursed countries.
Chapter 5 offers a conclusion to the thesis. This chapter summarises the results
and implications of the three papers for economists and policy makers; an evaluation of
the key findings and the economic interpretations; and a discussion of the limitations
of each paper with opportunities for future research.
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Chapter 2
A Native Perspective of Migration
in a Small Open Economy
2.1 Introduction
Migration is a contentious topic that is economically and politically relevant. There
has been an increase of international migrant stocks of 17% worldwide, and 18% in
Western Europe between 2000-2017 (United Nations, 2017). The higher levels of
migration in recent decades can, in part, be attributed to the increasing openness of
economies and labour markets. This increase in the host economies has not been
welcomed by all, indeed it has triggered a backlash on multiculturalism, a rise in
support for nationalist political parties, as well as tensions between natives and
recent immigrants.12
This paper analyses the business cycle effects of an exogenous migration shock in
an estimated small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model from a native perspective.3 This differs to the existing literature that presents
variables in per capita terms. The model uses two households to represent natives and
migrants, perfectly competitive firms, and an active fiscal authority. To compliment
the DSGE model, we present empirical analysis in the form of a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR). We question how a migration shock affects the macroeconomy
in per native rather than per capita terms.
1See Ambrosini and Boccagni (2015) and Scholten and van Nispen (2015) for discussions on the
politicisation of migration. Crawley and Skleparis (2018) discuss some of the issues raised following
the 2015 migration crisis.
2Research suggests that immigrants who have resided in the host country for a significant period
of time have similar views to natives on increasing immigration Braakmann et al. (2017)
3This shock is to simulate a relaxation in visa restrictions; in our applied case an expansion of
freedom of movement areas in Europe. A direct comparison with the refugee crisis is not appropriate
as the model assumes full employment.
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The economic importance of migration is becoming more apparent to a number
of host nations. Germany is home to the highest number of migrants in Europe,
where migration flows are the only source of population growth due to the negative
natural population change.4 At the end of 1991, there were 5.9 million foreign-born
residents in Germany or 7.3% of the population. By the end of 2018, these figures
nearly doubled to 10.9 million or 13.1%. In terms of the working-age population
(15-65 years old), migrants account for 14.5% at the end of 2018. The German
economy has experienced four major population shocks since 1989: reunification of
Germany, immigration following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the expansion of
the European Union, and the (European) migration crisis of 2015.
We fit the model to Germany where immigration has become a sizeable political
issue in addition to being an economic one. The refugee crisis of 2015 caused German
net migration to exceed 1 million for the first time (figure 2.1) which is more than a
twofold increase on the 2014 figure.5 The disparagement by some Germans led to
an increase in support for the anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschalnd (AfD)
party, and a dent in Chancellor Angela Merkel's approval ratings.6 Some of the
anti-immigration arguments put forward are that there are negative effects on wages
and jobs, and a drain on fiscal spending. To evaluate the contribution of migrants to
the economy relative to natives we need to assess the profile of the average immigrant
compared to native.
The results from the DSGE and SVAR models imply migration is positive for
an economy, and the responses coincide where the significance of the results is the
only major change. Migration has a small but statistically significant effect on per
native GDP, private consumption, and private investment such that migration shocks
matter but are not drivers of the business cycle.
Our paper offers a different way of looking at the economic responses of migration
in a theoretical model by examining the macroeconomy in per native terms and
the use of heterogenous households; and is supported with empirical analysis. The
remainder of this paper is as follows: in section 2.2 we discuss relevant theoretical
and empirical literature about effects of migration on the macroeconomy; section
2.3 elaborates on some of the migration data discussed in this section; we describe
the empirical model and its results in section 2.4; we set out the DSGE model in
4The natural population change for West Germany since 1972 was negative and for Germany
since reunification. Source Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) using natural population change
defined as is births - deaths.
5See section 2.3 for a discussion on migration in Germany
6AfD is now the third largest party in the Bundestag, and received 12.6% of the votes in the
September 2017 election. As of September 2019, the AfD hold 91 seats, where only the CDU/CSU
and SPD hold more with 246 and 152 respectively.
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section 2.5 and report the Bayesian estimation results of the model in section 2.6; we
present the results of the model in section 2.7; and offer a conclusion in section 2.8.
2.2 Immigration and the Macroeconomy
There is a developing literature covering the macroeconomics of migration, particularly
with regards to immigration in business cycle literature. A number of early works
looked at the effects of migration following the collapse of the USSR on Israel such
as Flug et al. (1994) and Hercowitz and Yashiv (2002). Others include Canova
and Ravn (1998), Canova and Ravn (2000), and Ben-Gad (2004). More recent
works include Baas and Brücker (2012), Mandelman and Zlate (2012), Burstein
et al. (2017), Pandey and Ray Chaudhuri (2017), and Smith and Thoenissen (2019).
Migration research incorporating search and matching fictions include Chassamboulli
and Palivos (2013), Chassamboulli and Peri (2015), Kiguchi and Mountford (2017),
and Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019). Few papers model natives and migrants in
separate households.
Dependent upon which migration path is being studied, the characteristics of
migrant workers differ. In the literature, migrants are predominately considered
to be low-skilled, at the very least they arrive into the low-skilled labour market.7
When more than one skill level is considered, the effect on the low-skilled workforce
usually has contrasting effects to the high-skill workers. As the low-skilled sector
receives an increased workforce, typically higher skill sectors see positive effects on
wages and employment. This can lead to labour market polarisation. However, as
noted in microeconomic literature, natives and migrant workers are usually imperfect
substitutes. We focus on the papers using full employment.
Canova and Ravn (2000) model the reunification of Germany as an inflow of
low-skilled, non-Ricardian households (East Germans) to West Germany. The model
includes a welfare state, the presence of which eliminates an investment boom and
prolongs the recession with a consumption loss for the high-skilled agents. The
government's purpose is to redistribute income between agents, balancing their
budget every period. When the model includes a government, the low-skilled workers
gain as wages increase. In the absence of a government, low-skilled workers lose
as wages fall, there is no redistribution of income, and high-skill workers gain as
return on capital increases, but their wages fall. The reunification process, or inflow
of low-skilled workers, is modelled as an AR(1) process. The long run effects of
unification show that there is still a fall in most variables, notably though skilled
7Partly due to the high frequency of studies for the Mexico-United States migration path.
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income, and skilled consumption are still above steady state levels, with skilled
labour hours below steady state. The authors note that the time needed to absorb
the migration shock depends on the speed at which the migrants develop to have
the same portion of skilled agents compared to natives.
Storesletten (2000) uses an overlapping generations model to analyse the effects of
high and low-skilled migration on fiscal policy. The results show that young/working-
age high and medium skilled immigrants have a positive impact for US taxpayers
but a negative one in the case of low-skilled or older workers. The conclusion is that
selective immigration policies should be towards individuals who are not of average
age and skill composition of current immigrants and population. In the context of
most countries where there is sizeable inward migration, such as countries in Western
Europe, the US and Canada, who (in the absence of freedom of movement) grant
visas to young workers.
Braun and Weber (2016) model immigration in West Germany following the end
of World War II in which 8 million expellees returned, however, the distribution across
two of the West German regions was different. Using search and matching frictions in
a two-region model that fits the data on regional unemployment differential. There
is small lost to native workers in the long-run in terms of lifetime labour income
of 1.38%, but in the short-run there is a larger effect. Some of these results are
applicable to the refugee inflow that Germany experienced in the 2015 European
migration crisis. Stähler (2017) examines the effect of the refugee crisis in Germany
using the Bundesbank's New Keynesian GEAR (Germany, Euro Area and Rest of the
World) model. Refugees are initially receiving transfers for the first year following
arrival. However, he notes the importance of fully incorporating the refugees into
the labour market since GDP per capita falls whilst they have not transformed to a
higher productivity worker. Fratzscher and Junker (2015) examine the effects of the
refugee inflow into Germany. The paper finds that the effects can be negative in the
short run, in terms of wages and output, but in the long run (5-10 years) the results
are positive, particularly after the immigrants have entered the labour market, and
especially for the younger immigrants, who have the potential to be more qualified
than the average German native.
In terms of empirical research, Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) use a Bayesian
VAR model to identify the results on aggregate macroeconomic variables from an
immigration shock using quarterly Norwegian net immigration data. An immigration
shock is treated as a labour market shock. The authors find that net immigration
does not have negative effects on native employment and public finances, two of the
key arguments used to oppose immigration, rather that a positive immigration shock
increases employment among natives and migrant workers as well as a small positive
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effect on public finances. Immigration shocks are small but significant drivers of the
business cycle, but immigration does not especially respond to the business cycle,
rather labour market factors.
In both macroeconomics and microeconomics, there is an assumption of separate
labour markets for natives and migrants which conforms with international evidence.
D’Amuri et al. (2010) examined the wage and employment effects of immigration to
Western Germany in the 1990s, where results showed that there were few effects on
natives' wage or employment rather the negative effects were on previous immigrants
employment, and to a smaller degree their wages. There are further topics examining
the wage gap in Germany including wage setting in Brücker and Jahn (2011), and
monopsonistic discrimination in Hirsch and Jahn (2015), where migrants supply
labour which is less elastic than natives. Due to the imperfect substitutability of
workers, the argument that migrants take natives' jobs is not necessarily the case.
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) show that migrants and natives with the same skill and
experience levels are imperfect substitutes and immigration has a positive effect on
natives' wages in the short and long run. If native and migrant workers are not
competing for the same job, immigrants, equivalently migration, cannot be blamed
for any negative employment related problems that natives experience.
To summarise, there is a general analysis that native or higher skilled wages
increase and migrant or lower skilled in the native country wages fall but only
by a small amount. Natives experience more favourable labour market conditions.
Migration has the effect of increasing output, as the economy is able to grow when
there is an increased workforce and investment. Supply side effects cause correspond-
ing increases in demand. Employment for highly skilled natives is positive, when
migrants and natives compete for the same type of job there is the possibility that
the natives experience a fall in employment and a decrease in wage. However, natives
experience more favourable labour market conditions including a lower volatility of
employment. Welfare increases for most types of households, with migrants seeing
the largest change, any decrease in native welfare is small or insignificant.
2.3 Facts on Migration in Germany
Germany experiences the highest migration flows and stocks in Europe, and second
only to the US worldwide. In the years since German reunification changes in net
migration have been driven predominantly by volatile non-German immigration,
rather than emigration. Annual migration data for Germany is available from 1991
shown in figure 2.1.
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Fig. 2.1 Total Annual Migration Flows for Germany 1991-2018
Immigration and emigration are identified by the blue and green lines measure with the left axis
(millions of people). Net migration is the red line measured on the right axis (100,000s people).
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) - Federal Statistics Office Germany
Two of the greatest migration shocks to hit a reunified Germany were following
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the refugee crisis of 2015. Of the people leaving
Russia following the collapse of the USSR, Germany received 59%, Israel received
25%, and the United States 11% of 1.2 million who emigrated to countries outside
the former Soviet Union between 1989-2002 (Heleniak, 2004). The largest number of
migrants arrived in the period 1989-1993 during the separation of states.
The impact of the 2004 EU expansion, predominantly the arrival of the A8
countries, did not have a large shock to the migration figures in 2004Q2 because
Germany did not allow free movement until 2011.8 During the intervening period
Germany issued a high number of work permits which staggered the increase. Due
to the fall in numbers of Polish nationals in Germany in 2004, there is evidence
to suggest that would be migrants from Poland changed their destination to other
8The A8 countries refer to the expansion of the May 2004 enlargement of the EU. The A8
countries include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Ten countries joined in 2004, the A8 are distinguished from Cyprus and Malta due to the
relatively low income per capita in comparison to the other EU nations.
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countries that allowed free movement (Fihel et al., 2006).9 The return migration of
Eastern European migrants during 2008-2009, in particular Polish workers, was the
reason for the negative net migration in 2008 and 2009. Workers returned due to more
favourable economic conditions. GDP growth in Germany would have been 0.2%
lower without the EU migrants in the years 2011-2016 (Clemens and Hart, 2018).
Even though migrants earn approximately 20% less than their native equivalent after
arrival and experience skill-downgrading (Beyer, 2016) where skill-downgrading is
being employed in a job for which the worker is overqualified.
One reason that immigration is important can be found in a country's demo-
graphics. Germany has an ageing population, falling birth rate, negative natural
population change, and an increased dependency ratio.10 An increase in immigration
counters these effects, since (in contrast to natives) immigrants typically have a
higher birth rate, are younger (in demographic profile), and often return to their
home country for retirement. The average age of migrants is 37.3 for men and 38
for women, compared to 45.7 for natives. Working-age migration helps to reduce
the decrease in working-age population. Therefore, the significant changes in the
employment can be partially attributed to migration.
As for the crude migration rate, shown in figure 2.2 for years 1990-2016, Germany
has number of outliers, predominantly at the beginning and end of the sample.11
However, in comparison to a number of other countries, this intervening period is
relatively stable. Peripheral Eurozone countries experience large swings around the
economic crisis, 2008 and 2009 are the only years that Germany experiences negative
net migration.
The other reason that migration is important is found in the labour market; there
are an estimated 1.2 million unfilled vacancies in Germany. Even with an assumption
of 200,000 migrant workers per annum, VBW (2015) estimate that there will be a
shortage of 3 million skilled workers in 2030, rising to 3.9 million by 2040. Research
by Vogler-Ludwig and Düll (2013) highlights the skills shortages faced by the labour
market; predominantly caused by an ageing population, pre-existing skills gap, and a
negative natural population change. A reduction in the availability of skilled workers
9Barrell et al. (2010) state that this may be due to the change in the data collection methods of
foreign nationals. This change caused an overall fall in the number of foreign nationals residing in
Germany.
10The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of dependants, aged 0 to 14 and
65+, to the total population, aged 15 to 64
11Crude rate of net migration is defined as the ratio of net migration (including statistical
adjustment) during the year to the average population in that year (per 1000 persons). The net
migration plus adjustment is calculated as the difference between the total change and the natural
change of the population (Eurostat).
17
A Native Perspective of Migration in a Small Open Economy
Fig. 2.2 Crude Rate of Net Migration for Selected Countries and EU28 1990-2016
Crude rate of net migration (plus adjustment) per 1000 inhabitants for selected countries and
EU28. The crude rate of net migration is defined as the ratio of net migration (including statistical
adjustment) during the year to the average population in that year (per 1000 persons). The net
migration plus adjustment is calculated as the difference between the total change and the natural
change of the population
Source: Eurostat
will cause firms to increase investment in human capital and longer working hours
for those already employed.
To target reducing the skill gaps, in December 2018 the Bundestag passed a
law Fachkräftezuwanderungsgesetz, which aimed to increase skilled migration from
non-EU countries as there is a significant shortage in Germany and EU migrants.12
The ambiguity of response to migration in some features of the macroeconomy,
particularly towards natives, absence of macroeconomic research for others, limited
research in migration using a small open economy model, minimal use of migration
data in macroeconomic research, and the stylised facts presented in sections 2.1 and
2.3 forms the motivation for our paper.
12Deutscher Bundestag (2019) http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/082/1908285.pdf
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2.4 Empirical Model
We begin the analysis of migration in Germany with a SVAR using the observables in
the DSGE model and related data from the macroeconomy. Other VARs analysing
the exogenous migration shock to the macroeconomy include Kiguchi and Mountford
(2017), Smith and Thoenissen (2019) and Furlanetto and Robstad (2019) who use
the United States of America, New Zealand, and Norway respectively.
The unrestricted VAR presented uses the same observables to be used in estimation
of the DSGE model, and additional components from the government national
accounts. As per Lütkepohl (2005), the VAR is specified by:
(yt − ν) = Ψ(yt−1 − ν) + ϵt (2.1)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, ν is the vector of expected values for
the endogenous variables of yt. The k x k matrix of coefficients is given by Ψ, and
ϵt is a vector of N element white noise error terms with ϵt ∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ
is an k x k variance-covariance matrix. The vector yt consists of net migration,
government consumption and investment, labour hours, wages, private consumption
and investment, tax receipts, government debt, and GDP.
2.4.1 Data
We use data for Germany, 2004Q1:2019Q3, which is seasonally adjusted, converted
to real terms, transformed to working-age per capita and working-age per native
(hereafter per capita and per native), logged and detrended using the Hamilton (2018)
filter. The cyclical components of the data used in the SVAR include GDP, private
consumption, private investment, labour hours, wage, government consumption,
government investment, government tax receipts, and government debt which are
subject to a migration shock.
We approximate a native population using data for total population, number of
migrants, naturalisation of foreigners, and net migration data.13 We use the two
resulting datasets to produce a SVAR for per capita and per native then compare
the results. The significance of comparing per capita and per native data is to show
the role of migration in the economy and assimilation of migrants into the economy.
The percentage of migrants of the population and of the working-age population has
increased significantly over the time period studied. The only source of population
growth is through migration. Whether the response of variables differs between per
capita and per native terms, is dependent on the profile of the migrant and how well
13Details are given in section A.2.
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the integration process occurs. In theory, the sign of the response has the potential
to change.
Migration is identified as an AR(1) process using the autocorrelation and partial
autocorrelation criteria. In selecting the lag length for the SVAR, Hannan-Quinn
information criterion (HQIC) and Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC)
suggest four lags and one lag respectively. The residuals are poorly behaved under
four lags and well behaved under one lag, therefore, we proceed with one lag. Using
Cholesky decomposition, we order net migration first as it is exogenous to the model.
The remaining variables in order: government consumption and investment, labour
hours, wages, private consumption and investment, tax receipts, government debt,
and GDP for both datasets.
2.4.2 Results
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses from the SVAR using per capita data and
figure 2.4 shows the SVAR using per native data. Our results show that the impact of
migration on an economy does not have a negative effect on the majority of variables.
The effects are mostly small, short lasting, and sometimes statistically insignificant
on impact.
Firstly, there is a small and statistically significant positive response to GDP in
both per capita and per native terms, with the peak arriving earlier in the case of
per capita. This expansionary effect from migration is not extended to an increase
in private consumption which negatively responds in both cases. On a household
basis, migrants tend to have lower wages and in Germany be low-skilled. A large
portion of the Eastern European and Turkish migrants send remittances which is a
potential leakage from the economy.14 The size of the response, while statistically
significant, is quite small.
Private investment (excluding residential investment) has a positive response to
migration of a size considerably larger than that of GDP or private consumption.
Some of the decrease in consumption could be explained by a shift to investment.
Labour hours increase in response to migration, more so in per capita terms than
per native terms where the reason could be due to the fall in wage or expansionary
effect from the increase in GDP.
The value for the wage is the gross value of the national concept. There is not a
value available for native or migrant. However, migration to Germany is recognised
as predominantly low-skilled. An increase in the number of low-skilled workers, and
14The two largest nationalities of migrants in Germany are Turkish and Polish (Source: Destatis
via Ausländerzentralregister (Central Register of Foreigners)).
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Fig. 2.3 Per Capita SVAR(1) Impulse Responses
A positive one standard deviation shock to working-age migration in Germany. The data used is in
logged per capita terms and detrended using the Hamilton (2018) filter. The migration shock in
the SVAR(1) is identified by a Cholesky decomposition where net migration is ordered first. The
shaded areas are the 68% confidence intervals.
hence workers earning a lower wage, would reduce this figure. In the literature it
is recognised that negative wage effects are evident with those workers that new
migrants are directly competing for work with, which is typically migrants who have
already arrived. That both impulse responses show they are statistically insignificant
implies little effect overall.
The effects of government consumption and investment are mostly statistically
insignificant. If there were negative effects on government spending, then it could be
reasoned that due to the expansionary effect on GDP and the use of countercyclical
fiscal policy which can reduce the government's debt.15 The impulse response for
household transfers is excluded due to the statistically insignificant responses.
The variable for taxes represents all taxes in the economy. In both per capita
and per native responses there is an increase following a migration shock. We can
deduce that the average migrant, directly and indirectly creates more tax revenue
for the government. Indirectly due to the expansionary output effects which usually
15Germany has used countercyclical fiscal policy as analysed in Guerguil et al. (2017).
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Fig. 2.4 Per Native SVAR(1) Impulse Responses
A positive one standard deviation shock to working-age migration in Germany. The data used is in
logged per native terms and detrended using the Hamilton (2018) filter. The migration shock in
the SVAR(1) is identified by a Cholesky decomposition where net migration is ordered first. The
shaded areas are the 68% confidence intervals.
coincides with and increase to taxes through countercyclical fiscal policy. The effect
on government debt is statistically insignificant in both data forms.
In conclusion, there is only a small difference in the responses between per capita
and per native terms. The response is either the same in terms of positive or negative
sign or one is statistically insignificant on impact. In neither per capita nor per
native is the response to migration large. The responses in per native terms peak
slightly later, and effects are longer lasting.
In the following section, we present a small open economy model with exogenous
migration to evaluate these variables in a theoretical model.
2.5 A Model of Migration from a Native Perspec-
tive
We put forth a stochastic growth model of a small open economy fitting the data to
Germany. The model features agents in infinitely lived heterogeneous households,
perfectly competitive final good producing firms, and an active fiscal authority.
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There are two types of households. The largest one consists of natives and long-
term migrants, hereafter referred to as native households. The smaller household
is an existing pool of recently arrived migrants. The households are imperfect
substitutes. Both types of households consume, and provide labour to the firms.
However, they differ by natives' ability to intertemporally optimise; own the firms;
and financial market participation. Following the migration shock, the migrants
first enter into the migrant households, and can acquire characteristics of native
households to be classified as long-term residents. The relative size of the household
plays a significant role in the economy, where a larger native household is preferable
for the economy. Perfectly competitive firms employ a combination of labour, private
capital, and public capital to produce the final good. The perfectly competitive and
profit maximising nature ensures they pay only the marginal products for capital
rental and labour services. To assess the effect of migration on government finances,
we include a fiscal authority employing countercyclical fiscal policy. The government
consumes, invests in public capital, provides household transfers, collects taxes, and
issues one period debt.
The data implies that net migration is an AR(1) process, therefore we model it
as exogenous. The shock is identified as the relaxation of migration policy with work
permits, or an enlargement of the common labour market in Europe. Migration in
Germany is driven by labour recruitment (de la Rica et al., 2013) therefore, these
situations can be associated with full employment hence employment commences on
arrival. We assume the process of migration is frictionless, such that there are no
monetary or psychological costs to migration.
To consider the native perspective, and stochastic growth feature of the model,
the variables specific to the native households, firms, government, and wider economy,
are expressed in per native terms, and the variables specific to the migrant household
are in per migrant terms.
2.5.1 Households
The small open economy features a continuum of two types of infinitely lived
households. One features natives of relative size ϕh, and migrants of relative size
1−ϕh. Each household maximises their lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint.
The households gain utility from consumption, cjt , and experience disutility from
labour hours, hjt , where superscript j ∈ [n,m] for native and migrant respectively.
Workers within the same household are perfectly substitutable. Households consume
units of the final consumption good, ct, which consists of a domestically produced
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good, cdt , and an imported good, c
f
t
ct =
[
v
1
σ (cht )
σ−1
σ + (1− v) 1σ (cft )
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
Where σ is the elasticity of substitution between home produced and imported
intermediate good, and v is the share of home produced goods in the final consumption
bundle or equivalently the home bias. The price index of the final good, Pt, is chosen
to be numeraire. Consequently, all other prices are expressed relative to the final
good.
2.5.1.1 Native Households
Firstly, we present the native households that consists of natives and longer-term res-
idents of size Nt. For simplicity, referred to only as natives. They are intertemporally
optimising agents whose utility function is
Ut = βtEt
∞∑
t=0
(
ψct
(cnt −Hct )1−θ
1− θ − ψ
h
t
ϕ0(hnt −Hht )1+η
1 + η
)
(2.2)
There exists an internal habit formation on consumption, Hct = κccnt−1, where κc
measures the degree of habit persistence and on labour supply where Hht = κhhnt−1
and κh is the degree of habit persistence on labour supply. The standard utility
parameters include: the coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by θ, ϕ0 is
the weight on disutility of labour, and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. The preferences on consumption and labour supply are subject to a shock,
ψit where i ∈ [c, h], which is an AR(1) process to allow for any unexpected changes in
consumption or labour supply patterns. Where εψ
i
t is a i.i.d. shock with zero mean
and a constant variance σ2ψi .
Consumption Preference Shock
lnψct = ρψ lnψct−1 + ε
ψc
t (2.3)
Labour Supply Shock
lnψht = ρψ lnψht−1 + ε
ψh
t (2.4)
Natives maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. Expenditures consist of
units of the final consumption good, cnt , purchase of one-period risk-free international
bonds, bt, and government bonds bgt , where pft is relative price of foreign produced
good. Households receive income from labour services paid at a rate wnt per unit
of labour, dividends from the firm, dt, the repayment of the previous period's bond
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purchases at a real interest rate, rt, and fiscal transfers znt . The size of the native
population at time t is Nt, the only way in which the size of the native population
can change is when migrants gain the characteristics to be classified as native or
long-term residents. Expressing the variables specific to the native household and
macroeconomy in per native terms means that all the carried over stocks such as
bonds are deflated by the inverse growth rate of the working-age native population,
nt = NtNt−1 .
Native Budget Constraint
(1+τ c)cnt +p
f
t bt+bgt = wnt hnt (1−τw)+dt+pft (1+rt−1)
bt−1
nt
+(1+rt−1)
bgt−1
nt
+znt (2.5)
Consumption is taxed at a rate τ c. Natives pay income tax that is proportional to
their labour income at a rate τw.
Native Income Tax
taxnt = wnt hnt τw (2.6)
The natives maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint and make optimal
bond market purchases.
max
cnt ,h
n
t ,bt
βtEt
∞∑
t=0
(
ψct
(cnt −Hct )1−θ
1− θ − ψ
h
t
ϕ0(hnt −Hht )1+η
1 + η
)
(1 + τ c)cnt + p
f
t bt + bgt = wnt hnt (1− τw) + dt + pft (1 + rt−1)
bt−1
nt
+ (1 + rt−1)
bgt−1
nt
+ znt
As a result, the optimality and first order conditions for consumption, labour supply,
and international financial market bond purchases are as follows:
Marginal Utility of Consumption
ψt(cnt − κccnt−1)−θ = µt (2.7)
Labour Supply
ϕ0ψt(hnt − κhhnt−1)η = µtwnt (1− τw) (2.8)
Native Household Euler Equation
µtp
f
t = βEtpft+1µt+1
(1 + rt)
nt+1
(2.9)
2.5.1.2 Migrant Households
There is an existing pool of migrant households, of size Mt, which migrants first enter
into. They differ from native households in their inability to access financial markets
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as they experience financial constraints similar to Canova and Ravn (2000). This
type of household is a non-Ricardian or hand-to-mouth consumer.16 Their inability
to save prohibits consumption smoothing in the face of varying labour income, to
the extent that any change in income is reflected by a change in consumption. We
classify migrants in this way since they arrive with no capital, offer no means of firm
investment, and are inactive in financial markets.
Migrants maximise period utility, which is derived from consumption, cmt , and
leisure hours, lmt . Where the time constraint is defined as 1 = lmt + hmt . The utility
function uses consumption and labour hours, where ϕm is the weight on labour hours.
The utility parameters θm, ϕm and ηm are specific to the migrant household.
Migrant Utility Function
Ut = βtEt
∞∑
t=0
(
(cmt )1−θ
m
1− θm −
ϕm(hmt )1+η
m
1 + ηm
)
(2.10)
They maximise utility subject to a budget constraint, expenditure on consumption
is equal to the income they receive which consists of hourly labour income paid at a
rate, wmt , and receipts of household transfers zmt .
Migrant Budget Constraint
(1 + τ c)cmt = wmt hmt (1− τw) + zmt (2.11)
The income tax, taxmt , is directly proportional to labour income at a rate τw.
Migrant Income Tax
taxmt = wmt hmt τw (2.12)
We set up the optimisation problem for migrant households, where µmt is the marginal
utility of consumption for the migrant household.
max
cmt ,h
m
t
(
(cmt )1−θ
m
1− θm −
ϕm(hmt )1+η
m
1 + ηm
)
(1 + τ c)cmt = wmt hmt (1− τw) + zmt
The optimality conditions are given by:
Marginal Utility of Consumption
(cmt )−θ
m = µmt (1 + τ c) (2.13)
16The presence of hand-to-mouth consumers is documented in the wider economic literature, for
instance Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2007).
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Labour Supply
ϕm(hmt )η
m = µmt wmt (1− τw) (2.14)
Combining equations 2.13 and 2.14 to eliminate µmt results in,
ϕm(hmt )η
m = w
m
t (1− τw)
cmt (1 + τ c)
(2.15)
2.5.2 Population Dynamics
The two types of households are of sizeNt andMt for natives and migrants respectively.
The population in the next period Nt+1 is a function of the natives at time t with
a separation rate ρn (the emigration of natives or longer-term residents at time t)
and stock of migrants. We assume no return migration of the most recently arrived
migrants.
Total Population
Nt+1 = (1− ρn)Nt +Mt
We denote the population growth rates of natives and migrants as nt and mt
respectively.
Nt
Nt−1
= nt
Mt
Mt−1
= mt
The migration shock is reflected in the growth rate of the migrant household. To
evaluate the growth rate of the migrant population, mt, we use an AR(1) process,
as supported in the data. The shock represents an increase in the pool of migrant
labour, where εmt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant variance σ2m.
Mt
Mt−1
= ln(mt) = ρm ln(mt−1) + εmt (2.16)
Overtime, migrants progressively gain the characteristics of natives to the extent
that they are considered to be longer-term residents. This process causes an increase
in the pool of native households.
Nt
Nt−1
= nt = ρmn
0
mt + ρmn
1
mt−1 + ρmn
2
mt−2...
The parameter ρmni identifies the exogenously determined portion of migrants who
become natives in that period, where ∑ni=0 ρmni = 1 to ensure stationarity. We are
interested in the ratio of migrants to natives, m
n
. Using the growth rates, we can
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evaluate the rates of change.
mt
nt
= Mt
Mt−1
Nt−1
Nt
= Mt
Nt
Nt−1
Mt−1
Through the aggregation process, we establish a variable mnt which is the rate of
change for migrant with respect to native households. This shows that any change
in the ratio of migrants to natives is dependent upon the growth rates of migrants
and natives. Where m
n
is the ratio of migrants to natives.
Mt
Nt
Nt−1
Mt−1
= mnt
mnt−1
(2.17)
2.5.3 Aggregation
We aggregate variables for which there exist ones for natives and migrants. Total
private consumption, ct, effective labour hours, lt, household transfers, zt, total
income tax, taxwt are given by a weighted average of the corresponding variables for
each type of household, ϕh and (1− ϕh). The aggregate variables are given in per
native terms. In equation 2.18, we show the process by which mnt is present. By
transforming the variables to aggregate terms then dividing by the size of the by
the native population, Nt, the ratio of migrants to natives features in the aggregate
equations for consumption, labour hours, household transfers, and income tax.
Total Private Consumption
ctNt = (cntNt)ϕh(cmt Mt)(1−ϕh)
ct = (cnt )ϕh(mntcmt )(1−ϕh) (2.18)
Total Labour Hours
lt = (hnt )ϕh(mnthmt )(1−ϕh) (2.19)
Household Transfers
zt = (znt )ϕh(mntzmt )(1−ϕh) (2.20)
Total Income Tax
taxwt = (taxnt )ϕh(mnttaxmt )(1−ϕh) (2.21)
2.5.4 Firms
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms, each producing a variety of the
traded consumption good. In production the firms employ labour, lt, private capital,
28
2.5 A Model of Migration from a Native Perspective
kt, and public capital, kgt where production is subject to a technological process at.17
Production Function
yt = atkαt l
(1−α)
t (kgt )α
g (2.22)
The share of private capital within a firm is given by α, with the share of labour
given by 1 − α. The firm utilises public capital, kgt , where αg is the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital indicating its productiveness.18 Total factor
productivity, at, follows an AR(1) process, where ρa is the coefficient on the previous
period's value, and εat is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2a. A positive
shock to total factor productivity, at, increases firm productivity.
Technological Process
ln at = ρa ln at−1 + εat (2.23)
Firms use a composite of native labour hours hnt and migrant labour hours hmt , in
proportion to their relative size: ϕh for native, and 1− ϕh for migrant. We formulate
effective labour supply as in equation 2.19. As the firm's labour force is comprised
from both households, the effective labour force needs to reflect the effect of a change
in labour force size needs to resulting from a migration shock.
Firms employ private capital from the native households which follows the law of
motion in equation 2.24. The capital accumulation constraint uses a Hayashi capital
adjustment cost function. Where δ is depreciation rate of existing private capital
and we assume that s(.) has the following properties: s′(.) > 0, s′′(.) ≥ 0, s′(δ) = 0,
and s′′(δ) = 0.
Capital Accumulation
kt = (1− δ)kt−1
nt
+ s
(
xtnt
kt−1
)
kt−1
nt
ψxt (2.24)
The firm is subject to an investment shock, ψxt , designed to reflect a situation where
a firm's access to credit changes. It is an AR(1) process with an i.i.d. shock that has
a zero mean and a constant variance σ2ψx , and ρψ
x is the persistence parameter.
Investment Shock
lnψxt = ρψ
x lnψxt + ε
ψx
t (2.25)
Firms are profit maximisers, where firm profits are denoted by Πt, and pht is the
relative price of domestically produced good.
17We introduce public capital due to the inclusion of fiscal policy and reasoning in Elekdag and
Muir (2014).
18We can assume increasing returns to scale with respect to public capital, see Baxter and King
(1993).
29
A Native Perspective of Migration in a Small Open Economy
Firm Profit
Πt = ytpht − wnt hnt − wmt hmt mnt − xt (2.26)
Firms maximise their profits with respect to the budget constraint, to make optimal
use of capital. Tobin's Q identifies the shadow price of capital. We set out their
optimisation problem, where µt is the marginal utility of consumption of the native
household, and qt is Tobin's Q.
max
kt,xt,hnt ,h
m
t
ytp
h
t − wnt hnt − wmt hmt mnt − xt
kt = (1− δ)kt−1
nt
+ s
(
xtnt
kt−1
)
kt−1
nt
ψxt
Investment
qt =
s′(xtnt
kt−1
)
ψxt
nt
−1 (2.27)
Tobin's Q
qt = β
µt+1
µt
[
α
yt+1
kt
+ (1− δ) qt+1
nt+1
]
(2.28)
The marginal product of capital is identified by ρkt .
Marginal Product of Capital
ρkt = α
ytp
h
t
kt−1
(2.29)
Firms employ workers, where wage is equal to the marginal product due to the
frictionless labour market.
Native Wage
wnt = (1− α)ϕh
ytp
h
t
hnt
(2.30)
Migrant Wage
wmt = (1− α)(1− ϕh)
ytp
h
t
hmt mnt
(2.31)
As a result from the per native evaluation, the variable mnt is present for the migrant
wage so that when a migration shock occurs, the migrant wage falls due to increased
labour supply. This agrees with the literature that due to imperfect substitutability
of workers, only those that are directly competing for the same type of employment
are affected, in this case the migrants.19 To compare the wage level between the two
households, we introduce a variable denoting wage differential, w∆t .
19See D’Amuri et al. (2010).
30
2.5 A Model of Migration from a Native Perspective
Wage Differential
w∆t =
wnt
wmt
(2.32)
2.5.5 Fiscal Policy
There is a large literature dedicated to analysing varying aspects of monetary policy,
yet fiscal policy remains relatively unexplored, especially in the setting of a small
open economy. There are questions surrounding the use of fiscal policy as there are
conflicting results from government expenditure changes on important macroeconomic
variables stemming from an empirical or DSGE model. Empirical models mostly
observe positive effects of government expenditure on the macroeconomic variables
such as output, consumption, and employment. However, DSGE models offer
alternative findings such as Coenen and Straub (2005) and Gali et al. (2007). To
examine the effects of migration on government finances, we include a fiscal authority.
The existing literature on fiscal policy is predominantly in the context of a closed
economy, featuring only one household. Studies featuring two households include
Coenen and Straub (2005), Horvath (2009), and Stork (2011) who uses a small open
economy model. Guerguil et al. (2017) analysis of countries' use of fiscal rules shows
that Germany has used various fiscal policy rules including the balanced budget rule
and cyclically adjusted balance rule. This supports the use of a countercyclical fiscal
policy. The model features fiscal rules based on Coenen et al. (2013) and Gadatsch
et al. (2016).
The fiscal authority collects taxes, consumes the final good, invests in public
capital, provides household transfers, and finances any budget deficit by issuing one
period debt.
2.5.5.1 Government Revenue
There are three types of taxes that the government collects, taxes from household
income, taxwt , tax on consumption, taxct , and corporation tax, tax
f
t . Labour income is
taxed at a rate τw, consumption tax rate τ c, and the corporation tax rate τ f . We use
proportional taxes.20 Income tax is described in equation 2.21. Total consumption is
a function of natives' consumption, cnt , and migrants' consumption, cmt , as shown in
equation 2.18. Consumption is taxed at a rate τ c.
Consumption Tax
taxct = τ cct (2.33)
20Canova and Ravn (1998) use implicit tax rates which enables the transfer of funds in a welfare
state from skilled households to unskilled.
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Firms are subject to corporation tax on profits at a rate τ f .
Corporation Tax
taxft = τ fΠt (2.34)
A variable taxt provides the total government revenue from taxation.
Total Tax
taxt = taxwt + taxct + tax
f
t (2.35)
2.5.5.2 Government Expenditure
Government expenditure consists of government consumption, government investment
for which there is full home bias, and they provide household transfers. Following
Coenen et al. (2013), fiscal instruments follow a countercyclical policy rule dependent
upon output, government debt, and are subject to shocks.21 Where ζg,bg and ζg,y
are the debt and output feedback coefficients and ϑg is the persistence parameter on
government expenditure of form g where g ∈ [c, x, z] for consumption, investment,
and transfers.
Public capital kgt is adjusted through depreciation of the previous period's capital
and government investment, xgt
Public Capital Accumulation
kgt = (1− δg)
kgt−1
nt
+ xgt (2.36)
Public capital depreciates at a rate, δg. Government investment evolves according
to equation 2.38 and subject to a shock which is an AR(1) process where ρxg is the
persistence parameter, and εxgt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2xg .
Government Investment Shock
ln xgt = ρx
g ln xgt−1 + εx
g
t (2.37)
Government Investment
x̂gt = ϑx
g
x̂gt−1 − ζxg ,yŷt−1 − ζxg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψxgt (2.38)
Governments provide household transfers to the households, zjt . The fiscal rule for
transfers is a function of government debt and output. In this section we present the
log-linearised equations.
21We exclude the pre-announcement coefficients but include household transfers in the fiscal
rules.
32
2.5 A Model of Migration from a Native Perspective
Household Transfers Rule
ẑt = ϑz ẑt−1 − ζz,yŷt−1 − ζz,bg b̂gt−1 + ψzt (2.39)
Household transfers are subject to a shock, representing a policy change. The process
follows an AR(1) form, where ρz is the coefficient on the previous period's value, and
εzt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2z .
Household Transfers Shock
lnψzt = ρψ
z lnψzt−1 + ϵ
ψz
t (2.40)
We set zmt = zt, therefore following equation 2.20, z
ϕn
t = (znt )ϕn(mnt)1−ϕn which
simplifies to zt = zmt therefore
zt = zmt (mnt)
1−ϕn
ϕn (2.41)
The final component of government expenditure is government consumption, cgt . The
fiscal rule is countercyclical, and subject to a government consumption shock, ψcgt .
Government Consumption
ĉgt = ϑc
g
ĉgt−1 − ζcg ,yŷt−1 − ζcg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψcgt (2.42)
The shock is an AR(1) process where ρcg is the coefficient on the previous period's
value, and εψ
cg
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance σ2ψcg .
Government Consumption Shock
lnψcgt = ρψ
cg lnψcgt−1 + ϵ
ψc
g
t (2.43)
In summation, government expenditure is given as,
Government Expenditure
get = xgt + zt + cgt (2.44)
2.5.5.3 Government Budget
The government's consumption is financed through taxation, and any deficits are
financed by the issue of one-period risk-free bonds. These are repaid at the rate, rt.
The primary surplus is defined as government expenditures less tax revenues.22
Budget Surplus
surpt = taxt − get (2.45)
22We use government surplus rather than deficit due to the format of the data.
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The government budget constraint comprises of primary budget and the government's
borrowing and debt repayments.
Government Budget Constraint
get +
bgt−1(1 + rt−1)
nt
= taxt + bgt (2.46)
2.5.6 An Open Economy
To close the small open economy model, we analyse the market clearing conditions.
We treat foreign demand for the domestic good, yft , as an exogenous, or AR(1)
process, where εy
f
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant variance σ2yf .
Foreign Demand
ln yft = ρy
f ln yft−1 + εy
f
t (2.47)
In closing the model, we require a market clearing equation to solve for terms of
trade.
Market Clearing
yt = v(pht )−σ (ct + xt + c
g
t + xgt ) + vf
(
rert
pht
)σf
yft (2.48)
The economy is defined by a current account which is a function of total home
consumption, investment, and trading in the international financial market.
Current Account
yt = ct + xt + pft bt − (1 + rt−1)pft
bt−1
nt
+ cgt + xgt (2.49)
To close the model, we introduce a debt-elastic interest rate premium as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003). The premium allows deviations from the world interest
rate when bond holdings deviate from their steady state levels. The agents active in
international financial markets face an interest rate, rt, which is a function of the
world interest rate, r∗, and deviations of the country's level of debt away from its
steady state. The world interest rate, r∗, is assumed to be constant.
Interest Rate
rt = r∗ exp(−ϕbhc(bt−b)) (2.50)
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2.6 Bayesian Estimation
In order to solve the model, the constraints and first order conditions are log-linearised
around the steady state. The log-linearised model is estimated using the Bayesian
techniques as described in An and Schorfheide (2007).
2.6.1 Data
We fit the model to quarterly data for Germany. As the number of data series used in
estimation cannot be greater than the number of shocks in the model, we therefore use
nine data series including GDP, private consumption, private investment, household
transfers, government consumption, government investment, total labour hours, net
migration and US GDP for 2004Q1:2019Q3.23 The economic time series have been
collected in national currency and deflated using the corresponding deflator to convert
the values to real terms. We use GDP data from the US to represent foreign output.
The data series has been transformed to per working-age native terms, logged, and
detrended using the Hamilton (2018) filter. Figure 2.5 plots the observables used in
estimation.
2.6.2 Calibration
We fix some parameters in the estimation process to address identification issues.
The values are taken from literature or by matching long run targets in the data. The
discount factor β = 11.01 which equates to an annual real interest rate of approximately
4%. The values for a private capital depreciation rate δ = 0.025 equivalent to 10%
per year and public capital depreciation rate, δg = 0.01 equivalent to 4% a year
as per Elekdag and Muir (2014). The ratio of migrants to natives calibrated to
M
N
= 0.1454, and an openness to trade parameter γ = 0.3.24 The value for the tax
rates for consumption is taken from Gadatsch et al. (2016), corporation tax from
Salgado (2011) and labour tax rates are determined by steady state calculations. For
the international sector, we assume all relative prices and terms of trade to have a
steady state value of 1. Net debt and bond holdings in steady stare are set to zero.
We choose the transition rate ρmn ad hoc to due the lack of consensus or reliable
data as in Stähler (2017).
23Data sources are detailed in table A.1.
24The average percentage of migrants in Germany during the sample is 12.7% (OECD data). If
we change it to MN so
12.7
100−12.7 = 0.1454.
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Fig. 2.5 Data Observables
This figure shows the Hamilton filtered series used in the estimation of this model. The vertical axis
measures the percentage deviations from trend. The horizontal axis measures the quarterly period.
The first eight variables are for Germany, and the final variable is GDP from the United States.
2.6.3 Estimation Results
We estimate nineteen model parameters, nine autoregressive parameters and the
standard deviation of the nine shocks, the results of which are presented in table 2.2.
The table shows the mean for the prior and posteriors, the standard deviation of the
prior, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution (obtained after 2
million iterations). We choose standard priors.
Table 2.2 Priors and Posteriors
Parameter Description Prior Mean 90% HPD interval PDF PstDev
AR(1) Coefficients
Technology ρa 0.7000 0.8932 0.8418 0.9448 β 0.1000
Migration ρm 0.7000 0.7835 0.6926 0.8773 β 0.1000
Foreign Output ρy
f 0.7000 0.6651 0.5015 0.8255 β 0.1000
Consumption Preference ρψ
c 0.7000 0.8647 0.8056 0.9248 β 0.1000
Labour Supply Preference ρψ
h 0.7000 0.8155 0.7337 0.8962 β 0.1000
Private Investment ρψ
x 0.7000 0.9789 0.9670 0.9915 β 0.1000
Continued on next page
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Parameter Description Prior Mean 90% HPD interval PDF PstDev
Government Investment ρx
g 0.7000 0.6359 0.4830 0.7874 β 0.1000
Government Consumption ρψ
gc 0.7000 0.7095 0.5897 0.8254 β 0.1000
Transfers ρψ
z 0.7000 0.6171 0.4312 0.7883 β 0.1000
Model Parameters
Adjustment Costs ac 2.0000 2.9239 2.3012 3.5738 Γ 0.5000
Elasticity of Substitution σ 2.0000 1.6625 1.3427 1.9787 Γ 0.5000
Risk Aversion θ 5.0000 4.6800 3.9842 5.3542 Γ 0.5000
Risk Aversion θm 5.0000 4.9671 4.1685 5.7344 Γ 0.5000
Frisch Elasticity η 5.0000 5.8816 5.2515 6.5395 Γ 0.5000
Frisch Elasticity ηm 1.0000 1.2118 0.4730 1.9152 Γ 0.5000
Bond Holding Constraints ϕbhc 0.1000 0.1076 0.0916 0.1222 β 0.0100
Consumption Habit Formation κc 0.5000 0.5526 0.4367 0.4367 β 0.1000
Labour Hours Habit Formation κh 0.5000 0.4277 0.2954 0.5572 β 0.1000
Openness to Trade γ 0.3000 0.3012 0.2848 0.3164 β 0.0100
Persistence of Transfers ϑz 0.7500 0.6667 0.5080 0.8393 β 0.1000
Debt Feedback on Transfers ζz,b 0.2000 0.2198 0.1384 0.3005 β 0.0500
Output Feedback on Transfers ζz,y 0.2000 0.2033 0.1262 0.2829 β 0.0500
Persistence of Gov Consumption ϑc
g 0.7500 0.5360 0.3753 0.6995 β 0.1000
Debt Feedback on cg ζc
g ,b 0.2000 0.1640 0.1045 0.2220 β 0.0500
Output Feedback on cg ζc
g ,y 0.2000 0.2070 0.1361 0.2786 β 0.0500
Persistence of Gov Investment ϑx
g 0.7500 0.7349 0.5947 0.8838 β 0.1000
Debt Feedback on xg ζx
g ,b 0.2000 0.1644 0.0994 0.2307 β 0.0500
Output Feedback on cg ζx
g ,y 0.2000 0.1930 0.1120 0.2708 β 0.0500
Continued on next page
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Parameter Description Prior Mean 90% HPD interval PDF PstDev
Standard Deviations
Technology σa 1.0000 0.2013 0.1616 0.2374 Γ−1 1.0000
Migration σm 1.0000 0.1748 0.1564 0.1921 Γ−1 1.0000
Foreign Output σyf 1.0000 0.1639 0.1564 0.1736 Γ−1 1.0000
Consumption Preference σψc 1.0000 0.6354 0.4386 0.8254 Γ−1 1.0000
Labour Supply σψh 1.0000 0.2883 0.2430 0.3324 Γ−1 1.0000
Private Investment σψx 0.5000 0.1694 0.1406 0.1965 Γ−1 0.2000
Government Investment σxg 1.0000 0.2375 0.2261 0.2512 Γ−1 0.5000
Government Consumption σcg 0.5000 0.0882 0.0782 0.0975 Γ−1 0.5000
Household Transfers σz 0.5000 0.1998 0.1388 0.2633 Γ−1 0.5000
Results from the Bayesian estimation after 2 million iterations. The first column describes the estimated
parameter and column two shows the corresponding symbol. Column three gives the priors. Columns 4
to 6 show the mean, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posteriors. Column seven shows the distribution
function and the final column shows the deviation of the posterior.
Distribution Functions: β Beta, Γ Gamma, and Γ−1 Inverse Gamma.
The posterior distributions obtained indicate that the majority of estimates are
not prior driven, rather data driven. The main characteristics of the posterior
distributions are shown in columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 2.2. Starting with the
persistence parameters, all of the shocks have a large persistence with private
investment the largest. In terms of the model parameters, given that some of the
estimates are close to the prior means, they may not be well identified by the data.
The habit formation of consumption is more persistent than labour supply. The
persistence parameter of government consumption in the feedback rule is significantly
lower than either of the other rules. However, the standard deviation is much lower
than either transfers or investment. The feedback coefficients on debt for both
government consumption and transfers are close to zero. In contrast, output feedback
for both policy rules is significant. The size of the shocks larger than output are
consumption preference, labour supply, and government investment.
2.7 Results
Using the results from estimation in section 2.6, we present the impulse responses
following a one standard deviation migration shock to the small open economy in
figure 2.6.
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Table 2.1 Calibrated Parameters and Steady State Ratios
Description Parameter Value
Baseline Parameters
Discount Factor β 11.01
Depreciation Rate δ 0.0250
Public Capital Depreciation Rate δg 0.0100
Share of Capital α 0.3300
Elasticity of Public Capital αg 0.0250
Labour Hours hn,hm 0.4226
Migrant to Native Ratio M
N
0.1454
Transition Rate ρmn 0.1250
Share of Natives ϕn 11+M
N
Tax Rates
Consumption τ c 0.1830
Corporate τ f 0.2350
Steady State Ratios
Private Consumption to GDP c
y
0.6800
Private Investment to GDP x
y
0.1300
This table shows the calibrated values of parameters and selected steady state ratios in the model.
We begin our analysis with the macroeconomy where the variables are in per
native terms. The migration shock increases the population and hence the supply of
labour. From the first period of landing, the native population size is effected. Due
to this increase in the native population, per native capital stocks and bond holdings
decrease ceteris paribus. The marginal product of capital increases due to the fall in
capital stocks and increase in output. However, the terms of trade has insignificant
effects. In response to a higher return on capital, there is a significant increase in
investment in private capital.
As a result of the migration shock, there is a direct increase in supply of labour
by the migrant household. This causes a decrease in the wage level they receive.
However, as the majority of their income is from labour services, they continue
with higher labour hours to offset the decrease in total labour income which results
in a smaller response in consumption. The household transfers they receive do
(eventually) increase but contribute only a small amount of their income. Both
the decrease in consumption and increase in labour supply decreases utility of the
household. In contrast, natives experience a higher wage level due to the increase in
output but also have an increase in labour hours. The increase in labour supply is
more than implied by the SVAR presented in figure 2.4.
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Fig. 2.6 Impulse Responses to a Migration Shock
A migration shock to a small open economy following a 1 standard deviation shock to migration.
The horizontal axis identifies the quarter following the migration shock. Vertical axis shows the
deviation from steady state. The solid black line shows the impulse response when the native
household experiences habits in labour and consumption. The dashed black line shows the impulse
responses when the native household does not experience habit persistence κc = κh = 0.
Output increases due to the rise in labour supply from both natives and migrants,
which outweighs the small decrease in public and private capital stocks. This increase
in output is small but still greater than the increase implied by the SVAR. The higher
level of demand is driven by investment more so than consumption or government
expenditures.
Firms see a decrease in their profits due to higher levels of investment and a
higher total labour expenses paid to natives. Whereas for migrants, the increase
in labour hours is outweighed by the fall in wage, but the effect is lessened due to
the larger household size. The wage differential (equation 2.32) is significantly in
favour of natives. This difference is mostly down to the decrease in the wage level of
migrants.
As recently arrived migrants gain native characteristics they transfer to be
classified as native agents. The native household experiences an increase in wages
levels due to the expansionary effect on the economy. Their increased labour income
results in higher consumption initially, though the change is insignificant. The
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insignificant change in consumption and increase in labour hours reduces the utility
for the household, however, the change is insignificant due to the small responses.
There is a different response amongst forms of tax receipts. Lower firm profits
result in lower levels of corporation tax, yet increased aggregate consumption produces
higher consumption tax. Total labour income tax increases due to the natives and
increase in labour supply resulting from migration.
For fiscal expenditures, initially the increase in output outweighs the fall in
government debt so each of the three types of government expenditure decreases
slightly before the decrease in government debt outweighs in the increase in output
which increases each of the three expenditures. The decrease in government debt
stems from the migration shock which passes through to reduce the per native value
of government debt. This is shown by an insignificant change in the surplus as the
change in government spending is approximately equal to the change in tax receipts.
Aside from different parameter specifications, we introduced habit persistence in
both labour supply and consumption for the native households to differ their utility
function from the migrant household beyond parameter specification. The role of
habits is designed to introduce persistence for the largest household. However, when
we set the persistence parameters to zero κc = κh = 0, as identified on figure 2.6 by
the dashed lines, we do not see a significant change in the impulse responses on the
macroeconomy. The utility of the native household is understandable since persistence
prohibits large changes. The most notable change lies with labour supply which
continues in an upward trajectory in the presence of habits. Whereas consumption
decreases slightly sooner without a change in magnitude. Understandably, the
responses are small to begin with, but these results show that the direction of
consumption and labour supply of natives do not change in response to migration.
2.8 Conclusion
The increasing levels of immigration, the contrasting views of natives, and the bearing
it has within society posed a number of questions that related to macroeconomy
in the countries that host migrants, and what immigration means for natives. All
areas of society are, in one way or another, affected by migration. Immigration
affects households in terms of consumption, income, investment, and labour supply.
Firms are affected as an increase in output and labour supply as well as changing
labour costs. In a wider environment, governments are affected in terms of their
expenditure, tax receipts and borrowing requirements.
In this paper, we have presented an empirical model, and a DSGE model to show
the effects of migration from a native perspective. The contribution of our paper to
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the literature of the macroeconomics of migration is the Bayesian estimation of a
model in a small open economy with exogenous migration and an empirical evaluation
of the impacts of migration on specific fiscal variables. The results from both models
show that, on the whole, migration has a positive effect on the macroeconomy.
The SVAR results show that output increases in per capita and per native terms.
The distinction between per capita, per native, and aggregate is important because
immigrant workers could be adding to the economy but less than another native.
The speed of integration of immigrant workers into the native labour force is debated
in the small microeconomic literature, we have used one of the slower, and smoother,
timescales. As migration is exogenous, we do not assess the drivers of immigration,
only the effects of immigration on the macroeconomy. The variables which experience
the greatest impact are variables specific to the migrant household and total labour
supply. This result matches with other literature which suggests that only sectors
where there are migrants and natives competing in the same sector, are they affected.
It is important for an economy to recognise migrants as an equivalent of natives
to fully utilise their skills and contribution to society. We have used German data
for this research but the interpretations are still valid for countries which host an
increasing number migrants.
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Appendix A
A.1 Model Derivations
International Relative Prices
This small open economy model accounts for domestic and foreign prices as fol-
lows. Household consumption and is comprised of domestic and foreign produced
intermediate goods, cht , c
f
t .
ct =
[
v
1
σ (cht )
σ−1
σ + (1− v) 1σ (cft )
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
Where σ is the elasticity of substitution between home produced and imported
intermediate good, and v is the share of home produced goods or equivalently the
home bias. Where the corresponding price index is:
P =
[
vPH
1−σ + (1− v)PF 1−σ
] 1
1−σ
The terms of trade is the ratio of import to export prices expressed in the same
currency.
T = PF
SP ∗H
, SP ∗H = PH
Since we assume that the law of one price holds for individual goods, and all goods,
we can rewrite the terms of trade expression as
T = PF
PH
The only way by which the consumer price based real exchange rate can deviate
from purchasing power parity is by home bias.
43
A.2 Data
The sources of data used in the empirical model and in the estimation of the DSGE
model are described in table A.1. Data that has been sourced which was not
seasonally adjusted, has been seasonally adjusted using X-12-Arima in stata.
German migration data has been sourced from the German Federal Statistics
Office at a monthly frequency which has been totalled to quarterly data and seasonally
adjusted. The age group of migrants under 18, 18-65, and 65+ is available annually.
The percentage of 18-65 year olds for each nationality of immigrants and emigrants
is multiplied by the quarterly values of immigration to obtain working age migration
per quarter.
In approximating the native population size, we use data for the total population
by age and nationality which provides the number of migrants at the end of each
year. The population change for the migrant household is calculated by adding
net migration figures of non-Germans, less naturalisation of citizens. The native
population size is calculated by net migration of working-age Germans plus naturali-
sation of citizens. The size of working age is calculated by the calculating percentage
working-age of Germans and non-Germans of the total Germans and non-Germans
then multiplied by the respective population.
To represent foreign output, we use macroeconomic data from the USA sourced
from the OECD. This is deflated at the corresponding index for the USA. The USA is
chosen since it is the world’s largest economy, one of only three larger than Germany.
A.3 Further Details on Population Changes
Following on from section 2.1 and section 2.3, here we discuss the evolution of
natural population change and migration in Germany, that has resulted in the
concerning demographic changes. Population change consists of natural population
change (births minus deaths) and net migration. Figure A.1 shows the causes for
population change in Germany. The natural population change is negative (apart
from 2016Q3), deaths have continuously exceeded births. The total population change
has only become consistently positive since 2011 which is driven by an increase in
net migration. Notably, the strong upward trend of positive net migration began
before the migration crisis of 2015 where net migration exceeded 1 million annually.
Migration has significantly increased in recent years, caused by immigration of non-
Germans. There are a group of countries which are frequent destinations/origins
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A.3 Further Details on Population Changes
Table A.1 Data Sources
Name Source Measure Code
Migration to/from Germany Destatis 12711-0008
Births in Germany Destatis 12612-0001
Deaths in Germany Destatis 12613-0002
Population by age and nationality Destatis 12411-0006
Wages and Salaries (national concept) Destatis Euros per month 81000-0008
Hours worked by employee Destatis 81000-0016
Government National Accounts Destatis Euros (1000) 81000-0032
Crude Rate of Net Migration Eurostat Per 1000 habitants tsdde230
GDP OECD CARSA, DNBSA B1-GE
Private Consumption OECD CARSA, DNBSA P31S14-S1
Government Consumption OECD CARSA, DNBSA P3S13
Gross Fixed Capital Formation OECD CARSA, DNBSA P51
Private Non-Residential Investment OECD CARSA, DNBSA
Public Investment OECD CARSA, DNBSA
United States GDP OECD CARSA, DNBSA B1-GE
Public Sector Debt OECD CARNSA
The data sources used in calibration, estimation, and VAR. CARSA -National currency, current
prices, annual levels, seasonally adjusted DNBSA - Deflator, national base year, seasonally adjusted.
Fig. A.1 Population Change in Germany
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) - Federal Statistics Office Germany.
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for migrants. Austria, Switzerland, France, Poland, Greece, Italy, and the United
Kingdom have persistently high migration figures in the thousands.
A.4 Model Equations
There are 45 variables plus the utility of each household. In these sections we present
the level equations, the log-linearised equations and steady state calculations. Time
dependent log-linearised variables are shown with a hat, e.g. ĉNt and the steady state
variables are shown as cN .
Level Equations
Native Households
Marginal Utility of Consumption
ψct (cnt − κcnt−1)−θ = µt (A.4.1)
Labour Supply
ϕ0ψ
h
t ψt(hnt )η = µtwnt (A.4.2)
Native Household Euler Equation
µtp
f
t = βEtpft+1µt+1
(1 + rt)
nt+1
(A.4.3)
Consumption Preference Shock
lnψct = ρψ
c lnψct−1 + ε
ψc
t (A.4.4)
Labour Supply Shock
lnψht = ρψ
h lnψht−1 + ε
ψh
t (A.4.5)
Migrant Households
Budget Constraint
cmt = wmt hmt (1− τw) + zmt (A.4.6)
Labour Supply
ϕ0(hmt )η = wmt (cmt )−θ (A.4.7)
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A.4 Model Equations
Population Dynamics
Growth Rate Migrants
Mt+1
Mt
= ln(mt) = ρm ln(mt−1) + εmt (A.4.8)
Rates of Change
mt
nt
= mnt+1
mnt
(A.4.9)
Population Growth Rate
nt = ρmn
1
mt−j + ρmn
2
mt−(j+1) + ρmn
3
mt−(j+2)... (A.4.10)
Aggregation
Total Household Consumption
ct = (cnt )ϕh(mntcmt )(1−ϕh) (A.4.11)
Native Income Tax
taxnt = τwwnt hnt (A.4.12)
Migrant Income Tax
taxmt = τwwmt hmt (A.4.13)
Total Income Tax
taxwt = (taxnt )ϕh(mnttaxmt )(1−ϕh) (A.4.14)
Household Transfers Aggregation
zt = (znt )ϕn(mntzmt )1−ϕn (A.4.15)
Firms
Production Function
yt = atkαt−1l
(1−α)
t (kgt )α
g (A.4.16)
Technological Process
ln at = ρa ln at−1 + εat (A.4.17)
Effective Labour
lt = (hnt )ϕh(mnthmt )(1−ϕh) (A.4.18)
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Capital Accumulation
kt = (1− δ)kt−1Nt−1
Nt
+ s
(
xtnt
kt−1
)
kt−1
nt
ψxt (A.4.19)
Firm Investment Shock
lnψxt = ρψ
x lnψxt + ε
ψx
t (A.4.20)
Native Wage
wnt = (1− α)ϕh
ytp
h
t
hnt
(A.4.21)
Migrant Wage
wmt = (1− α)(1− ϕh)
ytp
h
t
hmt mnt
(A.4.22)
Marginal Product of Capital
ρkt = α
ytp
h
t
kt−1
(A.4.23)
Tobin’s Q
qt =
s′(xtnt
kt−1
)
ψxt
nt
−1 (A.4.24)
Firm Euler Equation
qt = β
µt+1
µt
[
α
yt+1
kt
+ (1− δ) qt+1
nt+1
]
(A.4.25)
Wage Differential
w∆t =
wnt
wmt
(A.4.26)
Firm Profit
Πt = pht yt − wnt hnt − wmt hmt mnt − xt (A.4.27)
An Open Economy
Foreign Output
ln yft = ρy
f ln yft−1 + εy
f
t (A.4.28)
Current Account
yt = ct + xt + pft bt −
1
β
pft bt−1 + cgt + xgt (A.4.29)
48
A.4 Model Equations
Market Clearing
yt = v(pht )−σ (ct + xt + c
g
t + xgt ) + vf
(
rert
pht
)σf
yft (A.4.30)
Bonds
rt = r∗ exp
(
−ϕbhc
(
p
f
t
bt
yt
−b
))
(A.4.31)
Fiscal Policy
Government Capital Accumulation
kgt = (1− δg)
kgt−1
nt
+ xgt (A.4.32)
Government Investment
x̂gt = ϑx
g
x̂gt−1 − ζxg ,yŷt−1 − ζxg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψxgt (A.4.33)
Government Investment Shock
lnψxgt = ρψ
xg lnψxgt−1 + ϵ
ψx
g
t (A.4.34)
Household Transfers
ẑt = ϑz ẑt−1 − ζz,yŷt−1 − ζz,bg b̂gt−1 + ψzgt (A.4.35)
Household Transfers Shock
lnψzt = ρψ
z lnψzt−1 + ϵ
ψz
t (A.4.36)
Native Household Transfers
zt = (znt )(mnt)
1−ϕn
ϕn (A.4.37)
Government Consumption
ĉgt = ϑc
g
ĉgt−1 − ζcg ,yŷt−1 − ζcg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψcgt (A.4.38)
Government Consumption Shock
lnψcgt = ρψ
cg lnψcgt−1 + ϵ
ψc
g
t (A.4.39)
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Consumption Tax
taxct = τ cct (A.4.40)
Corporation Tax
taxft = τ f (yt − wnt hnt − wmt hmt mnt − xt) (A.4.41)
Government Revenue
taxt = taxwt + taxct + tax
f
t (A.4.42)
Government Budget Constraint
get +
bgt−1rt
nt
= taxt + bgt (A.4.43)
Government Expenditure
get = xgt + zt + cgt (A.4.44)
Primary Budget Surplus
surp = taxt − get (A.4.45)
Household Utility
Native Households Utility
UNt = ψct
(cnt −Hct )1−θ
|1− θ| − ψ
h
t
ϕ0(hnt −Hht )1+η
1 + η (A.4.46)
Migrant Households Utility
UMt =
(cmt )1−θ
m
|1− θm| −
ϕm(hmt )1+η
m
1 + ηm (A.4.47)
A.5 Log Linearised Equations
Native Households
Marginal Utility of Consumption
−θ
1− κ
(
ĉnt − ĉnt−1
)
= µ̂t − ψ̂ct (A.5.1)
Labour Supply
η
(
ĥnt − κhĥnt−1
)
+ ψ̂ht = ŵnt + µ̂t (A.5.2)
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A.5 Log Linearised Equations
Native Household Euler Equation
µ̂t − µ̂t+1 + (1− γ)(T̂t − T̂t+1) + n̂t = r̂t (A.5.3)
Consumption Preference Shock
ψ̂ct = ρψ
c
ψ̂ct−1 + εψ
c
t (A.5.4)
Labour Supply Shock
ψ̂ht = ρψ
h
ψ̂ht−1 + εψ
h
t (A.5.5)
Migrant Household
Labour Supply
ηmĥmt = ŵmt − θmĉmt (A.5.6)
Migrant Budget Constraint
cmĉmt = (1− τw)hmwm
(
ĥmt + ŵmt
)
+ zmẑmt (A.5.7)
Population Dynamics
Migration Shock
m̂t = ρmm̂t−1 + εmt (A.5.8)
Rates of Change
m̂t − 1m
n
n̂t = m̂nt − m̂nt−1 (A.5.9)
Population Growth Rate
n̂t =
m
n
(ρmn0m̂t+ρmn
1
m̂t−1+ρmn
2
m̂t−2+ρmn
3
m̂t−3+ρmn
4
m̂t−4+ρmn
5
m̂t−5+ρmn
6
m̂t−6+ρmn
7
m̂t−7
(A.5.10)
Aggregation
Consumption
ĉt = ϕhĉnt + (1− ϕh)(ĉmt + m̂nt) (A.5.11)
Native Income Tax ̂taxnt = ŵnt + ŵnt (A.5.12)
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Migrant Income Tax
t̂axmt = ŵmt + ĥmt (A.5.13)
Income Tax
t̂axwt = ϕh ̂taxnt + (1− ϕh)(t̂axmt + m̂nt) (A.5.14)
Aggregate Household Transfers
ẑt = ϕnẑnt + (1− ϕn)
(
ẑmt m̂nt
)
(A.5.15)
Firms
Output
ŷt = ât + αk̂t−1 + (1− α)l̂t + αgk̂gt (A.5.16)
Technology Shock
ât = ρaât−1 + εat (A.5.17)
Effective Hours
l̂t = ϕhĥnt + (1− ϕh)(ĥmt + m̂nt) (A.5.18)
Capital Accumulation
k̂t = (1− δ)(k̂t−1 − n̂t) + δ(x̂t + ψ̂xt ) (A.5.19)
Investment Shock
ψ̂xt = ρψ
x
ψ̂xt−1 + εψ
x
t (A.5.20)
Native Wage
ŵnt = ŷt − ĥnt − γT̂t (A.5.21)
Migrant Wage
ŵmt = ŷt − ĥmt − m̂nt − γT̂t (A.5.22)
Marginal Product of Capital
ρ̂Kt = ŷt − k̂t−1 − γT̂t (A.5.23)
Tobin’s Q
q̂t + ψ̂xt = δ(ac)
(
x̂t + n̂t − k̂t−1
)
(A.5.24)
Firm Euler Equation
µ̂t − µ̂t+1 + q̂t = βαy
k
ρ̂Kt+1 + β(1− δ)(q̂t+1 − n̂t+1) (A.5.25)
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Wage Differential
ŵ∆t = ŵnt − ŵmt (A.5.26)
Firm Profit
Π̂t = ŷt − wmhm
(
ŵmt + ĥmt + m̂nt
)
− wnhn
(
ŵnt + ĥnt
)
− xx̂t (A.5.27)
Open Economy
Current Account
ŷt =
c
y
ĉt +
x
y
x̂t +
cg
y
ĉgt +
xg
y
x̂gt + b̂t −
1
β
b̂t−1 + (1− (1− γ))T̂t (A.5.28)
Market Clearing
ŷt = (1− γ)
(
c
y
ĉt +
x
y
x̂t +
cg
y
ĉgt +
xg
y
x̂gt
)
+ γσ(1− γ)T̂t + γŷft (A.5.29)
Foreign Output
ŷft = ρy
f
ŷft−1 + εyf (A.5.30)
Interest Rate
r̂t = −bhcb̂t (A.5.31)
Fiscal Policy
Public Capital Accumulation
k̂gt = δg
(
k̂t−1 − n̂t
)
+ δgx̂gt (A.5.32)
Government Investment
x̂gt = ϑx
g
x̂gt−1 − ζxg ,yŷt−1 − ζxg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψxgt (A.5.33)
Government Investment Shock
ψ̂x
g
t = ρψ
xg
ψ̂x
g
t + εψ
z
t + εx
g
t (A.5.34)
Household Transfers
ẑt = ϑz ẑt−1 − ζz,yŷt−1 − ζz,bg b̂gt−1 + ψzt (A.5.35)
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Native Household Transfers
ẑt = ẑnt +
1− ϕn
ϕn
m̂nt (A.5.36)
Transfers Shock
ψ̂zt = ρψ
z
ψ̂zt + εψ
z
t (A.5.37)
Government Consumption
ĉgt = ϑc
g
ĉgt−1 − ζcg ,yŷt−1 − ζcg ,bg b̂gt−1 + ψcgt (A.5.38)
Government Consumption Shock
ĉgt = ρc
g
ĉgt−1 + εc
g
t (A.5.39)
Consumption Tax
t̂axct = ĉt (A.5.40)
Corporation Tax ̂
taxft = Π̂t (A.5.41)
Government Revenue
taxt̂axt = taxw t̂axwt + taxct̂axct + y
̂
taxft (A.5.42)
Government Budget Constraint
ŝurpt =
1
β
(
b̂gt−1 + r̂t − n̂t
)
− b̂gt (A.5.43)
Government Expenditure
geĝet = xgx̂gt + cg ĉgt + zẑt (A.5.44)
Primary Budget Surplus
ŝurpt =
tax
y
t̂axt − ge
y
ĝet (A.5.45)
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A.6 Steady State
Household Utility
Native Households Utility
Ûnt U
n = ψ̂ct
(cn − κccn)1−θ
|1− θ| +
(
ĉnt − κcĉnt−1
)
(cn − κccn)1−θ
− ψ̂ht
(hn − κhhn)1+η
1 + η − ϕ0
(
ĥnt − κhĥnt−1
)
(hn − κhhn)1+η (A.5.46)
Migrant Households Utility
Ûmt U
m = ĉmt
(cm)1−θm
|1− θm| − ĥ
m
t ϕm
(hm)1+ηm
1 + ηm (A.5.47)
A.6 Steady State
l = 0.33 (A.6.1)
mpk = (1− β)
β
+ δ (A.6.2)
mpkg = (1− β)
β
+ δg (A.6.3)
By numerical solver for k and kg
αg(kα)(l1−α)(kg)αg−1 = mpkg (A.6.4)
α
(
l
k
)1−α
(kg)αg = mpk (A.6.5)
y = kαl(1−α)(kg)αg (A.6.6)
x = δk (A.6.7)
xg = δgkg (A.6.8)
ge
y
= 1− c
y
− x
y
(A.6.9)
ge = ge
y
y (A.6.10)
cg = y − c
y
y − x− xg (A.6.11)
z = ge− xg − cg (A.6.12)
zm = z (A.6.13)
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zn = z
mn
1−ϕn
ϕn
(A.6.14)
n = l
mn1−ϕn
(A.6.15)
hn = n (A.6.16)
hm = n (A.6.17)
wn = (1− α)ϕn y
hn
(A.6.18)
wm = (1− α)(1− ϕn) y
hm
(A.6.19)
cm
y
= hmw
m
y
+ z
y
(A.6.20)
cn
y
= c
y
− c
m
y
(A.6.21)
c = c
y
y (A.6.22)
cn = c
n
y
y (A.6.23)
cm = c
m
y
y (A.6.24)
Πf = 0 (A.6.25)
tax = ge (A.6.26)
taxc = τ c(cn)ϕn(cm)1−ϕn (A.6.27)
τw = tax− tax
c
hnwn + wmhm (A.6.28)
taxw = (τwhnwn) + (τwwmhm) (A.6.29)
tax = taxc + taxf + taxw (A.6.30)
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Chapter 3
The Migrants’ Plight: A Skill-Job
Mismatch
Brain Waste in Canada
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, immigration has risen significantly in traditional immigrant host
countries which has caused increased opposition leading to some governments to
openly oppose (increased) immigration. An example of this is when countries voted
against the Global Compact on Migration, including the United States, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel in December 2018.1 A few countries have
remained positive to increasing economic immigration, particularly those able to
focus immigration on high-skilled and young workers through visa requirements.
This focus is because of their human capital and the resulting demographic changes.
Migrants on average are younger and higher skilled than natives, and they are most
likely to be net fiscal contributors.2
Countries that can use tailored migration programmes typically have two types
that are directly related to the labour market. Firstly, a high-skilled immigration
programme which is a way for a country to increase its human capital. This would
allow a country to aid development of high-skilled industries, which relates to long-
1Twelve countries abstained: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland.
2The majority of immigrant host countries have ageing populations, an increase in immigration
shifts the balance somewhat away from the older generation who are retiring, receive a pension,
and have increasing health costs to a younger generation who work, a number send remittances,
and receive fewer fiscal benefits due to their migrant status. Oxford Economics (2018) show that
EEA migrants, who are on average more highly skilled, contribute £2,300 more than the average
UK citizen. Similar results in Lisenkova and Sanchez-Martinez (2016).
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term migration. In the case of specific industry shortages, fast-track visas are
occasionally available with federal programmes sometimes promoting these industries.
Secondly, low-skill immigration programmes are predominantly used to ease labour
market shortages and more likely to be temporary migrants. The gaps in the labour
markets filled by these migrants helps to stimulate economic growth. However, (high-
skilled) migrants are not always able to reach their full potential, a phenomenon
known as brain waste. While brain waste is more akin to high-skill migrants, those
with low-skill qualifications can experience it too, at a somewhat lesser extent.
The problem of brain waste occurs when (high-skilled) immigrants experience
relatively higher rates of involuntarily unemployment, increased labour market
frictions, or underemployment. Migrants are underemployed when they are working
in jobs for which they are overqualified, receive lower wages (and associated benefits
of employment e.g. bonuses) than natives, or part-time employment when full-time
is desired. Underemployment in the form of a skill-job mismatch can be caused
by a failure to recognise the qualifications gained outside the host nation. In some
immigration systems, having a job is not a prerequisite to acquire a working visa.3
The migration of workers causes brain drain in the sending country, which if utilised,
results in brain gain for the host economy, and in absence of full utilisation creates
brain waste.
To understand the macroeconomic effects of brain waste and migration we
construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We compliment
the analysis with a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) to examine the effect of
a migration shock on the macroeconomy. These models are tested on Canadian data;
a country which has recognised the prominence at a microeconomic level.4 Canada
has used immigration systems to target both high-skill and low-skill migration, as
well as visa systems that is not necessarily conditional on having employment.5
6 Canada has one of the highest proportions of foreign-born residents at 22% in
2019, compared to the United States that has a relative size of 15.1%, or the United
Kingdom with 12.1%. In terms of foreign-born workers, this was 26.6% in 2016 which
3For example, Canada with Express Entry with two subcategories Canadian Experience Class
and Federal Skilled Worker programme. There are common labour markets, such as Single European
Labour Market which require no visa for those citizens in the participating countries. In contrast to
countries such as the United States where work visas are based on a specific offer of employment.
4The prominence of brain waste of medical graduates is discussed in Lofters et al. (2014) and a
study of skilled immigrant men in terms of mismatch and wage progression in Banerjee et al. (2019)
5Canada has employed a series of economic immigration programmes during the 21st century,
including Temporary Foreign Worker (TFW), Express Entry, Federal Skilled Worker Programme,
and Federal Trades Worker Programme.
6See Clarke and Skuterud (2013), Green and Worswick (2012), and Gross and Schmitt (2012).
Additional relevant research is discussed elsewhere in this paper.
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is most comparable to countries such as Australia and New Zealand with ranges
between 25 - 29%.7
In this research, we define brain waste as the underemployment of migrants which
includes higher levels of involuntary unemployment, higher search and matching
frictions, lower wage relative to natives, and skill-job mismatches within the labour
market. These situations are repeated in the majority of migrant host countries.
Microeconomic data identifies that on average, migrants are more highly qualified
compared to natives. However, migrants experience a higher unemployment rate at
each skill level, and participation rates of migrants are frequently lower.8 Due to a
lower rate of matches, migrants are evidenced as taking up employment for which
they are overqualified - a form of skill-downgrading. These difficulties extend to the
situation where a migrant is employed at the corresponding skill-level but are paid
less than their native equivalent.
We analyse the consequences of brain waste in a DSGE model for a small open
economy with asymmetric search and matching frictions. The model features three
households: a high-skilled native, low-skilled native, and a migrant household; final
good producing firms, and a fiscal authority. The model is calibrated and estimated
using data from Canada. We analyse the effects of brain waste using the calibrated
and estimated model, to reflect the differing labour market conditions between
natives and migrants. Then compare the results with a situation where brain waste
is absent. The model is subject to a migration shock, a representation of a relaxation
of immigration constraints for economic migrants. The different calibrations allow
analysis of the effects to an economy when migrants do not have the same recognition
as natives. In addition, we empirically analyse the effect of a migration shock on
several macroeconomic variables with a SVAR. The results from the DSGE model
indicate that there is a small loss to the economy due to brain waste. In absence of
brain waste, the macroeconomy would benefit in terms of output, consumption, and
investment. Migrants would receive higher wages and hence be able to increase their
consumption levels. There is a potential gain of 2.4% to output, 4.5% to private
consumption, and 2.1% gain of total employment. The results from the SVAR are
mostly small, for some insignificant, but positive for the economy in per capita values.
The remainder of this paper is as follows, in section 3.2, we discuss the relevant
literature. Section 3.3 examines migration and the associated problems of brain
waste in Canada. We present the empirical model and its results in section 3.4. The
7The difference between the residents and workers figures is due to residents including locally
born children whereas workers only includes 15 years or older.
8Unemployment and participation rate are discussed in calibration, and data is presented in
table B.2.
59
The Migrants’ Plight: A Skill-Job Mismatch
theoretical model is set out in section 3.5, with the calibration and estimation results
are presented in section 3.6. The results of the model are analysed in section 3.7.
Finally, we offer a conclusion in section 3.8.
3.2 Existing Migration Literature
Research in the macroeconomics of migration, particularly general equilibrium busi-
ness cycle effects, is limited. Exceptions include Mandelman and Zlate (2012), which
uses a two-country model to analyse international risk sharing via remittances, and
Smith and Thoenissen (2019) who analyse the role of migrants’ level of human capital
relative to natives following an exogenous migration shock to a small open economy.
A number of recent macroeconomic migration papers have incorporated search and
matching frictions, including Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013), Chassamboulli and
Peri (2015), and Kiguchi and Mountford (2017). The analysis of brain waste is
mostly microeconomic. In terms of the macroeconomics, brain drain is discussed
in Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Docquier and Iftikhar (2019), and
skill-downgrading is discussed in Muysken et al. (2015), with the focus is on medium
and low-skill migration in a static general equilibrium framework.
Dungan et al. (2013) empirically examine the macroeconomic effects of migration
in Canada, simulating a 100,000 increase in migrants.9 10 As a percentage, total
annual net migration would reflect a 1% increase in the population. The results
focus on GDP per capita, unemployment, investment, productivity; and government
finances. The results are mostly positive, however, two cases are examined. The
realistic case where migrants are paid less than natives, and an ideal scenario in
which migrants are equivalent to natives. There is an increase in real GDP, but GDP
per capita initially increases then falls in the baseline scenario. Unemployment is not
affected. Investment and productivity increase. Government spending increases but
less than the increase in tax receipts. Under a scenario where migrants are much
more quickly integrated into the labour market, the results are more positive, and
GDP per capita does not fall.
Fougère et al. (2011) examine how an increase in high-skilled workers would
benefit workers in an applied general equilibrium model applied to Canada. The
results show that highly skilled, and productive workers, increases human capital
and economic productivity. The effects on real GDP and real GDP per capita are
9The authors use FOCUS (Forecasting and User Simulation). FOCUS is a model of the Canadian
macroeconomy developed and maintained at the Policy and Economic Program within the Rotman
School of Management at the University of Toronto.
10At 2013 levels, an increase of 100,000 immigrants would equate to 350,000 migrants per annum.
60
3.2 Existing Migration Literature
different mostly due to young high-skilled migrants having a lower participation rate
and savings rate as they spend time acquiring skills in tertiary education relative to
lower-skilled workers which has a negative effect on labour hours and capital stocks.
Ileri (2019) uses an overlapping generations model calibrated to Canada in 1981
to analyse the impacts of the selective migration policies on natives. The model uses
endogenous education choice. The quantitative results show that skilled immigration
is positive for the welfare in the economy. However, this result varies amongst the
demographic groups. Lower rates of skilled migration reduces the welfare of the
native born population. The white native-born university graduates benefit in terms
of higher wages. This is not the case for non-graduates who experience deterioration
in wages.
Tu, Jiong (2010) looks at the effects of the native born labour market, where no
significant negative effects are found particularly on the native wage growth rate
during the large increase in immigration during the 1990s.
Eckstein and Weiss (1998) analyse the wage growth of immigrants in Israel using
human capital theory. The authors find that immigrants do not gain from the skills
which they import. Rather, the value of skills increases the longer they stay. The
occupational distribution of immigrants does converge to natives but not for wages.
A higher return in wages to education occurs for high-skilled migrants but not as
great natives.
Liu et al. (2017) examine the effects of skill heterogeneity and transfer of human
capital in a dynamic search and matching model. The results show that both skilled
and unskilled natives and migrants gain in terms of income and employment, and
when migrants’ human capital is utilised fully there is a further benefit to immigrants
and natives. Borjas (1999) shows that natives gain when the productive endowments
of immigrants differs from that of natives. However, the benefits for natives are not
uniform across skill levels since the workers that are substitutable with migrants
lose, while the natives who are complements of the productivity of migrants gain.
In our model, we present migrant workers who are imperfect substitutes to natives.
Dustmann et al. (2008) show that the skill downgraded high-skilled migrants have
higher productivity than low-skilled native workers, but the wage level is driven by
native productivity.
To summarise, there is a lack of research in the (dynamic) macroeconomics of
brain waste and there are a number of aspects that require a fair representation of
brain waste in a model. Brain waste consists of lower wages, imperfect substitution of
workers, higher labour market frictions, increased (involuntary) unemployment and
lower participation rates relative to natives. The participation and unemployment
rates differ between migrant source country too.
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3.3 Migration in Canada
Canada has been described as a nation of immigrants and views migration as a part
of its national identity. Canada has one of the highest numbers of net migration
flows and stock of migrants in the world. Figure 3.1 plots annual migration figures
for Canada from 1952 to 2019. It shows how recent immigration trends have seen
net migration surpass the previous highs from 1992, 1993, and 1957. Net migration
closely follows immigration, especially from 1980 to 2010.
Fig. 3.1 Annual Migration in Canada 1952-2019
The graph plots immigration (dotted...), emigration (dashed-dot -.-) and net migration (solid -)
100,000s (105) of people. This is raw data 1952-2018. Net migration tracks the path of immigration
as emigration appears relatively constant, particularly from 1980 onwards.
Source: Statistics Canada
Canada has one of the highest proportions of foreign born workers, 26.6% in 2016.
The relative shortage of labour caused Canada to relax its immigration policy, and
in 2017 committed to spending CA$440 million (£250 million) from 2017-2019 to
increasing immigration over three years from 310,000 in 2018 to 340,000 in 2020;
equivalent to 0.84% and 0.90% of the projected population respectively.11 This
programme has since been extended into 2020 and 2021. Immigration is predicted
to be the only source of population growth by 2030. In 2017-2018, 80% of the
11Population predictions source UN: 2018: 37.0 million ; 2020: 37.6 million.
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population growth in Canada was due to international migration (Hussen, 2018).
Previous programmes in the 1990s and 2000s shifted the migration focus towards
skilled migrants which is strongly related to long-term migration (Hou and Picot,
2016).
The main countries of origin for immigrants are the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and the United States, however, the share of immigration figures has
considerably diminished since the beginning of the figures, approximately 60% to 8%,
as immigration from predominantly Asian countries has increased. This is partly due
to the immigration policy imposed by the government which until the early 1960s
used a country preference system. In 1962 Canada changed to a skills-based system
and by 1967 introduced a points based system to target immigrants with “desirable
skills” (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007).
There is a consensus in the literature that immigrants experience problems
integrating into the labour market. One aspect of this is labour earnings, for which
theirs persistently lags behind those of natives even with similar skill levels.12 Most
problematic though, is that the ability to integrate into the labour market and into
wider society is ever increasing. The most recent immigrants face the prospect of
never expecting to match earnings of the equivalent native worker. Further, those
most likely to be negatively affected is the workers that they are directly competing
with for employment in terms of wage and employment status. In the case of
migration, this is most frequently the existing immigrant worker who is a substitute.
One reason, as suggested in Clarke and Skuterud (2013), as to why immigrants are
worse off in countries such as Canada, compared to Australia, is the lack of focus
on English proficiency in the selection system.13 A language barrier is a significant
obstacle to overcome, even if the immigrant is highly skilled.
In Quebec, there exists a rule domaines de formation privilégié, where full points
for education are only attributed for degrees obtained in Quebec or equivalent to
Quebec degrees.14 A significant barrier for some migrants to overcome. There is a
drive to increase the number of university students in Canada so that their skills
should be directly comparable to natives. One of the most studied professions for
12See Aydemir and Skuterud (2008), Green and Worswick (2012), Fortin et al. (2016), Kaushal
et al. (2016) and Green and Worswick (2017).
13English and French are the official languages of Canada, however, English is the most widely
spoken. On the Express Entry visa application there is only a weak bias towards English language
skills - exceptions apply for Quebec which is the only province to have French as its official language
(New Brunswick has English and French). However, the majority of Canada has English as its first
language. The census data in 2011 showed that English was the first language for approximately
58% of the Canadian population and French for nearly 22% which equated to 19.1 million and 7.2
million people respectively.
14Countries that are considered to be equivalent are The United States , Northern and Western
Europe countries, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Israel.
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effects of brain waste is that of medical practitioners. Lofters et al. (2014) examine
the case of brain waste for medical graduates from low-income and middle-income
countries who were seeking a medical residency in Ontario, Canada. The results
show that not only does brain waste have economic consequences but psychological
too; some of those surveyed expressed feelings of “anger, shame, desperation, and
regret”. On a more general high-skill level, Banerjee et al. (2019), examine the wages
of native-born and immigrant men over a six year period. The results show that
a complete mismatch results in smaller initial wages, especially for racial minority
immigrants, and that the wage gap does not completely close over the period.
The 2002 expansion of Canada’s temporary foreign worker programme (TFW) to
include low-skilled workers, which aimed to provide a short-term solution to labour
shortages through immigration, in order to support the economic boom in particular
provinces. However, the ease at which employers were able to hire this cheap labour
had detrimental effects on the low-skilled labour market in certain areas of Canada.
An increased cost to employers may have reduced the increase in immigrants and
lessen the negative labour market effects (Gross and Schmitt, 2012). The relaxation
of constraints led to a large increase in the TFW scheme, 101,000 immigrants in 1993
to 165,200 in 2007 (Clarke and Skuterud, 2013). By 2008, the number of foreign
workers exceeded the permanent migrants. The temporary nature exacerbated the
share of migrants being employed in low-skill employment (Finotelli, 2013). Such
is the problem of immigrants’ qualifications not being recognised, the Canadian
government established the Foreign Credentials Referral Office in order to help these
workers have their skills recognised. In addition, 2017 and 2018 saw an increase in
the number of highly skilled American workers migrating to Canada. In particular,
those who specialise in technology as Vancouver tries to create an alternative to
Silicon Valley.
The ambiguity of response to migration in some variables particularly towards
natives, absence of macroeconomic research for brain waste, limited research in
migration using a small open economy model, minimal use of net international
migration data in macroeconomic research, and the stylised facts presented in
sections 3.1 and 3.3 forms the motivation for our paper.
3.4 Empirical Model
We begin our analysis of migration to a small open economy with a SVAR. The focus
of the model is to analyse the response of macroeconomic variables to an increase in
migration. As part of the analysis, we decide whether migration as an exogenous
AR(1) process is a valid assumption.
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The existing empirical macroeconomic literature is limited. The most notable
being Furlanetto and Robstad (2019), who use a Bayesian VAR to analyse the
macroeconomic impacts of migration in Norway. Additionally, papers featuring
DSGE models and SVAR include Kiguchi and Mountford (2017) using data from
the United States , and Smith and Thoenissen (2019) using data from New Zealand.
The unrestricted VAR presented uses the same observables, and additional labour
market variables. As per Lütkepohl (2005), the VAR is specified as follows:
(yt − ν) = Ψ(yt−1 − ν) + ϵt (3.4.1)
where yt is vector of endogenous variables, ν is the vector of expected values for the
endogenous variables of yt. The k x k matrix of coefficients is given by Ψ, and ϵt is a
vector of N element white noise error terms with ϵt ∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ is an k x k
variance-covariance matrix.
In the DSGE model we present a change to net migration as an exogenous AR(1)
process, the empirical analysis of net migration flows confirms its exogeneity. The
lag-length specification is dependent upon the criteria. While AIC identifies two lags,
HQIC and SBIC identify one lag. The white noise processes are well behaved with
one lag, we proceed the analysis with a VAR(1). We orthogonalise the shocks using
Cholesky decomposition. In order, the vector yt consists of net migration, unemploy-
ment rate, labour hours, government investment and consumption, government debt,
private investment and consumption, wages, and GDP.
3.4.1 Data Description
The focus of the SVAR is to analyse the effect of a net migration shock on the macroe-
conomy. We use variables from the national accounts: GDP, private consumption,
public consumption, private gross fixed capital formation (investment), government
gross fixed capital formation (fiscal investment), general government net financial
liabilities which are collected at a quarterly frequency, converted to real per capita
values using the working-age population (15 years and older) and corresponding
deflator. Further, wages are taken from Statistics Canada table 36-10-0114-01 (com-
pensation of employees) at a seasonally adjusted quarterly frequency, and converted
to real terms.15 Net migration is seasonally adjusted and converted to per capita
terms. Hours worked by employee, and the total unemployment rate are also included.
United States GDP which is used as an observable in the estimation of the DSGE
model is dropped from the dataset as it is exogenous to the small open economy. We
15Data sources and more detailed description is available in section B.1 of the appendix.
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take the natural logarithm of trending series and then apply the Hamilton (2018)
filter to compute the trends and cyclical components of the data series. Due to time
series limitations, the duration of the time series is 1980Q1:2019Q1 inclusive.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse response of the nine variables to a one standard
deviation of 0.1870 shock to migration. The migration shock has a small effect on
most of the variables, however, they are positive for the economy.
There is a short and statistically significant increase in Canadian GDP. This in-
crease causes positive effects on the economy elsewhere. An increase in output results
in an increase in wages for workers. This has the effect of increasing consumption
for the workers (private consumption). The initial response of consumption is of
approximately the same magnitude. However, private consumption does not increase
any further while GDP continues to increase.
The real wage rises due to an increase in productivity and labour hours. The
persistent increase in wage is longer than the increase in labour hours as the peak of
the wage response is seven periods whereas for labour hours it is only four implying
the lack of a wealth effect.
Aside from the shock to migration, the response of unemployment is of the largest
magnitude. There is a fall in unemployment, a positive effect to the economy, that
is of a relatively large size. Following the shock, the response is a continued fall in
employment just as GDP continue to increase for three to four periods after the
shock has occurred.
As the data is presented in per capita terms, the expansion of the economy is not
only due to an increase in population but a per capita expansion.
The inflow of migrant workers and increase in economy results in a relatively
large increase in private investment. An expansion of the economy will result in
an increase in private investment as there are higher returns on capital due to the
increased demand.
The responses of government consumption and investment are statistically in-
significant on impact. However, government spending is often countercyclical which
would partially explain a decrease. The Canadian government has persisted with a
number of policies over the period of examination. The analysis of fiscal rules used
by governments by Guerguil et al. (2017), indicate that Canada used the balanced
budget rule (targets the budget balance often as a percent of GDP), debt rule (targets
the level of borrowing), and expenditure rule (targets the level or growth rate of
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public spending).16 Given that the response to the government’s net liabilities is
negative, one explanation is that the extra revenues from the taxes paid by migrants,
as well as the reduction in government spending and investment is used to pay off
liabilities.
Fig. 3.2 SVAR(1) Impulse Responses
An increase in per capita net migration in Canada. Data series are detrended using the Hamilton
(2018) filter. The migration shock in the VAR(1) is identified by Cholesky decomposition where net
migration is ordered first. The shaded areas are the 68% confidence intervals.
First we compare the results to those in Smith and Thoenissen (2019). We find
the responses of total migration to Canada to be of a similar size to migration to
New Zealand, however the responses for Canada are more statistically significant.
The response of private consumption has a size of +0.001 compared to that of +0.003
for New Zealand. The size of the responses for private investment are of the same
magnitude but not as long lasting in Canada. Real wages experience a small increase
in Canada, however the response for real wages in New Zealand is insignificant. In
comparison to the response for the United States in Kiguchi and Mountford (2017),
the responses are much larger than for Canada. There is a decrease in unemployment,
an increase in working hours, investment, consumption and GDP in Canada and
16The description in parentheses is the short description as defined by (Guerguil et al., 2017,
p. 192).
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the United States. However, the increase in real wages is statistically significant for
Canada but not the United States.
3.5 Brain Waste in a Small Open Economy
We employ a DSGE model to analyse the effects of brain waste and migration in
a small open economy. The stochastic growth model features heterogenous agents
in native and migrant households, a series of perfectly competitive firms, and a
fiscal authority. The model is augmented to the relaxation of visa restrictions in the
introduction of Express Entry programme.
There are three households in this model, in the baseline case we assume there
is no transition between the households.17 The relative size of the household at
time t is given by φit i ∈ [H,L,M ] where H is households of native agents classified
as high-skill, L is households of native agents classified as low-skill, and M is the
household of existing and (recently) landed migrants. There is a migration shock
which increases the size of the migrant household on impact and decreases the relative
size of the two native households. The agents in each household can be employed,
unemployed, or enjoying leisure.
The model features asymmetric search and matching frictions in the labour
market, and economy aggregates, as in Dolado et al. (2020) to reflect brain waste.
The asymmetric search and matching frictions illustrate the increased difficulties for
migrant and low-skilled native workers to successfully find employment relative to
high-skilled natives. In the case of Canada, immigrants do not necessarily require a
job to be granted a visa. Indeed of the recent Express Entry programme, workers
are increasingly likely to be granted a visa without having found employment prior
to arrival, which results in an increase of unemployed immigrant workers in addition
to newly landed migrants who have secured employment. We assume that there are
no costs to the migration process after arrival.
Perfectly competitive final good producing firms produce a homogeneous output
by employing high and low-skilled labour from households and renting capital from
the native high-skilled household. They post vacancies, at a cost, to hire workers of a
specific type. Vacancy and employment decisions are subject to search and matching
frictions. Wages are set by Nash bargaining.
There is a fiscal authority that runs a balanced budget consisting that finances
exogenous government expenditures and unemployment insurance via tax collection.
17In a development of the model, we allow the household sizes to return to steady state following
a migration shock. This is a process where the longest landed migrants transfer to the corresponding
native household. However, this is not a choice by the household which is explicitly modelled.
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3.5.1 Labour Market
The population has three types of household of size Ni where i ∈ [H,L,M ]. The
size of the population is normalised to one in steady state, i.e. ΣNi = N = 1. A
migration shock increases the size of the population which also changes the relative
size of each household, denoted by φit. High-skilled natives are employed and search
in market H, and similarly low-skilled natives in market L. The workers in the
migrant household have three employment opportunities. There are two types of
high-skill labour for migrants. The first, mH, is a high-skill level with low levels of
brain waste. High-skill migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste are employed
in sector mM . Low skill migrants find employment in one type of low-skill migrant
labour, mL. The high-skill migrants strictly prefer sector mH to mM as it has
lower levels of brain waste and utilises their skills to a greater extent. For each
type of household, agents can be employed, njt , (where j ∈ [H,L,mM,mH,mL]),
unemployed, uit or enjoying leisure, lit.
1 = ni + ui + li i, j ∈ H,L (3.5.1)
1 = nmH + nmM + nmL + uM + lM (3.5.2)
The aggregate measure of the employed and unemployed is N jt = φjtnjt and U jt =
φjtu
j
t .18
The firms post skill-specific vacancies, vjt , which are matched with unemployed
workers, ujt . The parameter aj reflects the matching efficiency for vacancy type j.
The asymmetric matching technology allow this value to differ between employment
type. A higher value makes for a more efficient process. The match elasticity with
respect to unemployment is given by Γj. A match is formed with the following
matching technology.
Matching Function
mjt = aj
(
vjt
)Γj (
U jt
)(1−Γj) (3.5.3)
To analyse the labour market dynamics, we use the probability of filling a vacancy,
Υjt , probability of successfully searching for employment, Ωjt , and labour market
tightness, θjt , which are defined as follows.
Probability of Filling a Vacancy
Υjt =
mjt
vjt
j ∈ H,L,mH,mM,mL (3.5.4)
18Following the relative household size given by φit, we separate φMt to include φmHt , φmMt , and
φmLt to aid analysis.
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Probability of Successfully Finding Employment
Ωjt =
mjt
U jt
j ∈ H,L,mH,mM,mL (3.5.5)
Labour Market Tightness
θjt =
vjt
U jt
j ∈ H,L,mH,mM,mL (3.5.6)
The law of motion of employment follows that a number of individuals are made
unemployed at an exogenous separation rate, ρjv. These agents can find another job,
remain unemployed, or exit the labour force. Since finding employment is dependent
upon the labour market frictions, participation in the labour force can only be
changed by the choice of ujt over lit. Similarly, firms are only able to influence future
employment by posting vacancies. Employment dynamics are as follows,
Law of Motion for Employment
N jt+1 = (1− ρjn)N jt +mjt j ∈ H,L,mH,mM,mL (3.5.7)
3.5.2 Households
The households share common features: they maximise lifetime utility with respect
to consumption, cit and leisure, lit; employed individuals provide labour to the firms,
njt ; and unemployed individuals, uit, search for employment. We assume that each
member within the household has equivalent preferences with respect to consumption
and leisure such that households pool their income, so each member receives the
same level of consumption. Households are endowed with an exogenously determined
constant number of hours, hj , which they supply inelastically to the labour market.19
Only the unemployed workers search for employment.20 The matching process in
the frictional labour markets determines the level of employment. Households pay
lump-sum taxes, taxjt to the government. Carried over stocks, such as capital and
bonds, are deflated by the inverse of the growth rate, git =
Nit
Nit-1
. Households are able
to smooth consumption over time by trading in the bond markets. The high-skilled
households own and invest in firms. The final consumption good, ct, consists of a
domestically produced good, cht and an imported good, c
f
t such that the final good is
19Due to labour market frictions, and the collective nature of the household, we do not account
for the intensive margin in the utility function.
20There is no on-the-job search.
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defined as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate:
ct =
[
v
1
Θ
(
cht
)Θ−1
Θ + (1− v) 1Θ
(
cft
)Θ−1
Θ
] Θ
Θ−1
Where Θ is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods, and v is
the share of the domestically produced good in final consumption. Each household
consumes cjt units of the final good. The price index of the final good, Pt, is chosen
to be numeraire. Consequently, all other prices are expressed relative to the home
final good, pht is the relative price of the domestically produced good, and p
f
t is the
relative price of the foreign produced good.
3.5.2.1 High-skilled Households
The household maximises utility from final good consumption, cHt , and leisure, lHt .
The intertemporal preferences of the high-skilled household are given by:
Ut = βtEt
∞∑
t=0
[
ψHt
(cHt − κcHt−1)1−σc
1− σc + Φ
H (lHt )1−σl
1− σl
]
(3.5.8)
The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is denoted by σc, habit
of consumption persistence by κ, ΦH governs the weight of leisure specific to the
high-skilled household, and σl is the inverse Frisch-elasticity of labour supply. The
elasticities for consumption and labour, and habit persistence are household invariant.
Their utility is subject to a preference shock, ψHt , to capture fluctuations of
changes in consumption, which is an AR(1) process, where εHt is an i.i.d. shock with
zero mean and constant variance, σ2H .
Preference Shock
lnψHt = ρH lnψHt−1 + εHt (3.5.9)
High-skilled households have the ability to smooth consumption over time by trading
one-period bonds, bHt , that pay out in units of the foreign-produced goods. The
interest rate, rt is payable on the bonds. For each unit of labour provided to the
firm, the household earns a wage of wHt . An unemployed member of the household
is entitled to an unemployment absolute, or time invariant, insurance, ubH . They
pay lump-sum taxes, taxHt
High-skilled Household Budget Constraint
cHt +xtψxt +p
f
t b
H
t +taxHt = wHt nHt +
pft (1 + rt−1)bHt−1
gHt
+uHt ubH+rkt (ztkt)+dt (3.5.10)
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The high-skilled households own the firms, investing xt, and receive a share of profits
as dividends, dt, each period. The household rents out capital to the firm at a rate rkt .
The intensity of capital utilisation, zt, can increase returns on capital. However, can
also affect the depreciation costs according to δ(zt) = δzϕt , where ϕ > 1, δ > 0. The
firm’s capital stock evolves according to the capital law of motion which is formed
from the previous period’s capital stock less depreciation, current investment, and
capital adjustment cost governed by ϕk.
Capital Accumulation
kt+1 = (1− δ(zt)) kt
gt+1
+ ϕk2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
+ xtψxt (3.5.11)
Investment is subject to a shock, ψxt , an AR(1) process where ρx is the autoregressive
parameter, and, εxt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and constant variance, σ2a.
Investment Shock
lnψxt = ρa lnψxt−1 + εxt (3.5.12)
Households maximise their utility subject to the budged constraint, and the laws of
motions for employment and capital. We set up the optimisation problem:
max
{cHt ,nHt+1,uHt ,bHt ,kt+1}
βtEt
[
ψHt
(cHt − κcHt−1)1−σc
1− σc + Φ
H (lHt )1−σl
1− σl
]
wHt n
H
t +
pft (1 + rt−1)bHt−1
gHt
+ uHt ubH + rkt (ztkt) + dt = cHt + xtψxt + p
f
t b
H
t + taxHt
nHt+1 = (1− ρHn )nHt + ΩHt uHt
kt+1 = (1− δ(zt)) kt
gHt+1
+ ϕk2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
+ xtψxt
The marginal utility of consumption is identified by µHt , and the multiplier on the
law of motion of employment is given by ΛHt . We replace leisure using equation
3.5.1. The law of motion for employment as in the optimisation problem allows the
household to account the effect of the unemployment decisions on matches rather
than taking the number of matches as in equation 3.5.7.21 Current employment can
only be influenced in the next period due to the restrictions imposed by the labour
market. The only adjustment in terms of participation that can be made today is
through unemployment, uHt . The optimality and first order conditions are:
21This is only partial as the full effect would require equation 3.5.3 to be substituted into 3.5.7.
72
3.5 Brain Waste in a Small Open Economy
Marginal Utility of Consumption
ψHt (cHt − κcHt−1)−σ
H
c = µHt (3.5.13)
Employment
ΛHt = βEt
[
(1− ρHn )ΛHt+1 + µHt+1wHt+1 − ΦH
(
lHt+1
)−σl] (3.5.14)
Unemployment
ΛHt =
ΦH(lHt )−σL − ubHµHt
ΩHt
(3.5.15)
Euler Equation
µHt p
f
t = βEtpft+1µHt+1
(1 + rt)
gHt+1
(3.5.16)
Capital Holdings
µHt
[
1 + ϕk
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
= βEtµHt
rkt+1zt+1 +
(1− δ(zt+1))
gHt+2
+ ϕk2
(kt+2
kt+1
)2
− 1

(3.5.17)
3.5.2.2 Low-skilled Households
Low-skilled households maximise lifetime utility subject to the consumption of a
final good, cLt and leisure, lLt , where ΦL is specific to the low-skill household.
Low-skilled Households Utility
ULt = βtEt
∞∑
t=0
[
(cLt − κcLt−1)1−σc
1− σc + Φ
L (lLt )1−σl
1− σl
]
(3.5.18)
The household consumes, pays lump-sum taxes, trade in bonds which is financed by
labour income and unemployment insurance.
Low-skilled Household Budget Constraint
cLt + taxLt +p
f
t b
L
t +
ϕbhcL
2
(
pft b
L
t − bL
)2
= wLt nLt +
rt−1p
f
t b
L
t−1
gLt
+ubLuLt +ΨLbhc (3.5.19)
There exists a bond holding cost, ϕbhcL that the low-skilled household is subject to
in the absence of financial autarky for the household, and deviation from the steady
state holdings bL. Borrowing from the financial markets allows for consumption
smoothing. To eliminate wealth effects, the costs are returned to the household as
a lump-sum transfers, ΨLbhc. As a result of utility maximisation, the household has
the following first order conditions with respect to consumption, employment, and
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unemployment. The marginal utility of consumption is identified by µLt , and the
multiplier on the law of motion of employment is given by ΛLt . The maximisation
problem for the household is given by
max
{cLt ,bLt ,uLt ,nLt+1}
βtEt
∞∑
t=0
[
(cLt − κcLt−1)1−σc
1− σc + Φ
L (lLt )1−σl
1− σl
]
cLt + taxLt + bLt p
f
t +
ϕbhcL
2
(
bLt − bL
)2
= wLt nLt +
rt−1p
f
t b
L
t−1
gLt
+ ubLuLt +ΨLbhc
nLt+1 = (1− ρLn)nLt + ΩLt uLt
Marginal Utility of Consumption
(
cLt − κcLt−1
)−η
= µLt (3.5.20)
Employment
ΛLt = βtEt
[
µLt+1w
L
t+1 +
(
1− ρLn
)
ΛLt+1 − ΦL
(
lLt+1
)−σl] (3.5.21)
Unemployment
ΛLt =
ΦL(lLt )−σL − ubLµLt
ΩLt
(3.5.22)
Euler Equation
µLt p
f
t
[
1 + ξ
(
bLt − bL
)]
= βtEtµLt+1
(1 + rt)
gLt+1
pft+1 (3.5.23)
Following the optimisation problem, the household eliminates the bond holding costs
with the lump-sum transfers such that the budget constraint redefined as
cLt + taxLt + bLt p
f
t = wLt nLt +
rt−1bLt−1
gLt
pft + ubLuLt (3.5.24)
3.5.2.3 Migrant Households
Migrant households maximise lifetime utility from the final consumption good, cMt ,
and leisure lMt , and lose utility from searching for employment, sk k ∈ [H,M,L].
The migrants experience this extra disutility because the job search is more difficult
and can include multiple markets. The parameter ΦM is specific to the migrant
household, and Ψk is specific to each type of search intensity. The parameter σs
governs the elasticity of search intensity.
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Migrant Households Utility
UMt = βtEt
∞∑
t=0
[
(cMt − κcMt−1)1−σc
1− σc +Φ
M (lMt )1−σl
1− σl −Ψ
H (sHt )1−σs
1− σs −Ψ
M (sMt )1−σs
1− σs −Ψ
L (sLt )1−σs
1− σs
]
(3.5.25)
In the household, there are members that are high-skill and low-skill. Members of
the household in high-skill employment experience low levels of brain waste, j = mH
earn a wage wmHt or experience high levels of brain waste in employment j = mM
who earn a wage level wmMt . The other sector of employment available to low-skill
migrants and high-skill migrants who have skill-downgraded is the low skill sector,
j = mL, who earn a wage wmLt . The remaining members of the household are
searching for employment, uMt , or enjoying leisure, lMt .
1 = nmHt + nmMt + nmLt + uMt + lMt (3.5.26)
At time t, a share of the unemployed migrants, sHt , are searching for employment in
the labour market mH, the share sMt are searching in the labour market mM , and
the remainder of unemployed migrants, sLt are searching in the low-skilled labour
market, j = mL. The labour market mH is most desirable for high-skilled migrants
as the degree of brain waste is lowest. However, due to the lack or lower levels of
unemployment insurance, the unemployed high-skill migrants are willing to take
up employment in the other sectors available to them; mM or mL the sectors of a
skill-job mismatch. To participate in the low-skill labour market is a form of skill-
downgrading, see Dustmann et al. (2013). We can define the unemployed migrants
searching in the sector j ∈ [mH,mM,mL] as ujt = skt uMt , where k ∈ [H,M,L]. The
search decision in each of the labour market is endogenous. Their budget constraint
comprises from final good consumption, cMt , lump-sum taxes, taxMt , bond market
purchases, bMt , labour income from the high-skill sectors, wmHt and wmMt , the low-
skilled labour market wmLt and from unemployment insurance.
Migrant Household Budget Constraint
cMt + taxMt + bMt p
f
t +
ϕbhcM
2
(
bMt − bM
)2
=
wHt n
mH
t +wmMt nmt +wLt nmLt +ubmHumHt +ubmMumMt +ubmLumLt +
rt−1bMt−1p
f
t
gMt
+ΨMbhc
(3.5.27)
There exists a bond holding cost, ϕbhcM that the migrant household is subject to in
the absence of financial autarky. To eliminate wealth effects, the costs are returned
to the household as a lump-sum, ΨMbhc.
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The multiplier on the budget constraint, µMt is the marginal utility of consumption
for the household. In addition, they have three laws of motion of employment con-
straints, the multiplier on which is ΛmHt , ΛmMt , and ΛmLt . We setup the maximisation
problem for the migrant household to find the choice variables.
max
{cMt ,bMt ,uMt ,njt+1,skt}
βtEt
∞∑
t=0
[
(cMt −κcMt−1)1−σc
1−σc + Φ
M (lMt )1−σl
1−σl −ΨH
(sHt )1−σs
1−σs −ΨM
(sMt )1−σs
1−σs −ΨL
(sLt )1−σs
1−σs
]
cMt + taxMt + bMt p
f
t +
ϕbhcM
2
(
bMt − bM
)2
=
wHt n
mH
t +wmMt nmt +wLt nmLt +ubmHumHt +ubmMumMt +ubmLumLt +
rt−1bMt−1p
f
t
gMt
+ΨMbhc
njt+1 = (1− ρjn)njt + Ωjtskt umt j ∈ [mH,mM,mL] k ∈ [H,M,L]
As a result, the optimality and first order conditions are:
Marginal Utility of Consumption
(
cMt − κcMt−1
)−η
= µMt (3.5.28)
Employment
Λjt = βtEt
[
µMt+1w
j
t+1 +
(
1− ρjn
)
Λjt+1 − ΦM
(
lMt+1
)−σl]
j ∈ mH,mM,mL
(3.5.29)
Unemployment
ΛmMt =
ΦM
(
lMt
)−σl − ubmMµMt
ΩmMt
(3.5.30)
Search intensity
Φk(skt )−σs = µMt uMt ubj + Λ
j
tΩjtuMt j ∈ mH,mM,mL k ∈ H,M,L (3.5.31)
Euler Equation
µMt p
f
t+1
[
1 + ξ
(
bMt − bM
)]
= βtEtµMt+1p
f
t+1
(1 + rt)
gMt+1
(3.5.32)
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Once the bond holding costs are cancelled with the lump-sum transfers, the budget
constraint is modified to
cMt +taxMt +bMt p
f
t = wHt nmHt +wmMt nmt +wLt nmLt +ubmHumHt +ubmMumMt +ubmLumLt +
rt−1bMt−1p
f
t
gMt
(3.5.33)
3.5.3 Firms
A continuum of perfectly competitive firms produce a final good, yt, using high
and low-skilled labour, LHt and LLt , and aggregate capital, Kt. Current employment
levels are determined by the previous period’s labour market conditions; hence the
firms are only able to influence their next period value by respecting the constraints
imposed by the frictions of the labour markets. The production function is a nested
CES composite of production factors, where it is possible to control the elasticity of
substitution between the different factors in production. We introduce capital-skill
complementarity to reflect the higher productivity of high-skilled workers as in
Mandelman and Zlate (2012).
Production Function
yt = ψat
(αs) 1α
((αk) 1αHK αH−1αHt + (1− αk) 1αH (ξLHt )αH−1αH
) αH
αH−1

α−1
α
+ (1− αs) 1α (LLt )
α−1
α

α
α−1
(3.5.34)
The parameter αs governs the skill intensity of total production, αk controls the
capital intensity of skilled production, and the elasticities of substitution between
capital and high-skill labour and the elasticity of capital and low-skill labour are
represented by αH and α. Due to the format of the nested CES production function,
the elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labour is the same as capital
and low-skill labour. The parameter ξ governs the steady state relative productivity
of high-skilled workers compared to low-skilled workers. Output is subject to a
productivity shock, ψat , which is an AR(1) process. Where ρa is the autoregressive
parameter, and, εat is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and constant variance, σ2a.
Total Factor Productivity
lnψat = ρa lnψat−1 + εat (3.5.35)
Aggregate capital is a summation of capital provided by the households and its
capacity utilisation, in the baseline model only the high-skill native households
provide capital to the firm. Aggregate investment is similarly determined.
77
The Migrants’ Plight: A Skill-Job Mismatch
Aggregate Capital
Kt = φHt ztkt (3.5.36)
Aggregate Investment
Xt = φHt xt (3.5.37)
High-skilled labour, LHt , is a CES aggregate of high skill labour from natives and
migrants experiencing high and low levels of brain waste. There are two forms of
high-skill employment that is filled by migrants which reflects the differing degrees
of brain waste experienced by landed and more recently landed migrants. In the
absence of brain waste, the only form of employment for high-skill migrants is NmHt ,
and there is no wage differential between natives and migrants. The migrants are
able to experience the same benefits from employment as natives. The share of
j ∈ H,mH,mM workers in the CES function of high-skill labour is given by χj , and
the elasticity of substitution between workers is given by θh.
High-skill Labour
LHt =
[
χ
1
θh
H (NHt )
θh−1
θh + χ
1
θh
mH(NmHt )
θh−1
θh + (χmM)
1
θh (NmMt )
θh−1
θh
] θh
θh−1 (3.5.38)
Low-skilled labour, LLt , is a CES aggregate of low-skill labour from natives and
migrants. The share of j ∈ L,mL workers in the CES function of high-skill labour is
given by χj and the elasticity of substitution between workers is given by θl.
Low-skill Labour
LLt =
[
χ
1
θl
l (N lt)
θl−1
θl + (1− χl)
1
θl (NmLt )
θl−1
θl
] θl
θl−1 (3.5.39)
We set out the firms’ profit maximisation problem, which is subject to the law of
motion of employment for each type of employment. Vacancies are posted at a cost,
κv
j . The multiplier on the laws of motion of employment is denoted by ηjt .
max
{Kt,Njt+1,vjt}
pht yt − rktKt − wjtN jt − κv
j
vjt
N jt+1 = (1− ρjn)N jt +Υjtvjt j ∈ H,L,mH,mM,mL
The maximisation problem computes the first order conditions for capital, Kt, future
employment, N jt+1 and vacancies, vjt .
Price of Capital Rental
rkt = phtmpkt (3.5.40)
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Employment
βηjt+1µt+1(1− ρjn) = µt
[
mpljt − wjt − ηjt
]
(3.5.41)
Vacancies
κv
j
µt = βηjt+1µt+1Υjt (3.5.42)
By the envelope theorem, combining equations 3.5.41 and 3.5.42 to eliminate ηj.
κv
j
Υjt
= βµt+1
µt
[
pht+1mpl
j
t+1 − wjt+1 + (1− ρjn)
κv
j
Υjt+1
]
(3.5.43)
3.5.4 Wage Bargaining
As a result of the asymmetries between labour markets, there are differing bargaining
powers. One of the most studied areas of the labour market conditions for migrants
is the difference with native which extends to bargaining power. Natives, and by
extension high-skill, have the highest bargaining power, and the low-skill migrants
the least. The primary reasons for migrants' lower bargaining power is that they are
unlikely to be members of a union, and natives have higher job security.
Wages are determined by relative bargaining powers of the firm and the worker.
The splitting rule is governed by (1 − ϑj)sf jt = ϑjswjt . Here, ϑj is the bargaining
power of the firm. The worker has a surplus from the value of employment less the
option of unemployment. First, we determine the surpluses for the worker, swjt and
for the firm, sf jt .
Worker Surplus
swjt = µitw
j
t − Φi(lit)−σl + (1− ρjn)Λjt
Firm Surplus
sf jt = phtmpl
j
t − wjt + (1− ρjn)
κj
Υjt
The final wage is a weighted average of the surplus from both bargainers. Firstly, the
worker’s marginal product of labour, and the continuation value of the match to the
firm adjusted by the continuation value of the match to the household. The second
term is the option of being unemployed corrected for the disutility from providing
labour. A higher bargaining power for a worker is equivalent to a lower bargaining
power for the firm. In this model, ϑH < ϑmH < ϑmM and for the low-skill labour
market ϑL < ϑmL.
wjt =
(
1− ϑj
) [
phtmpl
j
t +
(
1− ρjn
) κj
Υjt
]
+ ϑ
j
µit
[
Φi
(
lit
)−σl − (1− ρjn)Λjt] (3.5.44)
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3.5.5 Population dynamics and brain waste
To analyse brain waste, we focus our analysis on an increase to high-skill migration.
A focus of the recent drive to increase immigration, by increasing permanent resident
admissions to 350,000 by 2021 which is equivalent to 1% of the Canadian population.22
While modelling migration as exogenous may seem a simplifying assumption, it is
hard to predict when the changes in migration policy will occur.23
In this model, the high-skill migrants search for a job in the each of the high-
skill sectors where the lower levels of brain waste is preferable. This is due to its
higher wage, standing, and the ability to greater utilise their skillset. Migrants
who have been granted a visa based on a particular job commence employment in
the first period of arrival. Workers who have been granted a visa based only on
their skills enter the labour market as unemployed. The comparison of brain waste
is reflected in the asymmetric search and matching frictions presented in section
3.5.1, wage differential, unemployment rates, participation rates, and replacement
rates. When the migrants have the same powers as natives, this partially reduces
the effects of brain waste. In addition, the endogenous choice of employment search
due to insufficient matches in the high-skill sector(s). The matching efficiency of
the migrant households are significantly lower than that of natives. Unemployed
migrants eventually tire after unsuccessful searches in the high-skill labour market
with low levels of brain waste so search in the other labour markets. They are unable
to utilise their higher skill in the low-skill job. They do not receive an increase in
income either.
To enable calibration of different labour market statuses, we introduce the
participation rate and the unemployment rate from which the disutility of labour
and firm bargaining power can be calibrated.
particjt ≡
N jt + U jt
φjt
(3.5.45)
unempjt ≡
U jt
N jt + U jt
(3.5.46)
High-skilled households experience higher participation rates and lower unemployment
rates. The values for migrants can differ to what extent brain waste is experienced.
The participation rates for migrants are on average lower than the native equivalent.
The reasons for this agree with Hilgenstock and Koczan (2018) as it is dependent
upon the demographics of migrants relative to natives, for example those who are
22This figure was 271,845 in 2015-16 fiscal year.
23Net migration is analysed as an AR(1) process in the data
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caregivers to children or relatives are more likely to be out of the labour market than
the native equivalents who try for a part-time employment. Similarly, those who are
on family visas that may be ineligible to work. There is a significant difference in
participation rates of females at age levels 15 to 24 years, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44
years, and 45 to 54 years with up to 11%.24
Building on section 3.5.1, we put forth the distributional population dynamics to
reflect the distribution of workers in the economy, and the effect of their skills being
utilised fully. Where ζHt is the share of high-skill employment of total employment,
and ζLt is the share of low-skill employment of total employment.
High-skill Employment
ζH = N
H +NmH +NmMt
NH +NmH +NmM +NL +NmL
Low-skill Employment
ζL = N
L +NmL
NH +NmH +NM +NL +NmL
Using the population dynamics set out in section 3.5.1, we introduce the migration
shock that increases the growth rate of the migrant household. A migration shock in
this stochastic growth model increases the population size which dilutes capital and
financial asset stocks ceteris paribus. The migration shock increases the relative size
of the migrant households and decreases the relative size of the native households.
Hence there is a growth rate for each household which in steady state is equal to one.
Total Population
Nt = NHt +NLt +NMt (3.5.47)
To evaluate the growth rates of the population,
gt =
Nt
Nt-1
= N
H
t +NLt +NMt
Nt-1
gt =
Nt
Nt-1
= N
H
t
Nt-1
NHt-1
NHt-1
+ N
L
t
Nt-1
NLt-1
NLt-1
+ N
M
t
Nt-1
NMt-1
NMt-1
gt =
Nt
Nt-1
=
∑
i=H,L,M
Nit
Nit-1
Nit-1
Nt-1
= gitφit−1 (3.5.48)
Where N
i
t
Nit-1
= git is the growth rate of household i, and
Nit-1
Nt-1 = φ
i
t−1 is the fraction
of the household relative to the total population. The increased growth rate of
24The census provides different breakdowns of migration status. We define natives as “non-
immigrants” and migrants is inclusive of “immigrants” and “non-permanent residents”.
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household j, gjt , will affect the total population growth rate, gt. The growth rate of
the total population is defined as
gt =
∑
i=H,L,M
gitφ
i
t−1 (3.5.49)
The migration shock immediately affects the growth rate of the migrant household. In
the baseline model, the relaxation of migration restrictions affects the most recently
landed high-skill migrants, equivalently j = mM .
gjt = ρg
m
gjt−1 + εjt j ∈ [mH,mM,mL] (3.5.50)
Therefore, we replicate equation 3.5.49 for the growth rate of the migrant household.
gMt =
∑
j=mH,mM,mL
gjtφ
j
t−1 (3.5.51)
We evaluated the share of each household size by combination of the relative household
size, φjt , and the growth rates. When household sizes return to steady state, ρφ < 1
but when there are permanent changes to the household size, ρφ = 1. Here ρφ is the
persistence parameter on household size.25
φjt =
(
φj
)1−ρφ (gjt
gt
φjt−1
)ρφ
(3.5.52)
3.5.6 Fiscal Authority
There exists a fiscal authority that consumes, gct, provides unemployment insurance,
ubj, and receives lump-sum taxes, taxjt every period enabling the government to
run a balanced budget. The government provides unemployment insurance which is
determined by the replacement rates. Where Taxt is the sum of taxes paid by each
type of household, these are assumed to be equal.
Aggregate Taxation Receipts
Taxt = φHt taxHt + φLt taxLt + φMt taxMt (3.5.53)
As per the balanced budget definition policy, government expenditure is equal to tax
revenues.
Government Budget Constraint
get = Taxt (3.5.54)
25Derivation of equation 3.5.52 is available in section B.3.
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Total government expenditure, get, is given by,26
Government Expenditure
get = ubHUHt + ubLULt + ubmHUmHt + ubmMUmMt + ubmLUmLt + gct (3.5.55)
Government consumption is exogenously determined and subject to a shock εgct
Where ρgc is the autoregressive parameter, and, εgct is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean
and constant variance, σ2a.
Government Consumption
ln gct = (1− ρgc) ln (gct) + ρgc ln gct−1 + εgct (3.5.56)
3.5.7 An Open Economy
In this model of a small open economy, there is demand for the domestically produced
good both at home and from abroad. We analyse this with export demand, ext.
Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate, rert, is defined in terms of the consumer price indices. Since
the model is a small open economy, the relative size to the rest of the world is such
that the domestic import price is approximately the consumption real exchange rate,
pft ≈ rert.
1 = v
(
pht
)1−Θ
+ (1− v)
(
pft
)1−Θ
= v
(
pht
)1−Θ
+ (1− v) (rert)1−Θ (3.5.57)
Market clearing
Demand for the domestically produced good is a function of total home consumption,
investment, vacancy costs, and export demand. To simplify analysis, we aggregate
the household variables for consumption and bond holdings.
Aggregate Consumption
Ct = φHt cHt + φLt cLt + φMt cMt (3.5.58)
Aggregate Bond Holdings
bt = φHt bHt + φLt bLt + φMt bMt (3.5.59)
26Unemployed low-skilled migrants receive no form of unemployment insurance and only a small
fraction of those migrants experiencing high-levels of brain waste are eligible.
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Market clearing for the domestically produced good is given by
Market clearing
yt = v(pht )−Θ
(
Ct +Xt + κjvjt + gct
)
+ ext (3.5.60)
The demand for exports is given by:
Exports
ext = vf
(
rert
pht
)Θf
yft (3.5.61)
Here, Θf is the foreign value for elasticity of substitution between the home and
foreign goods and vf is the share of the home produced good in the final consumption
bundle. Total foreign demand for the domestic good, yft , is modelled as an exogenous,
or AR(1) process, where εy
f
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant variance
σ2yf .
Foreign Demand
ln yft = ρy
f ln yft−1 + εy
f
t (3.5.62)
The economy only produces the final good, henceforth gdpt = ytpht . We define the
trade balance to GDP ratio to be
Trade Balance
tbt = 1−
(
Ct +Xt + Σκjvjt + get
)
gdpt
(3.5.63)
Hence the net asset position to be
Net Foreign Assets
bt = rt
gdpt−1
gdpt
rert
rert−1
bt−1 + tbt (3.5.64)
We close the small open economy model with a debt elastic interest rate as put
forth by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The households active in international
financial markets face an interest rate, rt, which is a function of the world interest
rate, r∗, and is increasing in the country’s average level of debt, denoted by bt.
Interest Rate
rt = r∗ exp(−ϕbhc(bt−b)) (3.5.65)
3.6 Solving the model
We solve the model presented in section 3.5 with the estimation and calibration of a
non-linear DSGE model that is subject to six stochastic shocks for which we use six
observable variables. We describe the parameters calibrated and those taken from
the literature in section 3.6.1. The data transformations are discussed in section
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3.6.2 and the results of estimation in section 3.6.3. We use data from Canada, a
country where brain waste is prominent as explained in earlier sections of this paper.
3.6.1 Calibration
Some parameters are fixed in estimation to address any identification issues raised
by the complexity of the model. The values are taken from relevant literature
or by matching long run targets in the data. Starting with mostly standardised
parameters: the discount factor β = 0.99 which equates to an annual interest
rate of approximately 4%, a capital depreciation rate δ = 0.0125 equivalent to
5% per year, and an openness to trade parameter γ = 0.3. The values for the
capital-skill complementarity production function are based on Mandelman and
Zlate (2012) adjusted for the redefinition of high and low-skill labour. We calibrate
the matching efficiencies, aj and job destruction ρjn such that the job-finding and
vacancy probabilities are higher for the native worker at the same skill level. For
the international sector, we assume all relative prices and terms of trade to have
a steady state value of 1. The bargaining power is determined by the steady state
computations. Vacancy posting costs for the migrants are taken from steady state
calculations such that the difference in wage levels hold. To evaluate the change in
wage at each skill level between migrants and natives, we take data from the 2016
census table 98-400-X2016280. The low-skill wage, ∆wL is taken from the average
employment income of individuals that are employees (i.e. excluding self-employed
workers) with qualifications in the classification “apprenticeship or trades certificate or
diploma” (identifier 4), the native value is non-immigrants who gained qualifications
inside Canada, and for the migrants is immigrants who gained qualifications outside
of Canada.27 For the wage difference of high-skill natives and high-skill migrants
experiencing high levels of brain waste (j = mM), ∆wM is taken from category
“university certificate, diploma or degree at bachelor level or above” (identifier 7)
where the native wage is non-immigrants with qualifications gained inside Canada,
and the mM wage is for migrants who gained qualifications outside of Canada. The
difference between high-skill natives and high-skill migrants experiencing low levels
of brain waste (j = mH), ∆wH , the wage is at skill level as in ∆wmM but the migrant
wage is immigrants who gained their qualifications inside Canada. The values are
described in table 3.1. The differences are a fraction of the wage received by natives,
e.g. wmL = ∆wLwL.
For the employment type, values for particj and unempj are taken from the 2016
census table 98-400-X2016198. We define high-skilled workers as those with a college
27There is no data for non-permanent residents, nor the year of migration.
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Table 3.1 Calibrated Parameters
Description Param Value Description Param Value
Discount Factor β 0.9900 Matching Efficiency aH 0.8500
Depreciation Rate δ 0.0125 aL 0.3100
Openness to Trade γ 0.3000 amH 0.6500
Share of K vs LH αs 0.7100 amM 0.4500
Share of K and LH vs LL αk 0.2800 amL 0.2500
EoS K to LH αH 0.5800 Matching Elasticity Γj 0.5000
Eos K to LL α 0.6800 Job Destruction ρHn 0.0490
Productivity of LH vs LL ξ 1.8500 ρLn 0.0855
EoS σc 2.0000 ρmHn 0.0510
Inverse Frisch Elasticity σl 3.0000 ρmMn 0.0800
Elasticity of Search σs 1.5000 ρmLn 0.6280
Vacancy Costs κH 0.1500 Bargaining Power ϑH 0.2052
κL 0.1400 ϑL 0.6695
κmH 0.4226 ϑmH 0.5353
κmM 0.5334 ϑmM 0.7242
κmL 0.2429 ϑmL 0.7336
Wage Difference ∆wH 0.9512 Weight on Search ΨH 0.0104
∆wM 0.8032 ΨM 0.0258
∆wL 0.8855 ΨL 0.0321
Leisure Weight ΦH 0.0033 Replacement Rate ubH
wH
0.2000
ΦL 1.0515 ubL
wL
0.3000
ΦM 0.6273 ubmH
wmH
0.1250
Bond Holding Constraint ϕbhcM 0.0010 ub
mM
wmM
0.1000
ϕbhcL 0.0010 ub
mL
wmL
0.0000
Calibrated parameters for the baseline small open economy model with brain waste. This includes
the ones that are targeted specifically from the data and those from calculation of the steady state.
EoS = elasticity of substitution.
certificate, university degree at bachelor and higher level degrees. To define high-skill
migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste, labour market j = mM is defined
as high skill migrants that landed 2001-2016 and non-permanent residents. The
labour market j = mH is high skill migrants that arrived before 2001. The values
for relative population size, participation, and unemployment rate for employment
type j, are shown in table 3.2. The differing values within the migrant household
supports the model specification of natives and migrants with two types of high skill
migrants.
86
3.6 Solving the model
Table 3.2 Labour Market Values
Household φj partic unemp
Native Low-skill (L) 0.4197 0.5856 0.1026
Native High-skill (H) 0.3141 0.7685 0.0503
Migrant (M) 0.2662
mL 0.1255 0.4889 0.0907
mM 0.0676 0.7902 0.0902
mH 0.0731 0.6839 0.0527
The values for relative household size, participation rate, and unemployment rate of each labour
market. The total size of the migrant household is given by φM = φmH + φmM + φmL.
3.6.2 Data
The number of data series used in the estimation cannot exceed the number of
shocks in the model, therefore, estimation uses six data series. The six shocks of the
model: home TFP, investment, consumption preference of high-skilled households,
government consumption, foreign TFP, and net migration. We take data from
the national accounts: GDP (Canada and the United States), private gross fixed
capital formation (investment), aggregate private consumption, and government
consumption. These time series have been collected from the OECD in national
currency and deflated using the corresponding deflator to convert the values to real
terms. Net migration data is collected from Statistics Canada. The national accounts
and net migration data are transformed into per capita terms by dividing by the
working-age (15 years and older) population. We take the natural logarithm of
trending series and then apply the Hamilton (2018) filter to compute the trends and
cyclical components of the data series. Figure 3.3 shows the cyclical component of
each variable which is used in the measurement equations.
3.6.3 Estimation
We estimate the DSGE model using Bayesian methods by running a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. The results presented in table 3.3 shows the mean
for the prior and posteriors, the standard deviation of the prior, and 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distribution (obtained after 1,500,000 iterations) for the
baseline model of a small open economy with brain waste. We choose standard priors
for the model parameters.
We introduce tight priors for the autoregressive coefficients. Notably, migration
seems to be less persistent than in the SVAR and has a standard deviation slightly
87
The Migrants’ Plight: A Skill-Job Mismatch
Fig. 3.3 Data Observables
The six observables used in the Bayesian estimation of the baseline DSGE model as described
in section 3.5. The data presented is the cyclical component of the Hamilton filter applied. The
horizontal axis identifies the year of the observation. The series are at a quarterly frequency, with
157 observations, 1980Q1:2019Q1 inclusive. Measurement equations are xobst = xt − xss where
xobs is the observation of variable x, xt is the actual value at time t, and xss is the steady state or
expected value of variable x.
greater than output. The persistence parameter on investment is relatively small,
however the standard deviation is very large. Government consumption has the
same standard deviation as output but significantly different persistence parameter.
We would have expected a difference with output. The preference shock has a high
degree of persistence and has a higher standard deviation than output. Finally,
foreign output has a similar level of standard deviation to home TFP but is less
persistent. The model parameters deviated only slightly from their priors with capital
adjustment costs above and the elasticity of substitution and elasticity of debt to
the interest rate marginally lower than the respective priors.
3.7 Results
We now present the impulse responses from the migration shock with brain waste
in the non-linear model presented in section 3.5 using the results of the Bayesian
estimation in section 3.6. Then we present the model without brain waste that
eliminates sector j = mM and the labour market differences between natives and
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Table 3.3 Bayesian Estimation: Priors and Posteriors
Parameter Description Prior Mean 90% HPD Interval PDF PstDev
Autoregressive Parameters
TFP ρa 0.7000 0.8092 0.7039 0.9192 β 0.1000
Migration ρm 0.7000 0.5719 0.5067 0.6370 β 0.0500
Foreign Output ρy
f 0.7000 0.7024 0.5493 0.8665 β 0.1000
Consumption Preference ρψ
c 0.7000 0.8934 0.8348 0.9571 β 0.1000
Investment ρx 0.7000 0.4065 0.3569 0.4474 β 0.0500
Government Spending ρg 0.7000 0.6081 0.4497 0.7705 β 0.1000
Model Parameters
Adjustment Costs ϕk 4.0000 4.1834 3.5959 4.7936 Γ 0.5000
Elasticity of Substitution Θ 2.5000 2.2659 1.5677 2.9445 Γ 0.5000
Bond Holding Constraint ϕbhc 0.0500 0.0354 0.0196 0.0508 β 0.0400
Standard Deviations
TFP σa 1.0000 0.2284 0.2261 0.2315 Γ−1 0.5000
Migration σm 1.0000 0.2465 0.2261 0.2635 Γ−1 0.5000
Foreign Output σyf 1.0000 0.2283 0.2261 0.2313 Γ−1 0.5000
Consumption Preference σψc 1.0000 0.3889 0.2949 0.4905 Γ−1 0.5000
Investment σx 1.0000 1.0933 0.9749 1.2097 Γ−1 0.5000
Government Spending σxg 1.0000 0.2284 0.2261 0.2315 Γ−1 0.5000
Results from the Bayesian estimation of model parameters after 1,500,000 iterations for the baseline
model with brain waste. Probability Distribution Functions: β Beta, Γ Gamma, and Γ−1 Inverse
Gamma.
migrants. Finally, we calculate the potential gains that could be achieved without
brain waste.
3.7.1 A Small Open Economy with Brain Waste
First, we present the model with brain waste in two scenarios, one with permanent
changes to the relative size of the steady state household, and second a return to
steady state of the relative household size.
Brain Waste with Permanent Changes to the Relative Household Size
The first model we present is the baseline case where brain waste is present and
there is a permanent change to the household sizes of natives and migrants. There
is no transfer between the migrant household to a native household. Hence the
native households are relatively smaller following the migration shock. The impulse
responses are shown in figure 3.4. The shock is to the growth rate of the high-skill
migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste, mM . The migrant household that
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is high-skill and subject to high levels of brain waste is large however, they can search
for employment in different sectors.
Fig. 3.4 A migration shock to an economy with brain waste without household transfer
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration, that perma-
nently changes the relative household size φj - there is no household transfer. For investment the
solid line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the investment by the high-skilled
household. Subplots 3-16 show response to seven variables. In these subplots, the solid line
represents the high-skill employment in the native household and mH employment in the migrant
household. The dashed line represents the low-skill employment in the native household and mL in
the migrant household. The dash-dotted line represents the migrants experiencing high levels of
brain waste, mM . The impulse responses for employment and unemployment are for the household,
njt , u
j
t , with responses for aggregate, N
j
t , U
j
t are shown in in figure B.1 along with further impulse
responses.
A migration shock increases the size of the population that results in a decreased
the value of per capita carried over stocks including bonds and capital ceteris paribus.
The decrease in aggregate capital stocks is in Kt = ktφHt , which the migration
shock decreases φHt on impact. The increase in population decreases the value of
per capita lump-sum taxes. The decrease in capital stocks creates a higher return
which stimulates investment from the high-skilled household. However, the increased
investment does not return capital stocks to steady state levels quickly. High-skilled
native households receive a large gain in income that they increase their consumption
levels. This consumption increase outweighs the small decreases experienced by the
low-skilled and migrant households to raise aggregate consumption. The relatively
large increase in investment and aggregate consumption raises the demand side of
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the economy. The increase in firm output is due to higher productivity of all types
of employment except the migrant low-skill. However, this is due to the significant
increase in aggregate (NmLt ) low-skill supply of labour.
The effect on labour market status are skill specific. For high-skilled natives, there
is an initial increase in employment, a larger continuous decrease in unemployment,
and increase in leisure. An increase in leisure is due to the wealth effect. The decrease
in unemployment is initially relatively large compared to the increase in employment
but quickly returns to small level. The increase in those enjoying leisure and decrease
in unemployment results in a decrease in the participation and unemployment rates.
There is a tightening of the labour market due to the increased probability of finding
employment relative to the decrease of the firm successfully filling a vacancy. The
tightening of the labour market creates upwards pressure on the wage level. The
increase in leisure, and consumption results in an increase in utility for the high-skill
native household. The decrease in per agent bonds for the native households are
unaffected without household transfer. In contrast, the migrant households decrease
the average holdings ceteris paribus.
For low-skilled natives, their effects occasionally contrast to high-skill natives.
This is somewhat expected since the low-skill labour market is only indirectly affected
by high-skill migration through skill-downgrading. Household labour, nLt increases,
however, due to the decrease in relative household size, φL, aggregate labour decreases.
Unemployment experiences a one period increase before some agents change to enjoy
leisure. The increase in wage above steady state is not as great compared to high-
skill natives which partially explains the dominance of the substitution effect. The
low-skill labour market initially decreases before tightening which is explained by
the one period increase in unemployment. There is a positive effect since there
is a higher probability of successfully finding employment and higher wage. The
overall decrease in agents enjoying leisure increases the participation rate. The
change in consumption is small since the increases in employment and wage, less
the reduction in unemployment insurance are of similar magnitudes. There is a
very small increase in the probability of finding employment which comes from the
decrease in unemployment. It is notable that all of these responses are statistically
significant but would make little difference as the magnitudes are small. Both native
households experience increases in labour income of a magnitude similar to other
labour market responses.
Without household transfer, equivalently a very strict labour market experience
for migrants, the labour market struggles to an extent as migrants are unable to fill
gaps in the labour market left by high-skill natives.
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For the migrants, the type of skill is even more divergent. This increase in
high-skill migration reduces the number of agents employed in either of the high-skill
sectors whereas, skill-downgrading leads to an increase in employment in the low-skill
sector. One reason for the increase in unemployment as a household is the reduction
in agents enjoying leisure, equivalently an increase in the overall participation rate
of the migrants. Participation rates increase for all but the high-skilled migrant
workers experiencing high levels of brain waste. It would be expected that the
participation rates of new migrants would be high as they enter either unemployed or
employed. The participation rate for high-skilled migrants experiencing low levels of
brain waste eventually decreases, however the magnitude of response for this sector
is significantly smaller than either of the other markets specific to migrants. The
initial increase is due to some of the recently landed migrants switching their search
to j = mH. The increase in the low-skilled participation rate is largely due to the
higher number of unemployed agents searching in the low-skilled labour market but
also the increase in low-skilled migrant employment. The increase of search in the
low-skill labour market is a result of unsuccessful searchers in the high-skill, and lack
of unemployment insurance causes the skill-downgrading. All of the migrant labour
markets loosen on impact due to the increased number of unemployed agents relative
to the vacancies posted. A decrease in labour market tightness puts a downward
pressure on wages which is particularly true for the low-skilled migrant labour market.
The eventual tightening of both high-skill sectors increases the wages and a result
of the increase in marginal product of labour. As there is a reduction in labour
income, the wealth effect dominates due to the reduction in leisure. A reduction in
labour income, a reduction in taxes, decreased consumption results in an increase in
borrowing to smooth consumption.
The results presented agree with the existing migration literature that migrants
are affected most from an increase in migration and natives only experience small
effects. As previously mentioned, the value of per capita taxes fall in this model.
However, the only taxation in this model is lump-sum which is paid by the households
to finance a constant government spending (in absence of a shock) and unemployment
insurance to the households. Unemployment in the native household decreases who
receive higher levels of the insurance than migrants, which counteracts the effect
of increasing unemployment for migrants who receive lower or no unemployment
insurance.
The responses on GDP, investment, and labour supply (hours) follow the SVAR.
Aggregate private consumption increases in this model but only due to the high-skill
native household. However, the model specification in the form of household budget
constraints may explain this.
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Brain Waste with Household Transfer
Using the same model, we now show the effect of brain waste when the relative
household size returns to its steady state value.28 This involves a form of household
transfer, where some of the longest landed migrants acquire native characteristics
to become either high or low-skilled natives respectively. Further, the high-level of
brain waste migrants move to experiencing lower levels of brain waste, and some new
migrants become low-skill migrants as they accept employment in a lower skilled
sector. Household transfer is a way to eliminate brain waste for a small number of
high and low-skill migrants by becoming classified as natives. The responses are
shown in figure 3.5.
Fig. 3.5 A migration shock to an economy with brain waste with household transfer
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For investment the
solid line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the investment by the high-skilled
household. Subplots 3-16 show response to seven variables. In these subplots, the solid line
represents the high-skill employment in the native household and mH employment in the migrant
household. The dashed line represents the low-skill employment in the native household and mL in
the migrant household. The dash-dotted line represents the migrants experiencing high levels of
brain waste, mM . The impulse responses for employment and unemployment are for the household,
njt , u
j
t , with responses for aggregate, N
j
t , U
j
t are shown in figure B.2 along with further impulse
responses.
Firstly, we consider output which has a smaller positive response and begins to
return to steady state with the horizon presented (20 quarters, or 5 years). The
28Using equation 3.5.52, ρφ < 1.
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response for investment on impact is larger and does not fall below steady state. Due
to this, the impact on capital stocks is significantly smaller. The aggregate capital
stocks were affected by the total population growth rate.
High-skilled natives continue to experience an increase in their wage level, however,
it is smaller. This is due to the number of factors: less of an increase in the marginal
product of labour, a smaller decrease in employment (even though the initial increase
to employment is of the same magnitude), aggregate employment is converging to
its steady state value, the initial decrease in unemployment is approximately half,
a smaller increase in the number of agents enjoying leisure, and the labour market
tightens slightly more. The magnitude of these effects are so small that they make
little impact on the macroeconomy. That there are fewer agents enjoying leisure
decreases utility of the household, however, the response to consumption is affected
as the household increases their investment. Given both of these factors, there is a
small increase in utility.
The impact on low-skilled natives' wage is relatively insignificant. As is the case of
the high-skill natives, though the increase in marginal product of labour is lower. As
before there is an increase in employment in the households, but due to the changing
value of φLt , the aggregate value of employment to steady state. The changes to
the remainder of the labour market factors more closely matches that of high-skill
natives than previously. Notably though, there is an increase, albeit insignificant,
to those enjoying leisure which previously experienced a decrease. Similarly, for
consumption there is a decrease on impact before increasing on steady state levels
but still only a minimal change.
The wage for each of the migrant employment has a more persistent decrease
than before, however, the effect on the low-skilled wage for migrants is significantly
lower. Since some of the longest landed migrants move to be recognised as high or
low-skill natives to fill gaps in those labour markets, the effects on the migrant labour
markets is smaller. There are smaller negative impacts on both types of high-skill
employment and this time the aggregate levels of employment increase. Importantly,
there is a smaller reduction in labour market tightness which has less of a downward
pressure on the wage. The increase in low-skill employment is smaller as there is
less pressure on this market than before. The relative decrease in supply of workers
after the shock, and through dispersion, creates some upward pressure on wages
as the labour market begins to tighten. On impact there is a small increase in the
number of agents enjoying leisure, which decreases as the longest landed migrants
leave the household and some of the migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste
switch to enjoy leisure as the substitution effect dominates. Participation rates of the
other two migrant employment sectors dominate to reduce the number of migrants
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enjoying leisure. Their decrease in consumption levels is less than 10% of the previous
model due to increases in labour income. The household still experiences a decrease
in utility, however, it is relatively insignificant compared to the previous response
which was considerable affected by the increase in searching for employment in the
low-skilled labour market which has the highest disutility.
The decrease in the households’ lump-sum taxation on impact is of the same
magnitude as in the previous model. However, this value returns to steady state
levels within the presented horizon. All forms of financial market interaction are
smaller such that there is a decrease in overall interaction with the financial markets.
3.7.2 A Small Open Economy without Brain Waste
Having examined the case with brain waste, we now present analysis of a model
where brain waste is absent. The results from eliminating brain waste in the labour
market shown in figure 3.6. As there is only one high-skill employment option
for migrants the shock is for the growth rate of high-skilled migrants gmHt . This
begins with setting the labour market status, and probabilities equal between natives
and migrants. Additionally, there is no longer a wage gap. As there is no brain
waste, the labour market mM has been eliminated such that the remaining markets
j ∈ H,L,mH,mL. For migrant households, they can only search for employment
in two markets, therefore k ∈ H,L. We do not combine the households so that
there would only be a high-skill and a low-skill as there is not a shock to the
native household population size, and hence we can compare the effects on migrant
households with other literature.
The response of output in figure 3.6 is greater than in figure 3.5 which has
households returning to their steady state size. It is noteworthy that the steady state
value of output is higher in the economy without brain waste in the labour market.
There is a very small positive response to per capita output due to the increased
productivity of native workers and increased low-skill labour. From the demand
side, there is a large increase in investment due to the increased return on capital
and a small decrease in aggregate consumption. There is an insignificant response
to taxation which is higher in steady state as the increase in government spending
is equivalent to the increase in output and there is now equivalent unemployment
insurance for migrants at each skill level.
For high-skill natives, there is a small increase in employment to start with as
the wage rate increases. However, then it does then fall slightly below steady state.
This is due to the wealth effect, since wages have increased a number of high-skilled
agents switch to enjoying leisure before returning to steady state. For the same
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Fig. 3.6 A migration shock to an economy without brain waste
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For investment the solid
line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the investment by the high-skilled household.
Subplots 3-16 show response to seven variables. In these subplots, the solid line represents the
high-skill employment in the native household and mH employment in the migrant household. The
dashed line represents the low-skill employment in the native household and mL in the migrant
household. The impulse responses for employment and unemployment are for the household, njt , u
j
t ,
with responses for aggregate, N jt , U
j
t are shown in figure B.3 along with further impulse responses.
reason, there is a significant fall in the unemployed workers. As more are enjoying
leisure, there is an initial fall in the participation rate and unemployment. Due to
the increase in wage and employment levels, there is an increase in labour income.
The case for low-skill workers is similar in terms of wage and employment.
However, their decrease in unemployment is smaller due to fewer agents switching to
leisure as there is a slight tightening of the labour market. The participation rate
decreases initially, as there are more agents enjoying leisure. Due to the increase in
income, there is a higher level of consumption. For both high and low-skill natives,
the effects are quite small that they are of little significance.
There now exists only two employment types for migrants, high and low-skill. The
migrant employment in the high-skill sector decreases while the low-skill employment
increases shortly after the initial decrease. The aggregate values both increase.
Both types of unemployment increase, with unemployment of low-skill migrants
experiencing the greatest increase. This is due to a lower probability of finding
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employment and increase in participation rate as unsuccessful searchers in the high-
skill labour market switch to the low-skill labour market. Whereas the change in
probability of finding high-skilled employment is relatively insignificant. There is a
small increase in the number of migrants enjoying leisure. The wage level has fallen
for both types of migrant labour particularly the low-skill migrants.
One reason for an increase in the participation rate of low-skill migrants is the
greater decrease in wage, and skill-downgrading of high-skill migrants who would
rather be employed in a low-skill job than unemployed or enjoying leisure. While
the effect on the unemployment variables are greater than in figure 3.5, this is due
to the reduction in sector of employment. The values return to steady state quicker
without brain waste. The steady state analysis shows that there is a higher level
of wages and consumption, higher participation rate, lower unemployment rate,
higher employment, and probability of finding employment. Therefore, the negative
responses are somewhat misleading. As the steady state analysis in table 3.4 shows,
migrants are significantly better off than before.
The response of wages and (un)employment to the natives and migrants agrees
with the general literature that they are only affected by those directly competing for
that type of employment. The effects for natives are positive and often longer lasting
than in the case of brain waste. As they make up the majority of the population
that is important for an economy. The steady state values without brain waste have
economic gains for both migrants and natives, which has positive overall effects for
the economy.
From the results where household sizes return to steady state values, there are
greater positive responses in the case without brain waste in addition to having
higher steady state values.
3.7.3 A Small Open Economy with Integration of Migrants
The analysis without brain waste in section 3.7.2 showed the responses to a migration
shock if the steady state labour market differences between natives and migrants had
been eliminated. However, the elimination of brain waste does not fully recognise
the potential contribution of high-skill migrants. In the baseline model, native high-
skill agents differ from native low-skill agents in their firm ownership, yet high-skill
migrants do not differ from low-skill migrants. As a small extension, we introduce
the ability for high-skill migrants to invest in the firms.29 We introduce investment
and capital stocks for the migrant household, therefore aggregate investment and
29Further description of this model extension is available in section B.4.
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aggregate capital are modified to be Xt = xtφHt + xMt φMt and Kt = ktφHt + kMt φMt .
Figure 3.7 shows the impulse responses.
Fig. 3.7 A migration shock to an economy without brain waste with integration of
migrants
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For investment the solid
line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the investment by the high-skilled household.
Subplots 3-16 show response to seven variables. In these subplots, the solid line represents the
high-skill employment in the native household and mH employment in the migrant household. The
dashed line represents the low-skill employment in the native household and mL in the migrant
household. The impulse responses for employment and unemployment are for the household, njt , u
j
t ,
with responses for aggregate, N jt , U
j
t are shown in in figure B.4 along with further impulse responses.
The results are similar to those as shown in the case where labour market brain
waste has been eliminated, however, they further enhance the positive responses to the
economy. There is an insignificant change the response in output, however aggregate
capital increases initially and even though there is a small decrease below steady state
levels, it is smaller than in the model that eliminates brain waste in the labour market.
The results for the labour market are a slightly bigger response for both aggregate
labour provided to the firm, LHt and LLt respectively. More capital allows for greater
production with the same amount of labour. There are marginally higher increases in
labour income for both the native households, and smaller decreases for the migrant
household. More agents from the high-skilled household enjoy leisure and higher
consumption as there are other agents who invest in the firms to maintain capital
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levels. Following the migration shock, a marginally lower return on capital then
slows the amount of consumption exchanged for investment. Aggregate consumption
increases in this model.
One distinct change between the two models without brain waste is the effects on
capital stocks. When migrants invest in capital, after a migration shock, aggregate
capital stocks increase. Once the effect of capital stock deflation due to the increase
population size, the decrease of the aggregate capital is much smaller. In this model
of capital-skill complementarity this results in a positive response to output with
small effects on the labour market.
3.7.4 Gains from Eliminating Brain Waste
These models presented have shown that there are significant gains to be had in the
case of full skill utilisation. To analyse the economic issues arising from brain waste,
we present potential gains to the economy if brain waste was eliminated in table 3.4
using the steady states of the models with and without brain waste.
Table 3.4 Potential percentage gains to the economy from elimination of brain waste
Variable Gain
Output yt 2.38
Total Consumption Ct 4.48
Migrant Household Consumption cMt 33.55
Labour Income for Migrant Household 27.42
Unemployment Migrant uMt -0.30
Total Migrant Employment 1− uMt − lMt 11.13
Participation Rate High Skill Migrant particmHt 12.37
Participation Rate Low Skill Migrant particmLt 19.78
High-skill Labour LHt 2.07
Low-skill Labour LLt 3.68
Capital, Investment Kt, Xt -7.87
Steady state calculations between the models with and without brain waste. The gain of variable s,
snobw−sbw
sbw
100. The percentage change between the model without brain waste, and the model with
brain waste.
Firstly, we consider output that based on the calculations, a 2.38% gain is
small but statistically significant to the economy. The model has used capital-skill
complementarity to assess the effects of high-skill migration. The increased labour
supply reduces the requirement for as high of a level of capital to have the same
steady state return, rk = 1−β
β
+ δ, which explains the fall in capital and investment.
This, along with lower vacancy posting costs allows higher consumption levels.
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Low-skill natives marginally lose out when brain waste is eliminated, as their
wages are lower using this model. This is due to the lower productivity of low-skill
workers. Low-skill migrants gain as the lower steady state wage for low-skill natives
in the model without brain waste, is higher than the wage differential caused by brain
waste. High-skill natives experience a higher steady state wage and consumption
levels.
Migrants gain utility from their increase in consumption by one third. The
wage and employment rate equality with natives generates a higher labour income.
Additionally, the migrant household now has equal unemployment insurance that
marginally increases their income. The decrease in migrants enjoying leisure is due
to the higher participation rates.30 Of those that were previously enjoying leisure,
the majority of them have become employed. This change is demonstrated by the
very small decrease in unemployment and large increase in total employment.
From the results presented in this section we conclude that migration shocks
do not have large effects on the economy. However, eliminating brain waste offers
significant gains to the economy, and particularly the migrant household.
3.8 Conclusion
The increasing levels of immigration, the contrasting views of natives, and the bearing
it has within society posed a number of questions that related to macroeconomic
variations in the countries that host immigrants, and what migration means for
natives. All areas of society are, in one way or another, affected by migration.
Immigration affects households in terms of consumption, income, investment, and
labour supplied. Firms are affected as an increase in output and labour supply as well
as changing labour costs. Governments are affected by tax receipts and expenditure.
The prominence of brain waste is negative for each sector of the economy, and
elimination of it offers statistically significant gains.
This paper has shown the potential gains from eliminating brain waste in the
labour market. However, we have not completely allowed the economy to experience
gains should the high-skill migrants have the financial ability to match their native
counterparts in investing in firms and wider participation. The migrant household
consists of high and low-skill workers which have a balance of preferences as better
demonstrated in labour preferences - low-skill workers place a higher weight on
leisure, and more likely consume rather than invest. We included a basic extension to
allow the migrant household to invest in physical capital, however, there is potential
30In the figures, the participation rate of j = mM was higher than high-skill natives, but j = mH
was less than high-skill natives. The weighted average was less than natives.
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to develop this further. One possibility is to separate the migrant household into
a high and low-skill which would allow a high-skill migrant household to replicate
investment decisions made by the high-skill natives.
The Canadian government has recognised that brain waste is an issue and has
taken steps to eliminate it, which the government spending in the model does not
reflect. This is an opportunity for future research. One issue with the current model
is the number of agents entering as unemployed which is not reflective of the current
statistics, further examination in methods of modelling this is required to match
more immigration systems. The results from this paper support the policy of helping
migrants gain recognition, and have equivalent standing to natives in the labour
market.
Our paper has contributed to the literature using an estimated small open economy
DSGE model, calibrated with recent data to present the effects of a migration shock
with and without brain waste. The results presented in section 3.4 showed the
effects of immigration on the macroeconomy and the first paper to use a SVAR
with migration data from Canada. Section 3.7 highlighted the issues arising from
migration and brain waste. The DSGE model allowed the illustration of brain waste
and the different scenarios show the effects to the economy with and without brain
waste. There were positive responses to output in the models with and without brain
waste that matches with the SVAR. There were no long-run negative effects for the
total economy and high-skill natives under the assumption of imperfect substitutes.
The low-skill native household had a small loss, however, this could be due to model
specification. While it is impossible for an economy to be perfectly responsive to the
correct level of skilled immigration, our analysis shows there is a loss from the brain
waste of migrant workers. The calculations in steady state have shown significant
potential gains to the economy when migrants experience the same labour market
conditions to natives. Overall, we conclude that migration has a positive effect
on the macroeconomy and there are significant gains to be made when skills of
migrants are fully recognised. The SVAR results show that when the responses are
statistically significant, migration is beneficial to an economy. The results are given
in per capita terms, the distinction between per capita and aggregate is important
because immigrant workers could be adding to the economy but less than another
native.
In this paper, we have modelled migration as exogenous, identifying shocks based
on the relaxation of migration constraints. Thus we conclude that migration shocks
and brain waste matter for the economy but only contribute a small amount to the
business cycle, where the full utilisation and integration of migrants to the economy
is beneficial.
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Appendix B
B.1 Data Sources
Table B.1 lists the raw data used in analysis and the source.
B.2 Labour Market
Table B.2 shows the relative size and labour market statistics for the model of each
qualification level in the 2016 census data. It is notable that the relative size of the
households for those with university degrees is significantly higher for migrants than
natives.
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B.3 Equation Derivation
Firm Surplus
Here we derive equation 3.5.43. From equation 3.5.42 we solve for ηjt+1
ηjt+1 =
κv
j
βajΓj
µt
µt+1
(
vjt
ujt
)1−Γj
Replace ηjt and ηjt+1 respectively.
(1− ρjn)
κv
j
µt
βµt+1ajΓj
(
vjt
ujt
)1−Γj
= wjt +
κv
j
βajΓj
µt−1
µt
(
vjt
ujt
)1−Γj
gjt (B.3.1)
Population Dynamics
The derivation of the distribution following the migration shock to the relative
household size (equation 3.5.52) is as follows
φjt =
Njt
Nt
φjt =
Njt
Nt
Njt-1
Njt-1
Nt-1
Nt-1
φjt =
Njt
Njt-1
Nt-1
Nt
Njt-1
Nt-1
φjt = gjt
1
gTt
φjt−1 =
gjt
gTt
φjt−1 (B.3.2)
To ensure stationarity in the model, the relative household size returns to steady
state, the equation is
φjt =
(
gjt
gTt
φjt−1
)ρφ (
φj
)1−ρφ
B.4 Model Extension - Full Integration of High-
skill Migrants
In section 3.7.3, we presented the results to a model that fully integrates migrants
into society. This built on the elimination of brain waste in the labour market as
shown in 3.7.2. In the baseline model we assumed that the migrant household as a
collective offered no form of firm investment. We eliminated brain waste from the
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labour market by equating the characteristics of natives to that for the migrants
which reflected integration into the labour market. Using this methodology, we
enable the migrant household to offer investment to the firms at the same per capita
level as the native high-skill household.
Using the no brain waste model, we modify the migrant households’ budget
constraint to include investment and the return on capital.
cMt + taxMt + p
f
t b
M
t + xMt =
wmHt n
mH
t + wmLt nmLt + rtp
f
t b
M
t−1 + ubmHumHt + ubmLumLt + rkt (ztkMt ) (B.4.1)
This adds two equations to the model, the first being capital accumulation and the
second their choice of capital holdings. For simplicity, we model it in the same way
as the native high-skilled household.
xMt = kMt+1 −
(
1− δzϕt
)
kMt +
ω
2
(
kMt+1
kMt
− 1
)2
kMt (B.4.2)
µMt ψ
X
t
[
1 + ω
(
kMt+1
kMt
− 1
)]
= βEtµMt+1
rkt+1zt+1 + ψXt+1
1− δ (zt+1) + ω2
(kMt+2
kMt+1
)2
− 1

(B.4.3)
Finally we modify the aggregate investment and capital stock.
Xt = xtφHt + xMt φMt (B.4.4)
Kt = ktφHt + kMt φMt (B.4.5)
B.5 Additional Impulse Responses
In section 3.7 we presented the impulse responses for household employment and
unemployment. As aggregate values are defined as N jt = φjtnjt and φjt is changing,
these values differ. Additionally we present the impulse responses for labour market
tightness, probability of filling a vacancy, total labour supply to the firms, aggregate
consumption, capital stocks.
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Fig. B.1 A migration shock to an economy with brain waste
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration, that per-
manently changes the relative household size φj - there is no household transfer. For capital
the solid line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the capital by the high-skilled
household. In labour market subplots, the solid line represents the high-skill employment in the
native household and mH employment in the migrant household. The dashed line represents the
low-skill employment in the native household and mL in the migrant household. The dash-dotted
line represents the migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste, mM . The impulse responses
for employment and unemployment are aggregate N jt , U
j
t . The responses are a continuation of
figure 3.4
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Fig. B.2 A migration shock to an economy with brain waste with household transfer
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For capital the solid line
shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the capital by the high-skilled household. In
labour market subplots, the solid line represents the high-skill employment in the native household
and mH employment in the migrant household. The dashed line represents the low-skill employment
in the native household and mL in the migrant household. The dash-dotted line represents the
migrants experiencing high levels of brain waste, mM . The impulse responses for employment and
unemployment are aggregate N jt , U
j
t . The responses are a continuation of figure 3.5
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Fig. B.3 A migration shock to an economy without brain waste
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For capital the solid line
shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the capital by the high-skilled household. In
labour market subplots, the solid line represents the high-skill employment in the native household
and mH employment in the migrant household. The dashed line represents the low-skill employment
in the native household and mL in the migrant household. The impulse responses for employment
and unemployment are aggregate N jt , U
j
t . The responses are a continuation of figure 3.6
110
B.6 Model Equations
Fig. B.4 A migration shock to an economy without brain waste with integration of
migrants
Impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to high-skill migration. All household
sizes relative to the population, φj return to their steady state values - there is household transfer
as the longest landed migrants transfer to the equivalent native household. For capital the solid
line shows the economy aggregate, with the dashed line the capital by the high-skilled household,
and dotted line for migrants household. In labour market subplots, the solid line represents the
high-skill employment in the native household and mH employment in the migrant household. The
dashed line represents the low-skill employment in the native household and mL in the migrant
household. The impulse responses for employment and unemployment are aggregate N jt , U
j
t . The
responses are a continuation of figure 3.7
B.6 Model Equations
The baseline DSGE model includes 133 variables, six of which are exogenous. The
measurement equations in estimation are not presented.
Labour Market
mHt = ah(vHt )Γ
H (UHt )1−Γ
H (B.6.1)
mLt = al(vlt)Γ
L(ULt )1−Γ
L (B.6.2)
mMt = am(vMt )Γ
M (UmMt )1−Γ
M (B.6.3)
mmHt = amh(vmHt )Γ
H (UmHt )1−Γ
H (B.6.4)
mmLt = aml(vmLt )Γ
L(UmLt )1−Γ
L (B.6.5)
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θHt =
vHt
UHt
(B.6.6)
θLt =
vlt
ULt
(B.6.7)
θMt =
vMt
UMt
(B.6.8)
θmHt =
vmHt
UmHt
(B.6.9)
θmLt =
vmLt
UmLt
(B.6.10)
ΥHt =
mHt
vHt
(B.6.11)
ΥLt =
mLt
vlt
(B.6.12)
ΥMt =
mMt
vMt
(B.6.13)
ΥmHt =
mmHt
vmHt
(B.6.14)
ΥmLt =
mmLt
vmLt
(B.6.15)
ΩHt =
mHt
UHt
(B.6.16)
ΩLt =
mLt
ULt
(B.6.17)
ΩMt =
mMt
UmMt
(B.6.18)
ΩmHt =
mmHt
UmHt
(B.6.19)
ΩmLt =
mmLt
UmLt
(B.6.20)
NHt = (1− ρHn )NHt−1 +mHt−1 (B.6.21)
NLt = (1− ρLn)NLt−1 +mLt−1 (B.6.22)
NmMt = (1− ρMn )NmMt−1 +mMt−1 (B.6.23)
NmHt = (1− ρmHn )NmHt−1 +mmHt−1 (B.6.24)
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NmLt = (1− ρmLn )NmLt−1 +mmLt−1 (B.6.25)
High-Skilled Native Households
xt = kt+1 −
(
1− δzϕt
) kt
gHt+1
+ ω2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt (B.6.26)
(
cHt − κcHt−1
)−η
= µHt (B.6.27)
µHt ψ
X
t
[
1 + ω
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
= βEtµHt+1
rkt+1zt+1 + ψXt+1
(1− δ (zt+1))
gHt+2
+ ω2
(kt+2
kt+1
)2
− 1

(B.6.28)
µHt rert = βEtµHt+1rtrert+1 (B.6.29)
rkt = ψXt δ′ (zt) = ψXt δϕz
ϕ−1
t (B.6.30)
1 = nHt + uHt + lHt (B.6.31)
ΛHt =
ΦH
(
lHt
)−σl − ubHµHt
ΩHt
(B.6.32)
ΛHt = βEt
[
µMt+1w
H
t+1 +
(
1− ρHn
)
ΛHt+1 − ΦH
(
lHt+1
)−σl] (B.6.33)
Low-Skilled Native Households
1 = nLt + uLt + lLt (B.6.34)
cLt + taxLt + rertbLt = wLt nLt + rertrtbLt−1 + bLuLt (B.6.35)(
cLt − κcLt−1
)−η
= µLt (B.6.36)
µLt
[
1 + ξ
(
bLt − bL
)]
rert = βEtµLt+1rtrert+1 (B.6.37)
ΛLt =
ΦL
(
lLt
)−σl − bLµLt
ΩLt
(B.6.38)
ΛLt = βEt
[
µLt+1w
L
t+1 +
(
1− ρLn
)
ΛLt+1 − ΦL
(
lLt+1
)−σl] (B.6.39)
Migrant Households
1 = nMt + nmHt + uMt + lMt (B.6.40)
cMt +taxMt +rertbMt = wmHt nmHt +wMt nmMt +wmLt nmLt +rtrertbMt−1+ubmHumHt +ubmMumMt +umLumLt
(B.6.41)(
cMt − κcMt−1
)−η
= µMt (B.6.42)
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µMt
[
1 + ξ
(
bMt − bH
)]
rert = βEtµMt+1rtrert+1 (B.6.43)
ΛmMt =
ΦM
(
lMt
)−σl − ubmMµMt
ΩmMt
(B.6.44)
ΛMt = βEt
[
µMt+1w
M
t+1 +
(
1− ρMn
)
ΛMt+1 − ΦM
(
lMt+1
)−σl] (B.6.45)
ΛmHt = βEt
[
µMt+1w
mH
t+1 +
(
1− ρmHn
)
ΛmHt+1 − ΦM
(
lMt+1
)−σl] (B.6.46)
ΛmLt = βEt
[
µMt+1w
mL
t+1 +
(
1− ρmLn
)
ΛmLt+1 − ΦM
(
lMt+1
)−σl] (B.6.47)
ΦH(sHt )−σs = µMt UMt ubmH + ΛmHt ΩmHt UMt (B.6.48)
ΦM(sMt )−σs = µMt UMt ubmM + ΛmMt ΩmMt UMt (B.6.49)
1 = sHt + sMt + sLt (B.6.50)
Firm
rkt = phtmpkt (B.6.51)
κH
ΥHt
= βEt
µHt+1
µHt
[
pht+1mpl
H
t+1 − wHt+1 +
(
1− ρHn
) κH
ΥHt+1
]
(B.6.52)
κM
ΥMt
= βEt
µHt+1
µHt
[
pht+1mpl
H
t+1 − wMt+1 +
(
1− ρMn
) κM
ΥMt+1
]
(B.6.53)
κL
ΥLt
= βEt
µHt+1
µHt
[
pht+1mpl
L
t+1 − wLt+1 +
(
1− ρLn
) κL
ΥLt+1
]
(B.6.54)
κmH
ΥmHt
= βEt
µHt+1
µHt
[
pht+1mpl
mH
t+1 − wmHt+1 +
(
1− ρmHn
) κmH
ΥmHt+1
]
(B.6.55)
κmL
ΥmLt
= βEt
µHt+1
µHt
[
pht+1mpl
mL
t+1 − wmLt+1 +
(
1− ρmLn
) κmL
ΥmLt+1
]
(B.6.56)
yt = ψat
(αs) 1α
((αk) 1αHK αH−1αHt + (1− αk) 1αH (ξLHt )αH−1αH
) αH
αH−1

α−1
α
+ (1− αs) 1α (LLt )
α−1
α

α
α−1
(B.6.57)
LHt =
[
χ
1
θh
h (NHt )
θh−1
θh + χ
1
θh
m (NmHt )
θh−1
θh + (1− χh − χm)
1
θh (NmMt )
θh−1
θh
] θh
θh−1
(B.6.58)
LLt =
[
χ
1
θh
l (N lt)
θh−1
θh + (1− χl)
1
θh (NmLt )
θh−1
θh
] θh
θh−1 (B.6.59)
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f(K,LH)t = (αk)
1
αHK
αH−1
αH
t−1 + (1− αk)
1
αH (ξLHt )
αH−1
αH
mplHt = χ
1
θh
H (αs)
1
α (1− αk)ξ α
H−1
αH ψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1
(f(K,LH)t)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1(LHt )
αH−1
αH
−1(NHt )
−1
θh (B.6.60)
mplmHt = χ
1
θh
M (αs)
1
α (1−αk)xiα
H−1
αH ψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1
(f(K,LH)t)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1(LHt )
αH−1
αH
−1(NmHt )
−1
θh (B.6.61)
mplmMt = (1−χH−χM)
1
θh (αs) 1α (1−αk)xiα
H−1
αH ψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1
(f(K,LH)t)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1(LHt )
αH−1
αH
−1(NmMt )
−1
θh (B.6.62)
mplLt = χ
1
θh
L (1−αs)
1
αψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1 (LLt )α−1α −1(NLt )−1θh
(B.6.63)
mplmL = (1−χL)
1
θh (1−αs) 1αψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1 (LLt )α−1α −1(NmLt )−1θh
(B.6.64)
mpkt = (αs)
1
α (αk)ψAt
f(K,LH)αH (α−1)(αH−1)αt + (1− αs) 1α (LLt )α−1α
 αα−1−1
(f(K,LH)t)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1K
αH−1
αH
−1
t−1 (B.6.65)
wHt =
(
1− ϑH
) [
phtmpl
H
t +
(
1− ρHn
) κH
ΥHt
]
+ ϑ
H
µHt
[
ΦH
(
lHt
)−σl − (1− ρHn )ΛHt ]
(B.6.66)
wMt =
(
1− ϑM
) [
phtmpl
M
t +
(
1− ρMn
) κM
ΥMt
]
+ ϑ
M
µMt
[
ΦM
(
lMt
)−σl − (1− ρMn )ΛMt ]
(B.6.67)
wLt =
(
1− ϑL
) [
phtmpl
L
t +
(
1− ρLn
) κL
ΥLt
]
+ ϑ
L
µLt
[
ΦL
(
lLt
)−σl − (1− ρLn)ΛLt ]
(B.6.68)
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wmHt =
(
1− ϑmH
) [
phtmpl
mH
t +
(
1− ρmHn
) κmH
ΥmHt
]
+ϑ
mH
µMt
[
ΦM
(
lMt
)−σl − (1− ρmHn )ΛmHt ]
(B.6.69)
wmLt =
(
1− ϑmL
) [
phtmpl
mL
t +
(
1− ρmLn
) κmL
ΥmLt
]
+ϑ
mL
µMt
[
ΦM
(
lMt
)−σl − (1− ρmLn )ΛmLt ]
(B.6.70)
Government
Tt = ubHUHt + ubLULt +Gt + ubmHUmHt + ubmMUmMt + ubmLUmLt (B.6.71)
Tt = φHtaxHt + φM taxMt + φLtaxLt (B.6.72)
taxMt = Tt (B.6.73)
taxLt = Tt (B.6.74)
Aggregate variables
Ct = φHcHt + φMcMt + φLcLt (B.6.75)
bt = φHbHt + φMbMt + φLbLt (B.6.76)
Xt = φHxt (B.6.77)
Kt = φHztkt (B.6.78)
Further Labour Market
UHt = φHuHt (B.6.79)
ULt = φLuLt (B.6.80)
UmMt = φmMumMt (B.6.81)
UmHt = φmHumHt (B.6.82)
UmLt = φmLumLt (B.6.83)
UmHt = uMt sHt (B.6.84)
UmMt = uMt sMt (B.6.85)
UmLt = uMt sLt (B.6.86)
NHt = φHt nHt (B.6.87)
NLt = φLt nLt (B.6.88)
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NmMt = φmMt nmMt (B.6.89)
NmHt = φmHt nmHt (B.6.90)
NmLt = φmLt nmLt (B.6.91)
particHt ≡
NHt + UHt
φH
(B.6.92)
particLt ≡
NLt + ULt
φL
(B.6.93)
particmMt ≡
NmMt + UmMt
φmM
(B.6.94)
particmHt ≡
NmHt + UmHt
φmH
(B.6.95)
particmLt ≡
NmLt + UmLt
φmL
(B.6.96)
unempHt ≡
UHt
NHt + UHt
(B.6.97)
unempLt ≡
ULt
NLt + ULt
(B.6.98)
unempmMt ≡
UmMt
NmMt + UmMt
(B.6.99)
unempmHt ≡
UmHt
NmHt + UmHt
(B.6.100)
unempmLt ≡
UmLt
NmLt + UmLt
(B.6.101)
bwHt ≡
ubH
wHt
(B.6.102)
bwLt ≡
ubL
wLt
(B.6.103)
bwMt ≡
ubM
wMt
(B.6.104)
bwmHt ≡
ubmH
wmHt
(B.6.105)
uMt = umHt + umMt + umLt (B.6.106)
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Open Economy
rt = r∗ exp(−ϕbhc(bt − b)) (B.6.107)
v(pht )1−θ = 1− (1− v)(rert)1−θ (B.6.108)
yt = v(pht )−θ
(
Ct +Xt +Gt + κHvHt + κmHvHt + κMvMt + κLvLt + κmLvmLt
)
+ ext
(B.6.109)
ext = v∗
(
rert
pht
)θ∗
y∗t (B.6.110)
bt = rt−1
gdpt−1
gdpt
rert
rert−1
bt−1 + tbt (B.6.111)
tbt = 1−
(
Ct + ψxtXt +Gt + κHvHt + κmHvmHt + κMvMt + κLvLt + κmLvmLt
)
gdpt
(B.6.112)
gdpt = pht yt (B.6.113)
Exogenous Processes
ψt = ρψψt−1 + εψt (B.6.114)
ψat = ρψaψat−1 + εat (B.6.115)
Gt = (G)1−ρg (Gt−1)ρg exp (εgt ) (B.6.116)
ψxt = ρψxψxt−1 + εxt (B.6.117)
y∗t = ρy
∗
y∗t−1 + ε
y∗
t (B.6.118)
Population Dynamics
gt = φHt gHt + φMt gMt + φLt gLt (B.6.119)
gHt = gH (B.6.120)
gLt = gL (B.6.121)
gmMt = ρg
m
gmMt−1 + ε
gm
t (B.6.122)
gmHt = gmH (B.6.123)
gmLt = gmL (B.6.124)
φMt g
M
t = φmHt gmHt + φmMt gmMt + φmLt gmLt (B.6.125)
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φHt = (φH)(1−ρ
φ)
(
gHt
gt
φHt−1
)ρφ
(B.6.126)
φLt = (φL)(1−ρ
φ)
(
gLt
gt
φLt−1
)ρφ
(B.6.127)
φmHt = (φmH)(1−ρ
φ)
(
gmHt
gt
φmHt−1
)ρφ
(B.6.128)
φmMt = (φmM)(1−ρ
φ)
(
gmMt
gt
φmMt−1
)ρφ
(B.6.129)
φmLt = (φmL)(1−ρ
φ)
(
gmLt
gt
φmLt−1
)ρφ
(B.6.130)
φMt = φmHt + φmMt + φmLt (B.6.131)
ζHt =
NHt +NmHt +NmMt
NHt +NmHt +NmMt +NLt +NmLt
(B.6.132)
ζLt =
NLt ++NmLt
NHt +NmHt +NmMt +NLt +NmLt
(B.6.133)
B.7 Steady State
There are 137 variables, excluding the observables. Of these, six of them are exogenous
processes. We take the labour market variables, φj, particj, and unempj from the
data.
U j = φjparticjunempj (B.7.1)
N j =
(
1
unempj
− 1
)
U j (B.7.2)
mj = ρjnN j (B.7.3)
vj =
(
mj
aj(U j)1−Γj
) 1
Γj
(B.7.4)
Ωj = m
j
U j
(B.7.5)
Υj = m
j
U j
(B.7.6)
θj = v
j
U j
(B.7.7)
uj = U
j
φj
(B.7.8)
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nj = N
j
φj
(B.7.9)
li = 1− nj − uj i, j ∈ [H,L] (B.7.10)
lM = 1− nmH − nmM − nmL − uM (B.7.11)
ξH = N
H
NH +NmH (B.7.12)
ξL = N
L
NL +NmL (B.7.13)
ζH = N
H +NmH
NH +NmH +NmM +NL +NmL (B.7.14)
ζM = N
M
NH +NmH +NmM +NL +NmL (B.7.15)
ζL = N
L +NmL
NH +NmH +NmM +NL +NmL (B.7.16)
z = 1 (B.7.17)
rk = 1− β
β
+ δ (B.7.18)
r = 1
β
(B.7.19)
r∗ = 1
β
(B.7.20)
bi = 0 (B.7.21)
mpk = rk (B.7.22)
LH =
[
χ
1
θh
h (NH)
θh−1
θh + χ
1
θh
m (NmH)
θh−1
θh + (1− χh − χm)
1
θh (NmM)
θh−1
θh
] θh
θh−1
(B.7.23)
LL =
[
χ
1
θh
l (N l)
θh−1
θh + (1− χl)
1
θh (NmL)
θh−1
θh
] θh
θh−1 (B.7.24)
Aggregate capital is determined by numerical solver only - no algebraic solution
K =MPK−1
(
MPK,ΣN j
)
(B.7.25)
k = K
zφH
(B.7.26)
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y = ψa
(αs) 1α
((αk) 1αHK αH−1αH + (1− αk) 1αH (ξLH)αH−1αH ) αHαH−1

α−1
α
+ (1− αs) 1α (LL)α−1α

α
α−1
(B.7.27)
f(K,LH) = (αk)
1
αHK
αH−1
αH + (1− αk) 1αH (ξLH)α
H−1
αH
mplH = χ
1
θh
H (αs)
1
α (1− αk)ξ α
H−1
αH ψA
[
f(K,LH)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α + (1− αs) 1α (LL)α−1α
] α
α−1−1
(f(K,LH))
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1(LH)
αH−1
αH
−1(NH)
−1
θh (B.7.28)
mplmH = χ
1
θh
M (αs)
1
α (1− αk)ξ α
H−1
αH ψA
[
f(K,LH)
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α + (1− αs) 1α (LL)α−1α
] α
α−1−1
(f(K,LH))
αH (α−1)
(αH−1)α−1(LH)
αH−1
αH
−1(NmH)
−1
θh (B.7.29)
mplmM = (1−χH−χM)
1
θh (αs) 1α (1−αk)ξ α
H−1
αH ψA
[
f(K,LH)
αH (α−1)
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Chapter 4
The Resource Curse and
Migration
4.1 Introduction
The migration profile of medium-sized developing economies varies as to whether
they are net receivers or senders of migrants. In the case of Latin American countries,
historically Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (hereafter Venezuela) and less
so Brazil have been net hosts while Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay have been senders.1 2 A feature of a number of these emerging economies
is that they are prone to severe economic crises, the likes rarely experienced by
developed and diversified economies. These can be accompanied by a devaluation
in currency and/or government default.3 Often made worse by the dollarisation of
government debt.
Both Argentina and Venezuela are examples of countries that suffer from a
resource curse and experience macroeconomic populism.4 The resource curse is
experienced by commodity dependent non-advanced economies for which the effects
can be political and economic.5 If we dissect the OPEC member countries, none of
1The International Organisation for Migration provides migration flow estimates based on data
such as visas granted. For a discussion on migration in Latin America see Zlotnik (1998)
2Venezuela was defined as an emerging economy by Morgan Stanley Capital International
Emerging Market Index until 2006 when it was reclassified as a standalone economy. The UN
defines all Latin American countries as developing.
3See Reinhart (2002), Reinhart et al. (2003), and Na et al. (2018). In Reinhart (2002), the
unconditional probability of a large devaluation in any 2-year period is 17%. However, if there is a
default in the 2-year period, the probability of a large devaluation is 84%. Bleaney (2005) for an
analysis of currency collapse in emerging economies.
4The resource curse for oil economies is discussed in Humphreys et al. (2007).
5For a history of the Venezuelan economy, including fiscal and monetary policy see Restuccia
(2018) and Bello et al. (2011). For Latin America political economy and economic development see
Grilli (2005).
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them would be described as advanced economies. In terms of politics, the resource
wealth can have harmful effects including supporting authoritarian regimes, higher
levels of corruption, and the incitement of violent conflict (Ross, 2015). The economic
side is primarily a dependence on the sale of the commodity as an export, so focus is
shifted away from domestic manufacturing industries or a developed service sector.
When the price falls there is large macroeconomic instability that is transmitted
through channels including the real exchange rate (Frankel, 2010). Including high
unemployment and emigration as workers search for employment elsewhere. Without
a developed industry that workers can transfer their skills to, and a reliance on
imports resulting in shortages, the economic losses continue.
We apply the model to Venezuela due to the length of macroeconomic, oil specific,
and migration data available. The research in this paper looks at the effects of the
shocks in Venezuela, the policy implications and how they can be used to prevent
other resource cursed, macroeconomic populist countries following their example.
Once a country of destination, Venezuela has become a sender of migrants
in the last two decades. The change to migrant sender has been caused by the
economic conditions brought on by the resource curse and macroeconomic populism
under President Hugo Chávez and most recently President Nicolàs Maduro, has
resulted in a deteriorating labour market, unstable currency, goods shortages, and
increasingly hard to access services.6 President Maduro's drive to keep Venezuela’s
international status by not defaulting on debt has led to a humanitarian crisis.
The result of the economic crisis in Venezuela has shrunk GDP from a high of
554bn US$ in 2013 to 331bn US$ in 2018.7 The accelerating factor is considered
to be the 2014 fall in oil prices.8 The stock of Venezuelans worldwide, increased
10-fold since 2004 (International Organisation for Migration, 2019). One reason
for an increase in emigration was the country’s participation is MECOSUR, an
economic and political bloc providing a common labour market with Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and subsequently joined by Bolivia. Venezuela’s
membership was suspended in December 2016.9 An estimated 2.9 million Venezuelan
residents emigrated between April 2017 and March 2018 (Hausmann et al., 2018). The
emigration of Venezuelans has grown exponentially since 2015, the extent to which
6A strict enforcement of currency controls have limited private imports which make the country
dependent on its own produce.
7IMF, see table C.1
8As of December 2018, oil production is at the same level as 1930s. Nationalisation of PDVSA
(Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A) in 1976 can partially be attributed to the fall in production. The
price of Venezuelan crude oil in mid-2014 was just under $100 per barrel, this had fallen to $47 by
the end of 2014, and by the end of 2015 was just $29.
9Venezuela only gained full membership in 2012 but was eligible for many of the benefits prior
to this.
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the Venezuelan government created the migration police to limit emigration using
increased border patrols, and the increased expense of a passport. The migration
crisis is referred to as the Venezuelan diaspora (also as the Bolivarian diaspora). The
migrants fleeing economic crises in particular, experience difficulties in attaining
secure employment. Illegal migration is recognised in Colombia where, in 2018, the
Colombian government estimated that 45,000 of the 870,093 Venezuelans in Colombia
have expired visas or crossed the border illegally (International Organisation for
Migration and Colombia Migration).10 One significant issue for Venezuela is the flight
of human and physical capital. The loss of high skilled workers through emigration,
equivalently brain drain, has left gaps in the labour market.11 Of those leaving, are
a high number of business owners which due to the deteriorating economy leads to
capital flight.
In this paper, we examine the role of economic contraction of an economy as
the driver for emigration in an estimated two-country dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model using data from Venezuela and the United States. The
cause is a negative shock to oil price. We use occasionally binding migration policies
which reflect a difficulty in migration either legally or illegally. For legal migration
it reflects increased challenges in attaining a working visa or means of working
abroad legally. This can lead to an increase in illegal migration. The constraint on
illegal migration is by way of increased efficiency of a border force, and finally the
deportation of illegal migrants.
This paper differs from the existing literature on emigration with the inclusion of
illegal and legal endogenous migration where the focus is on the effects of the sending
economy, the use of occasionally binding migration policies, (asymmetric) labour
market frictions, and the endogenous price and supply of oil decisions. We use a real
business cycle (RBC) model, as Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) demonstrate that RBC
models with financial frictions can reflect the business cycles of emerging economies
well. This is a basis for the commodity producing nation research by Drechsel
and Tenreyro (2018). A considerable portion of the literature on Latin America
focuses on Argentina and Mexico, and oil price shocks for oil exporting nations are
predominantly focused elsewhere such as Norway. In terms of the commodity prices
literature, additional contributions of this paper include that the price and supply of
oil is endogenous, and labour market frictions.
10The top 10 destination countries for Venezuelan emigrants (2013): United States, Spain, Italy,
Colombia, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Canada, Mexico, Argentina (World Bank,
2016). In 2018, the top 4 countries were: Colombia, Peru, Spain and United States (International
Organisation for Migration, 2019).
11See Arias and Guerra-Salas (2019) which discusses the high-skill immigration of Venezuelans
and effects of immigration shock to an emerging economy in an OLG model.
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The remainder of this paper is as follows, section 4.2 discusses existing literature
on emigration, emerging economies, and commodities. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 set out
the model and its constraints. Section 4.5 presents the calibration and estimation
results. Section 4.6 analyses the results from the model, and finally section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The research in this paper adds to the migration literature by examining emigration
from a developing economy with legal and illegal migration, and the inclusion of
occasionally binding migration policies. In this paper we are able to evaluate how
emigration effects an economy, how much the economic contraction is a driver of
emigration and the role of constraints in the emigration decision. Here we discuss
some of the literature in commodities and emigration. The combination of emigration
and commodities is unexplored in DSGE literature, including two-country models,
and similarly the analysis of migration policies.
Much of the literature on commodity price shocks focuses on the purchaser where
price rises have been shown to cause recessions (Kim and Loungani (1992), and e.g.
United States 2001 Barsky and Kilian (2004)). However, there are a number of
papers, including Bodenstein et al. (2018), that examine the role of the producing
nation. A significant portion of the literature on commodity prices makes the price
and/or supply exogenous. Where oil is the commodity, there are a select few papers
including Bergholt et al. (2017) and Arora and Gomis-Porqueras (2011) using a
New Keynesian and RBC approach respectively. Santos (2016) used a basic RBC
to attempt to replicate the business cycle of Venezuela as an oil producing country
while a number of papers have tried to examine to oil-consuming countries Kose
et al. (2003), Barsky and Kilian (2004), Kilian (2009), and Bodenstein et al. (2011).
For commodities in emerging economies, an RBC example includes Drechsel and
Tenreyro (2018), and a New Keynesian model in Medina and Soto (2005) and Medina
and Soto (2007) for Chile. Agnani and Iza (2011) discuss growth in an oil-abundant
economy with an application to Venezuela. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) compare
business cycles, focusing on the Solow residual, in Mexico and Canada using a small
open economy model and comparing the results of estimation. Their results show
that emerging markets’ business cycles are driven by shocks to the stochastic trend
whereas developed economies have stable trends. There are two-country models in
which one is an emerging economy and the other a developed such as Ozkan and
Unsal (2017) who use South Korea and the United States in a study of the effects of
a global financial crisis on an emerging economy.
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Bandeira et al. (2018) examine emigration in peripheral Euro area countries
and the focus on fiscal implications of emigration in a small open economy that
employs debt consolidation. Migration effects are examined on the business cycle with
responses for a total factor productivity (TFP), monetary policy, and a government
spending shock. For fiscal consolidation, labour tax increases, cuts in unemployment
benefits, and public spending cuts. There are no limits to emigration as the countries
under focus are part of the European labour market. Bandeira et al. (2019) specifies
the country to Greece. Our paper differs in that we use a developing economy that
has a commodity sector shock as the driver rather than TFP and is not in a monetary
union. The downturns of the developed economies are of a smaller severity to those
under examination in this paper due to the diversification of industries. Additionally,
this paper uses a shock to the oil price rather than those typically used in business
cycle analysis.
Lazaretou (2016) empirically analyses the effects of emigration in Greece during
the financial crisis with a focus on skilled emigration.12 Of note, during 2013 alone,
Greece lost 2.2% of its workforce through emigration. This was three times the levels
of emigration experienced in 2008. The results are largely negative. The loss of the
workforce has detrimental effects, however, there is an increase in remittances. Due
to brain waste, remittances are not as high as they could be as the migrants are
overqualified and underpaid in the host country.13 There are positive responses on
the return to education. As some of the emigrants were unemployed, on the one
hand it decreased the burden on the social security system. However, as the majority
of emigrants were of working-age, which negatively affects the birth rate, in the long
run it increases the burden on the social security system. The full (macroeconomic)
effects won’t be fully realised for a number of years, particularly if the migrants do
not return.
There is a large literature that studies the emigration of Mexicans to the United
States. This includes Mandelman and Zlate (2012) who use a two-country model
with an endogenous migration decision based on the wage premium however these
two country models focus on the macroeconomics results of the host country. Kiguchi
and Mountford (2017) analyse the United States using an empirical and DSGE model
with search and matching frictions.
Mehra (2017) uses an occasionally binding constraint, in terms of imposing a cap
to the number of foreign skilled workers that can be hired each period. She notes
12It is worthy to note that Greece is defined as an emerging economy by Morgan Stanley Capital
International Emerging Market Index.
13Brain drain is the loss of skilled workers in an economy through emigration. Brain waste is the
underemployment of migrants in the host economy.
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that the cap imposed by the United States government is non-binding in periods
such as recessions. Alternatively, the constraint is binding when demand for foreign
labour is greater than the imposed quota. She offers an extension to her model that
includes search and matching frictions in the migrant receiving economy to analyse
the effects of immigration on (un)employment of natives whereas this paper uses
search and matching frictions as core to our model. Other research using occasionally
binding constraints in migration models focus on credit constraints, such as Bahadir
et al. (2018). In their research, they analyse how the receipt of remittances affect the
economy. When remittances are predominantly to the credit constrained households,
the effects are contractionary for the economy. However, when the remittances go to
mostly entrepreneur households, the effects are expansionary. The role of remittances
in the informal economy is analysed in Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2018). Since
informal employment has poorer labour market conditions than the formal sector,
it has negative effects for the home economy. The effect of a temporary shock to
remittance inflows results in depreciation of the real exchange rate and a contraction
of GDP. Remittances can be shown to increase corruption, for example, governments
getting a cut through exchange rate controls. However, Tyburski (2012) argues that
remittances to Mexico actually reverse the resource curse.
A large portion of the literature analyses the effects of migration on the host
country, with less examination of the sending country. There is limited use of
occasionally binding constraints in the migration literature, and absence of analysis
of oil prices in the Venezuelan business cycles which together forms motivation for
our paper.
4.3 Baseline Model
We present a two-country model where each country is populated by infinitely lived
households, perfectly competitive firms, and a fiscal authority. The primary country
is referred to as Home which is a developing and resource cursed country. The
second country, referred to as Foreign, is an oil-consuming developed economy. The
asymmetries extend beyond the production versus consumption of oil. The countries
differ in GDP per capita, relative population size, openness to trade, steady state
technology, credit-worthiness, and whether they are migrant senders or hosts.
The households are intertemporal optimisers who provide labour services that
are subject to search and matching frictions, participate in international financial
markets and own the final-good producing firms. The agents in Home have domestic
employment opportunities in a perfectly competitive final good producing and an
oil-producing firm. A third source of employment requires migration to Foreign,
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where they can find employment in an oil-consuming firm. The migration decision for
the household is endogenous based upon employment opportunity success, and it is
subject to a migration cost which increases when there are constraints on migration.
Their employment status in Foreign can be legal or illegal under migration constraints.
The households in Foreign have a choice of being employed in the oil-consuming firm,
or being unemployed. All agents are economically active.
There exists a series of perfectly competitive final good producing firms in Home
that employ labour and capital services in production. They post vacancies at a
cost and engage in wage bargaining with workers. There are oil-producing firms in
Home that produces oil using capital and labour.14 By introducing a second type of
firm in the Home economy, we are allowing oil to be separate from the domestically
produced final good. In Foreign, there are perfectly competitive oil-consuming firms
that employ labour and capital services. The firms post vacancies at a cost and
employ a composite of Foreign and migrant labour. The workers are imperfect
substitutes, and due to brain waste, the migrants experience poorer labour market
conditions.15 The capital services consist of oil and physical capital. A contribution
of this paper, by having an oil-consuming firm in Foreign, is the price, demand, and
supply of oil is able to be determined by market forces in addition to a shock.
In each country, there is a government that consumes, collects taxes, and borrows
from financial markets to finance deficits. Part of the governments' consumption
includes defence spending which is proportional to the illegal migration rate.
In this paper, we introduce occasionally binding migration policies. The first
constraint introduces a limit on legal migration, which makes a share of migrants
illegal. This leads to negative labour market effects for the migrants. Their bargaining
power, security in employment, and the wage level have all decreased. The reduction
in wage level is inclusive of other employment benefits. The second constraint
focuses on limiting migration altogether, legal and illegal. This further worsens the
labour market conditions of migrants, by reducing migration more agents remain
unemployed in Home. The final constraint causes a destruction of matches where
illegal migrants are removed from employment in Foreign. The destruction occurs
either when they have already been employed or during the migration process. The
occasionally binding migration policies are described further in section 4.4.
14The oil sector is critical to representing exports for Venezuela as it accounts for approximately
96% of exports and in excess of 20% of GDP during the observed period. In 2016, the oil sector
accounted for 12% of GDP, however, this was after the significant fall in oil price in 2014.
15Brain waste results from the migration constraints and a basic form in terms of higher frictions
in the labour market.
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4.3.1 Labour Market
There is a total number of native agents in country i, Ni, where i ∈ [H.F ] for
Home and Foreign respectively. For Home, the agents are working or searching for
employment both in Home and Foreign. The natives residing in Home, are denoted
by NHt , and those in Foreign by mt. Thus the native population is given by,
Total Home Population
NH = NHt +mt (4.3.1)
All household members are in a type of employment, njt or unemployed ujt . Employ-
ment is in one of the three types of firms. For Home agents, j ∈ H,M , where H is
the final good producing firm in Home, and M is the oil-consuming firm in Foreign.
The two types of firms in Home are modelled in a way that the oil producing, and
final good producing firm are a collective such that employees are distributed between
the two depending on labour demand. There is one wage level and the steady state
marginal products of labour are equal. The effective labour hours that are dedicated
to either the final good producing or oil-producing sector is dependent on the relative
productiveness of the sector. Hence, nHt includes those working in the oil and final
good producing sectors.16
Unemployed members of the households in Home can either search for employment
in the Home labour market or in the Foreign labour market, specific to migrants
due to the imperfect substitutability of native and migrant workers. A share of
unemployed members, λHt , are searching for employment in Home. The remainder,
1−λHt , search for employment in Foreign. We can define the agents residing in Home
as
Effective Home Population
NHt = nHt + λHt uHt (4.3.2)
Therefore, the effective migrant stock, mt, consists of the migrants who have already
emigrated and those who are searching for employment in Foreign, (1− λHt )uHt .
Effective Migrant Stock
mt = nMt + (1− λHt )uHt (4.3.3)
We set immigration of Foreign agents to Home to zero, due to the wage premium, so
that the total available workforce in Home is, NHt . Agents who become unemployed
in Foreign, can remain in Foreign or return to Home to search for employment. When
migration constraints are imposed, the employed migrants are either illegal or legal.
The (relative) size varies depending on the migration constraints and business cycle
16By modelling this way, there is a choice of employment in Home and Foreign rather than Home,
oil producing, and Foreign.
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status since migration is driven by employment opportunities. Illegal migrants are
denoted by nILt and legal migrants by nLt .
Migrant Employment with Constraints
nMt = nILt + nLt (4.3.4)
The portion of migrants that are illegal is given by ℵt.17
Illegal Immigrant Share
ℵt = n
IL
t
nMt
(4.3.5)
In Foreign, there are a number of native agents, NF, which is normalised to 1. These
agents are either employed in the oil-consuming firms or unemployed in Home as
migration from Foreign to Home by agents native to Foreign is zero due to the wage
premium of Foreign over Home. For these agents, j ∈ F where F is the identification
of agents native to Foreign in the labour market.
Foreign Population
NF = nFt + uFt (4.3.6)
The effective population of Foreign, NFt is given by.
Effective Foreign Population
NFt = NF +mt (4.3.7)
The number of unemployed workers, uit, where i ∈ H,F , searching for a job at the
start of the period is given by,
uHt = 1− (1− ρHn )nHt−1 − (1− ρMn )nMt−1 (4.3.8)
And in Foreign,
uFt = 1− (1− ρFn )nFt−1 (4.3.9)
Where ρjn is the exogenous periodic destruction rate of employment for type j. The
unemployment rate is given by u˜it.
Home Unemployment Rate
u˜Ht = 1− nHt − nMt (4.3.10)
Foreign Unemployment Rate
u˜Ft = 1− nFt (4.3.11)
17While illegal migration does not feature in the baseline model, i.e. ℵ = 0, we define it here to
aid explanation of the model.
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We introduce asymmetric search and matching frictions to reflect the different
difficulties in gaining employment in the different sectors; primarily in Foreign where
migrants experience increased frictions in searching for employment. For each type
of employment j, there is a matching function of the form:
Matching Technology
mjt = aj(vjt )Γ
j(ujt)(1−Γ
j) j ∈ [H,F,M ] (4.3.12)
Where vjt is the vacancies posted by firms, aj reflects the efficiency of the matching
process, and Γj, the elasticity of the matching technology with respect to vacancies.
The probability of a worker being hired, ζjt , the probability of the firm filling a
vacancy, γjt , and labour market tightness θjt are given by,
Probability of Finding Employment
ζjt =
mjt
ujt
(4.3.13)
Probability of Filling a Vacancy
γjt =
mjt
vjt
(4.3.14)
Labour Market Tightness
θjt =
vjt
ujt
(4.3.15)
Therefore, the law of motion of employment evolves according to
Employment Dynamics
njt = (1− ρjn)njt−1 +mjt (4.3.16)
4.3.2 Households in Home
The household has members working in Home or in Foreign. Those working in
Foreign send remittances. In the household living in Home the income is pooled to
allow the same consumption amongst all members irrespective of their employment
status. The household experiences a utility function of the GHH form (Greenwood
et al., 1988),
Home Household Utility Function
Ut = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ψtc
H
t − ϕ01+ϕ
(
hHt
)1+ϕ)1−σc
1− σc (4.3.17)
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Where Et is the expectations operator at time t, β is the intertemporal discount
factor, cHt total household consumption in Home of the final good, hHt is the hours
worked by the household, σc is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ϕ0 is the
weight on labour hours, and ϕ is the inverse of labour supply elasticity. To reflect the
high volatility of consumption in emerging economies, the household is subject to a
preference shock on consumption, ψt, which is a first order autoregressive process.
Where ρψ is the autoregressive parameter, and εψt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean
and a constant variance, σ2ψ.
Consumption Preference Shock
lnψt = ρψ lnψt−1 + εψt (4.3.18)
The household in Home consumes units a final consumption good, cHt and pays
lump-sum taxes, Taxt. The household smooths its consumption with bond purchases
in the international financial market, d∗t where pFHt is the price of the Foreign good
in Home. Emigration costs are identified by Ωt (see section 4.3.2.2). This is financed
by labour earnings from Home, wHt , and remittances, Ξt, sent by household members
working in Foreign. Additionally, households receive time invariant unemployment
insurance, ubH , paid to those searching in Home. The return paid on borrowing
from the international markets are given by rt. Carried over stocks of bonds are
deflated by the gross growth rate of working-age population N
H
t
NHt−1
= gHt for Home.
The households receive dividends from the firms, Πt.
Budget Constraint in Home
cHt +Taxt+pFHt
d∗t−1
gHt
(1+rt−1)+Ωt = wHt nHt hHt +λHt uHt ub+pFHtd
∗
t+Πt+pFHtΞt (4.3.19)
The agents working in Foreign are credit constrained so finance their consumption,
lump-sum taxes. and remittances by the labour income, wMt . A number of migrants
in Foreign are eligible for unemployment insurance, ubM , which is adjusted using
the replacement rate. The migrants who are working illegally in Foreign, receive a
reduced income, the rate ∆w ∈ (0, 1] is fraction that they earn of the wage paid to
legal migrants.18
Budget Constraint of Migrants
cMt + Ξt + TaxMt = wMt nMt hHt (1− ℵt) + wMt nMt hHt ℵt∆w + ubMuMt (4.3.20)
18As well as loss of labour income, some additional employment benefits are lost. For simplicity,
these are accounted for by ∆w
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The consolidated household budget constraint combines equations 4.3.19 and 4.3.20.
Consolidated Household Budget Constraint
cHt + Taxt + pFHt
d∗t−1
gHt
(1 + rt−1) + Ωt + pFHtc
M
t + pFHtTaxMt =
wHt n
H
t h
H
t +λHt uHt ubH+pFHtub
M(1−λHt )uHt +pFHtd∗t+pFHtwMt nMt hHt (1−ℵt)+pFHtwMt nMt hHt ℵt∆w+Πt
(4.3.21)
The final consumption bundle is formed of a Home produced good, cht , and a
Foreign produced good, cft . The Home bias in the consumption bundle is identified
by v, and θ is the elasticity of substitution between the Home and Foreign produced
good.
cHt =
[
v
1
θ
(
cht
) θ−1
θ + (1− v) 1θ
(
cft
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
(4.3.22)
The price index of the final good, Pt, is chosen to be numeraire. Consequently, all
other prices are expressed relative to the Home final good.
The optimisation problem for the household is given by:
max
cHt ,n
H
t ,n
M
t ,d
∗
t
βt
∞∑
t=0
Et
(
ψtc
H
t − ϕ01+ϕ
(
hHt
)1+ϕ)1−σc
1− σc
wHt n
H
t h
H
t +λHt uHt ub+pFHtub
M(1−λHt )uHt +pFHtd∗t+pFHtnMt hHt wMt ((1−ℵt)+ℵt∆w)+Πt
= cHt + Taxt + pFHt
d∗t−1
gHt
(1 + rt−1) + Ωt + pFHtc
M
t
nHt = (1− ρHn )nHt−1 + ζHt uHt λHt
nMt = (1− ρMn )nMt−1 + ζMt uHt (1− λHt )
Using the law of motion for employment as in the optimisation problem allows
the household to account the effect of the unemployment decisions on matches rather
than taking the number of matches as in equation 4.3.16.19 Equation 4.3.13 is
substituted into equation 4.3.16 to account for the employment opportunities.
The household maximises utility and the budget constraint with respect to con-
sumption, employment, search intensity, and financial market investments. Marginal
utility of consumption is denoted by µHt , and η
j
t is the Lagrange multiplier on the
law of motion of employment of type j.
19This is only partial as the full effect would require equation 4.3.12 to be substituted into 4.3.16.
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Marginal Utility of Consumption
µHt = ψt
(
cHt −
ϕ0
1 + ϕ(h
H
t )(1+ϕ)
)−σ
(4.3.23)
Euler equation
µHt p
F
Ht = β
µHt+1p
F
Ht+1
gHt+1
(1 + rt) (4.3.24)
Search intensity
µHt ub
H + ηHt ζHt uHt = µHt ubM + µHt
∂Ωt
∂λHt
+ ηMt ζMt uHt (4.3.25)
The surplus of a match to the household is given by the marginal value of
employment less the marginal value of unemployment. By the envelope theorem, the
worker surpluses for employment in Home and Foreign is given by
Home Worker Surplus
ηHt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
H
t )1+ϕ + (wHt hHt − ubh) + (1− ρhn)β
µHt+1
µHt
ηHt+1(1− ζHt+1) (4.3.26)
Migrant Worker Surplus
ηMt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
H
t )1+ϕ+(wMt hHt ((1− ℵt) + ℵt∆w)−ubm)+(1−ρmn )β
µHt+1
µHt
ηHt+1(1−ζMt+1)−
∂Ωt
∂uHMt
(4.3.27)
4.3.2.1 Remittances
The role of exchange rate provides an additional dimension to the role of the
remittances. We follow the remittance rule as in Mandelman and Zlate (2012)
and Finkelstein Shapiro and Mandelman (2016). Remittances are assumed to be
countercyclical and follow the wage premium of Foreign over Home.20
Remittances
Ξt = Ξ¯ϱΞ
(
wMt
wHt
)ξ
ξ > 0 (4.3.28)
The size of remittances is proportional to the wage premium of Foreign over Home.
Since the elasticity of remittances to wages ξ > 0, an increase in the wage premium
will result in an increase in remittances.
20See section C.4 of the appendix for remittances received in Venezuela
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4.3.2.2 Emigration Costs
When a member of the household decides to emigrate, there is a monetary cost
incurred. The migration costs are captured by ω1 and ω2, where ω1 is the scale
parameter and ω2 is the elasticity of the migration cost. This migration cost includes
the search, visa application fee, and the relocation fee. The search cost to the
household is given by
Emigration Costs
Ωt = ω1
(
(1− λHt )uHt
)ω2 (4.3.29)
An extended version, where there are additional costs for illegal migration, which is
dependent on the efficiency of the border force, would modify equation 4.3.29 to
Ωt = ω1
(
(1− λHt )uHt + bft
)ω2
4.3.3 Households in Foreign
The household in Foreign gains utility from consumption, cFt and disutility from
labour services, hFt . They provide labour to the oil-consuming firms in Foreign, nFt .
Income is pooled to allow the same consumption amongst all members irrespective
of their employment status. The household experiences a GHH utility function.
Foreign Household Utility Function
UFt = βF
t
Et
∞∑
t=0
(
cFt − ϕ
F
0
1+ϕF
(
hFt
)1+ϕF)1−σcF
1− σcF
(4.3.30)
There is a specific discount factor βF to Foreign, the parameters for coefficient of
relative risk aversion, σcF , weight on hours, ϕF0 , and inverse of labour supply elasticity,
ϕF are specific to the household in Foreign.
The final consumption bundle for agents in Foreign is formed of the Home
produced good, cht , and the Foreign produced good, c
f
t . The Home bias in the
consumption bundle is identified by vF , and θF is the elasticity of substitution
between the Home and Foreign produced good.
cFt =
[
(vf )
1
θF
(
cht
) θF−1
θF + (1− vf ) 1θF
(
cft
) θF−1
θF
] θF
θF−1
(4.3.31)
The price index of the final good, P Ft , is chosen to be numeraire. Consequently, all
other prices are expressed relative to the Foreign final good.
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They face a budget constraint, where expenditures including consumption, cFt ,
purchase of one-period bonds, d∗t , and pay lump-sum taxes, TaxFt are financed by
labour earnings, wFt , unemployment insurance, ubF , return on the previous period’s
bond purchases and profits from the firm, ΠFt . Carried over stocks of bonds are
deflated by the gross growth rate of working-age population N
F
t
NFt−1
= gFt in Foreign.
Household in Foreign Budget Constraint
cFt + pFFtd
∗
t + TaxFt = wFt nFt hFt + uFt ubF + pFFt
d∗t−1(1 + rFt )
gFt
+ΠFt (4.3.32)
The household maximises utility with respect to consumption, bond holdings, and
employment status. Marginal utility of consumption is denoted by µFt , and ηFt is the
Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion of employment.
max
cFt ,n
F
t ,d
∗
t
βF
t
∞∑
t=0
Et
(
cFt − ϕ01+ϕ
(
hFt
)1+ϕ)1−σc
1− σc
nFt w
F
t h
F
t +ΠFt + pFFt
d∗t−1
gFt
(1 + rFt−1) + uFt ubF = cFt + pFFtd
∗
t + TaxFt
nFt = (1− ρFn )nFt−1 + ζFt−1uFt
Marginal Utility of Consumption
µFt =
(
cFt −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
F
t )(1+ϕ)
)−σ
cF
(4.3.33)
Euler Equation
1
1 + rft
= βF µ
F
t+1
µFt
pFFt+1
pFFt
1
gFt+1
(4.3.34)
The surplus of a match to the household is given by the marginal value of employment
less the marginal value of unemployment.
Foreign Worker Surplus
ηFt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
F
t )1+ϕ + (wFt hFt − ubf ) + (1− ρhn)βF
µFt+1
µFt
ηFt+1(1− ζFt+1) (4.3.35)
By applying the envelope theorem, this is formed from the first order conditions for
employment and unemployment.
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4.3.4 Firms
There are three types of firms: final good producers, oil-producers, and oil-consuming
final good producers. The firms in Home that produce the final good and oil, employ
capital and labour services. In Foreign, the oil-consuming firms use a composite of
capital inputs consisting of oil and physical capital, along with labour to produce
a final good. Current employment conditions in each sector is determined by the
labour market conditions in the previous period, therefore the firms are only able to
influence the next period value by respecting the constraints imposed by frictions of
labour markets, and any migration constraints in the case of Foreign.
4.3.4.1 Final Good Producers
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms in Home. Output is denoted
by yHt with a relative price, pHHt . Production uses capital, kHt , and labour, lHt , and
output is subject to a productivity shock, ψat .21
Home Final Good Production Function
yHt = ψat (kHt−1)α(lHt )1−α (4.3.36)
Where the parameter α governs the intensity of capital services in production. Total
factor productivity, ψat is a first order autoregressive process. Where ρa is the
autoregressive parameter, and εat is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant
variance, σ2a.
Home TFP
lnψat = ρa lnψat−1 + εat (4.3.37)
Current capital stocks are equal to the previous period’s capital stock, depreciated
at a rate δ, and current investment, xHt with conventional investment adjustment
cost functions, ι(xHt , xHt−1).22 Carried over capital stocks are deflated by the inverse
growth rate of the population in Home, gHt .
Capital Accumulation
kHt = (1− δ)
kHt−1
gHt
+ ψxt ι(xHt , xHt−1) (4.3.38)
21For simplicity, we do not use oil in the final good production. The majority of oil produced by
the country is exported and price is determined largely by international market forces and shocks.
22The derivatives of the adjustment costs are given in equations C.7.1 and C.7.2 in section C.7.
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Investment Adjustment Costs
ι(xHt , xHt−1) = κxxHt
1− ϕx2
(
xHt
xHt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.39)
The process of posting vacancies has a variable cost, κ(vHt , vHt−1) that depend on the
rate at which vacancies are posted, and a fixed cost κH as in Pissarides (1985) who
assumes the firm has to pay a fixed cost before the bargaining process can begin.
Vacancy Posting Adjustment Costs
κ(vHt , vHt−1) = κHv vHt
1 + ϕHv2
(
vHt
vHt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.40)
Due to inefficiencies in the labour market, firms are constrained by the laws
of motion of employment. The firm’s law of motion of employment reflects how
vacancies affect the number of matches by substituting equation 4.3.14 into equation
4.3.16.
nHt = (1− ρHn )nHt−1 + γHt vHt
The firm seeks to maximise profits subject to the capital accumulation constraint,
the law of motion of employment, labour costs, and vacancy posting costs. There
are two Lagranian multipliers: ΥHt on the law of motion of employment, and Tobin’s
q, tqt on capital accumulation.
max
xHt ,k
H
t ,v
H
t ,n
H
t
βt
∞∑
t=0
Etµt
[
pHHty
H
t − wHt lHt − xHt − κ(vHt , vHt−1)− κHγHt
]
kHt = (1− δ)
kHt−1
gHt
+ ι(xHt , xHt−1)
nHt = (1− ρHn )nHt−1 + γHt vHt
The maximisation process results in the following first order conditions.
Investment
1 = tqt
∂ι(xHt , xHt−1)
∂xHt
+ Etβ
µt+1
µt
tqt+1
∂ι(xHt+1, xHt )
∂xHt
(4.3.41)
Tobin's Q
tqt = β
µt+1
µt
[
α
pHHtyt+1
kHt
+ (1− δ)tqt+1
gHt+1
]
(4.3.42)
Vacancies
γHt (ΥHt − κH) =
∂(vHt , vHt−1)
∂vHt
+ βµ
H
t+1
µHt
∂(vHt+1, vHt )
∂vHt
(4.3.43)
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Where the expected benefit from posting a vacancy, γHt (ΥHt − κH) is equal to the
marginal cost of posting a vacancy. The Lagrangian multiplier on employment, ΥHt ,
gives the value that the firm places on an additional unit of employment. Using the
envelope theorem, the surplus of the firm per additional unit of employment is given
by:
Home Firm Match Value
ΥHt =
(
(1− α) pHHt
yHt
lHt
− wHt
)
hHt +
(
1− ρhn
)
β
µHt+1
µHt
ΥHt+1 (4.3.44)
The firm raises profits when the marginal product of labour exceeds the wage paid
to workers. When the match survives, the firm experiences a continuation value.
4.3.4.2 Oil-consuming Firms
The perfectly competitive firms in Foreign are oil consumers, in addition they employ
capital and a composite of labour from Foreign natives and migrants as described in
the production for output, yFt .
Foreign Production Function
yFt = ψa
F
t
(
IFt
)αF (
LFt
)1−αF
(4.3.45)
The parameter αF governs the intensity of capital inputs in production. Total
factor productivity, ψaFt is a first order autoregressive process. Where ρa
F is the
autoregressive parameter, and εaFt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant
variance, σ2aF .
Foreign TFP
lnψaFt = ρa
F lnψaFt−1 + εa
F
t (4.3.46)
Labour supply to the oil-consuming firm, LFt consists of labour services native to
Foreign, nFt , and migrants, nMt ; where 1−χ is the share of migrants employed by the
firm. The workers are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, the impact of immigration
will have negligible effects on the labour market conditions for Foreign natives.
Labour Supply
LFt =
(
nFt h
F
t
)χ (
nMt h
H
t
)1−χ
(4.3.47)
The capital services, IFt , oil and capital, are given in a CES function where τF is the
elasticity of substitution between oil and capital and ΦF = τF−1
τF
. The share of oil in
capital services is given by νF . The firms’ demand for oil is given by yOFt .
140
4.3 Baseline Model
Production Inputs
IFt =
[
νF (yOFt)
ΦF + (1− νF )(kFt−1)Φ
F
] 1
ΦF (4.3.48)
Current capital stocks are equal to the previous period’s capital stock, depreciated
at a rate δF , and current investment, xFt subject to investment adjustment costs,
ι(xFt , xFt−1).23 Carried over capital stocks are deflated by the inverse growth rate of
the population in Foreign, gFt .
Capital Accumulation
kFt = (1− δF )
kFt−1
gFt
+ ι(xFt , xFt−1) (4.3.49)
Investment Adjustment Costs
ι(xFt , xFt−1) = κx
F
xFt
1− ϕxF2
(
xFt
xFt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.50)
Vacancies are posted at a cost with a fixed component, κF and κM as well as a variable
cost κ(vFt , vFt−1) and κ(vMt , vMt−1) for the Foreign natives and migrants respectively.
Vacancy Posting Adjustment Costs
κ(vFt , vFt−1) = κFv vFt
1 + ϕFv2
(
vFt
vFt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.51)
κ(vMt , vMt−1) = κMv vMt
1 + ϕMv2
(
vMt
vMt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.52)
The oil-consuming firm seeks to maximise profits subject to the capital accumulation
constraint, the law of motion for employment, labour costs, oil consumption, and
vacancy posting costs. There are Lagrangian multipliers on the law of motion of
employment, ΥFt and ΥMt , and Tobin’s q, tqFt on the capital accumulation constraint.
max
xFt ,k
F
t ,y
O
t ,v
F
t ,v
M
t ,n
F
t ,n
M
t
βF
t
∞∑
t=0
Et
[
pFFty
F
t −xFt −POFtyOt −wFt nFt hFt −wFt nMt hHt ((1−ℵt)+ℵt∆w)
− κ(vFt , vFt−1)− κ(vMt , vMt−1)− κFγFt − κMγMt
]
kFt = (1− δF )
kFt−1
gFt
+ ι(xFt , xFt−1)
23See section C.7.1 of the appendix, equations C.7.3 and C.7.4 for the derivations
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nFt = (1− ρFn )nFt−1 + γFt vFt
nMt = (1− ρFn )nMt−1 + γMt vMt
The first order conditions for investment, physical capital, vacancies posted, and oil
are given by,
Investment
1 = tqFt
∂(xFt , xFt−1)
∂xFt
+ βF µ
F
t+1
µFt
tqFt+1
∂(xFt+1, xFt )
∂xFt
(4.3.53)
Tobin's Q
tqFt = βF
µFt+1
µFt
αF (1− νF )(kt−1)ΦF−1yFt+1pFFt+1
(IFt )ΦF
+ (1− δF )tq
F
t+1
gFt+1
 (4.3.54)
Oil Demand
mpot = POFt =
αF (νF )(yOFt)Φ
F−1yFt p
F
Ft
(IFt−1)ΦF
pO∗t (4.3.55)
Vacancies
γFt (ΥFt − κF ) =
∂(vFt , vFt−1)
∂vHt
+ βF µ
F
t+1
µFt
∂(vFt+1, vFt )
∂vFt
(4.3.56)
γMt (ΥMt − κM) =
∂(vMt , vMt−1)
∂vMt
+ βF µ
F
t+1
µFt
∂(vMt+1, vMt )
∂vMt
(4.3.57)
Where the expected benefit from posting a vacancy, γjt (Υjt − κj)j ∈ F,M is equal to
the marginal cost of posting a vacancy. The Lagrangian multiplier on employment,
Υjt , gives the value that the firm places on an additional unit of employment for
in labour market j ∈ F,M . Using the envelope theorem, the value to the firm per
additional unit of employment is given by:
Foreign Firm Match Value of a Foreign Worker
ΥFt =
(
χ
(
1− αF
) pFFtyFt
nFt h
F
t
− wFt
)
hFt +
(
1− ρfn
)
βF
µFt+1
µFt
ΥFt+1 (4.3.58)
Foreign Firm Match Value of a Migrants Worker
ΥMt =
(
(1− χ)
(
1− αF
) pFFtyFt
nMt h
H
t
− wMt ((1− ℵt) + ℵt∆w)
)
hHt +(1− ρmn ) βF
µFt+1
µFt
ΥMt+1
(4.3.59)
The firm makes a profit when the marginal product of a worker exceeds the wage,
and the firm experiences a continuation value.24
24When there is no illegal migration, ℵt is equal to zero, therefore the term ((1−ℵt)+ℵt∆w) = 1
in equation 4.3.59. All migrant workers earn the same wage level.
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4.3.4.3 Oil Producing Firms
There is an oil-producing firm in Home that employs labour and capital services
in the production process.25 26 Following Arora and Gomis-Porqueras (2011), we
endogenise the oil sector in terms of production and price. However, the international
price of oil, POF , is subject to a shock. There is a price at Home which is determined
by the demand in Foreign. Oil production is given by
Oil Production Function
yOt = ψa
O
t (kOt−1)α
O(lOt )β
O (4.3.60)
The elasticities of capital and labour in production are given by αO and βO respec-
tively.27 Oil production is subject to a productivity shock, ψaOt . This is a first order
autoregressive process, where ρaO is the autoregressive parameter, and εaOt is an i.i.d.
shock with zero mean and a constant variance, σ2aO .
Oil Production TFP
lnψaOt = ρa
O lnψaOt−1 + εa
O
t (4.3.61)
The capital stock of the oil-producing sector is subject to investment adjustment
costs. Here δO is the depreciation rate of capital used in the oil producing sector.
Capital Accumulation
kOt = (1− δO)
kOt−1
gHt
+ ι(xOt , xOt−1) (4.3.62)
The oil-producing firm faces investment adjustment costs.28
Investment Adjustment Costs
ι(xOt , xOt−1) = κx
O
xOt
1− ϕxO2
(
xOt
xOt−1
− 1
)2 (4.3.63)
25Venezuela shows evidence of oil dominance. In 1976, PDVSA was nationalised giving the
government control of Venezuela’s oil reserves. The highs of oil revenue to GDP were 26% (using
1968 as the base year), during the years 1929-1969 the ratio exceeded 20% every year and has not
been above 20% since. In 2016, 98% of Venezuela’s exports was oil, of which these exports account
for 12% of GDP (Source: OPEC).
26We do not nationalise the oil industry because evidence shows that resource cursed countries,
and definitely oil sectors, takes away from the endogenous supply and demand. With decisions
no longer related to the business cycle, rather corruption. As our focus is on migration decisions
and policies, we allow for full endogeneity of supply and price which the latter is determined
internationally.
27Elasticity of labour is calibrated such that the marginal product of labour is the same as in the
final good producing firm.
28For derivations see section C.7.1, equations C.7.5 and C.7.6.
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The oil producing firm faces capital and labour adjustment costs of the form.
Capital Adjustment Costs
ξ(kOt ) = kOt
ξ(kO)
2
(
kOt
kOt−1
− 1
)2
(4.3.64)
Labour Supply Adjustment Costs
ξ(lOt ) = lOt
ξ(lO)
2
(
lOt
lOt−1
− 1
)2
(4.3.65)
Labour supply is determined in conjunction with the final good producing firm in
Home and the adjustment costs. As a result, the oil-producing firm optimises for
capital where POHt is the price of oil in Home.
Tobin's Q
tqOt = β
µHt+1
µHt
[
α
yt+1p
O,H
t+1
kOt
+ (1− δO)tq
O
t+1
gHt+1
]
(4.3.66)
The shock to oil price, pO∗t , is a first order autoregressive process. Where ρp
O is the
autoregressive parameter, and εp
O
t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and a constant
variance, σ2POIL.
Oil Price Shock
pO∗t = (1− ρp
o)pO∗t−1 + ε
pO
t (4.3.67)
4.3.4.4 Wage Bargaining
Due to labour market frictions the firms and workers engage in wage bargaining.
In a continuation of asymmetric search and matching frictions, workers experience
bargaining power of the differing levels. Particularly migrants relative to the native
workers in Foreign. The bargaining process uses the surpluses of the match from the
worker and the firm. The workers’ surplus, ηjt (equations 4.3.26, 4.3.27, and 4.3.35)
is the marginal value for the household of being employed, and the firm surplus, Υjt ,
(equations 4.3.44, 4.3.58, and 4.3.59) is the expected value for the firm of filling a
vacancy. The general forms follow:
Worker Surplus
ηjt = −
ϕ0
1 + ϕ((h
i
t)1+ϕ + w
j
th
j
t − ubj) + (1− ρjn)β
µit+1
µit
ηjt+1(1− (ζjt+1)) (4.3.68)
Firm Surplus
Υjt = (piitmpl
j
t − wjt )hjt + (1− ρjn)β
µit+1
µit
Υjt+1 (4.3.69)
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The bargaining power of the worker is given by ϑj . The splitting rule is governed by:
Υjt =
(1− θj)
θj
ηjt (4.3.70)
4.3.5 Fiscal Authority
In both Home and Foreign there exists a fiscal authority that consumes, collects
taxes, and borrows (lends) from (to) the international financial markets in the case
of a primary deficit (surplus).
The fiscal authority collects taxes from households via time variant lump sum
taxes, Taxit. The government spending, Git, has expenditures from defence spending,
bf it and the government consumption, gcit that is modelled as exogenous.
Government Expenditure
Git = gcit + bf it (4.3.71)
The government in Home keeps gcHt = gcH as long as it can access financial markets.
Using this rationale, we set gcHt = gcH and allow changes in government consumption
in Home to be reflected by a shock.
Government Consumption
gcHt = (1− ρgc)gcHt−1 + ρgcgcH + εgc
H
t (4.3.72)
Thus, the primary deficit, def it is given by:
Government Deficit
def it = Git − Taxit (4.3.73)
The fiscal authority in Home borrows to finance any deficit such that the budget
constraint is given as,
Home Government Budget Constraint
GHt + (1 + rHt−1)pFHt
d∗t−1
gHt
= TaxHt + pFHtd
∗
t (4.3.74)
In Foreign, the government collects taxes from households that are native to Foreign,
and from migrants, TaxFt .
Foreign Government Budget Constraint
GFt + (1 + rFt−1)pFFtd
∗
t−1 = TaxFt + pFFtd
∗
t (4.3.75)
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The left side of equation 4.3.74 provides the expenditures: Gt is government spending
and the real debt service on debt. The right-hand side represents the sources of
financing of tax revenue and new debt.
The two fiscal authorities have one significant difference between them. The fiscal
authority in Home is known to be a defaulter on its debt obligations and Foreign is
assumed to be risk-free.
4.3.6 Open Economy
This is a two-country model where prices are chosen to be numeraire. In this section
we cover the market clearing conditions, international financial markets, and the
terms of trade.
4.3.6.1 Market clearing and trade
To simplify the analysis, we aggregate the capital stocks and investment for the
Home economy.
Total Home Capital
kt = kHt + kOt (4.3.76)
Total Home Investment
xt = xHt + xOt (4.3.77)
Let n denote the size of Home relative to the size of Foreign. The notation
on price level corresponds to equation 4.3.22 for consumption. Demand for the
domestically produced good is a function of consumption, investment, vacancy costs,
and demand from abroad.
Market Clearing Conditions
yht + pOHty
O
Ft = v(p
H
Ht)
−θ(cHt + xt + κHvHt + γHt κH + ξ(kOt ) + ξ(lOt ) +GHt )
+ 1− n
n
vf (pHFt)
−θ(cFt + xFt + κFvFt + κMvMt + γFt κF + γMt κM +GFt + cMt )
(4.3.78)
yFt = (1− vF )
(
pFHt
rert
)−θ
(cFt + xFt + κFvFt + κMvMt + κMvMt + γFt κF +GFt + cMt )
+ n1− n(1− v)(p
F
Ht)
−θ(cHt + xt + xOt + κHvHt + γHt κH + ξ(kOt ) + ξ(lOt ) +GHt )
(4.3.79)
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Oil is exported to Foreign, therefore the GDP of Home consists of the foreign demand
for oil and the domestically produced good.
Home GDP
gdpt = pHHty
h
t + pOHty
O
Ft (4.3.80)
GDP in Foreign is a function of the demand for the Foreign produced good.
Foreign GDP
gdpFt = pFFty
F
t − pOFtyOFt (4.3.81)
The ratio of trade balance to GDP, tbt analyses the trade balance of final goods. In
steady state we set this to zero.
Trade Balance
tbt = 1− c
H
t + xt + κHvHt +GHt
gdpt
(4.3.82)
4.3.6.2 International Financial Markets
In equation 4.3.82, we analysed the balance of the final good. Now we analyse the
balance of financial assets. The net stock of financial assets is determined by the
inverse growth of GDP, change in price of debt, and the trade balance.
Net Foreign Assets
d∗t = (1 + rHt−1)
gdpt−1
gdpt
pFHt
pFHt−1
d∗t−1
gHt
+ tbt (4.3.83)
The interest rate payable on debt, rHt , following the small open economy nature
of Home is dependent upon the world interest rate, rFt and a premium term. In
addition to the standard method of closing a model with a debt elastic interest
rate premium (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003) we add two terms to the equation
following Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).
Interest Rate
1 + rHt =
(
1 + rFt + ψrt
) (
expϕd∗ (d∗t−d∗)−ϕp(pOt − pO)
)
(4.3.84)
The premium term is a function of deviations of debt and oil price from steady state,
and a shock to the default risk interest rate premium, ψrt . The parameters ϕd∗ > 0
and ϕpO > 0 govern the sensitivity of the interest rate with respect to the deviations
from the steady state debt and oil price respectively. The assumption that the
interest rate responds to oil price changes is important in determining the effect of
oil price fluctuations for the business cycle. The shock to the interest rate premium
is due to exogenous changes in the country’s interest rate which is considered one
147
The Resource Curse and Migration
of the sources of fluctuations in the business cycle.29 This is an exogenous process.
Where ρr is the autoregressive parameter, and εrt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean
and a constant variance, σ2r .
ψrt = ρrψrt−1 + (1− ρr)ψr + εrt (4.3.85)
4.3.6.3 Terms of Trade
We assume that the consumption based price index corresponds to a CES aggregate
of the Home and Foreign produced goods, where v is the share of Home-produced
goods in the final consumption bundle and θ is the elasticity of substitution:
PH =
[
v(PHH )1−θ + (1− v)(P FH )1−θ
] 1
1−θ
Here terms of trade is defined as tot = PF
PH
. In keeping with the two-country model,
the price index in Foreign is given by
P F =
[
vf (PHF )1−θ + (1− vf )(P FF )1−θ
] 1
1−θ
Where vf is the share of the Home produced good in final consumption.30 Following
these two definitions, we define the terms of trade as the price of the Home produced
good in Foreign relative to the price of the Home produced good in Home, tott =
pHFt
pHHt
.31
We assume that the law of one price holds for oil, where POH and POF is the price of
oil at Home and Foreign respectively, such that
POH = POF rert (4.3.86)
4.4 Migration Policies
In section 4.3, we set out the model where migration was unrestricted. However, in
practice there are migration policies that are designed to restrict migration usually by
29(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2017, p. 486) calculate the premium for Venezuela to be 9.23% for
years not in default, and 9.24% for all years (table 13.4) meaning that there is not a significant
impact from the default years (at least in this sample). Venezuela is considered a serial defaulter
hence the high premium which is above the average for the sample given of 5.5% (and 4.5% for years
not in default). The sample includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Turkey, and Venezuela who have all experienced on external default or debt restructuring in the
years 1824-1999. The calculations of the averages 1994-2013 using the JP Morgan EMBI data.
30We link the relative size of a country and its openness to trade as described in De Paoli (2009).
Due to the asymmetries of the countries, their openness to trade differs.
31Full definitions of the price levels are given in section C.7.2.
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the host nation. To implement these migration policies we use occasionally binding
migration policies to limit legal and illegal migration.32 The first constraint on
migration is limiting legal migration by the inclusion of a cap on working visas in
Foreign. The second constraint is aimed to reduce illegal migration with an increase
in policing to prevent illegal border crossings.33 The final constraint causes an
exogenous destruction of matches by border force agents.
4.4.1 Requirement for a Working Visa
In Foreign, there is an exogenously determined number of working visas available,
V ∗. There are certain periods of time that the government in Foreign wishes to limit
the number of immigrants, including worsening domestic economic conditions. This
limits the ability of a firm and a would-be migrant to successfully apply for a visa.
This may be due to an economic downturn in Foreign or the limit of visas being
reached. The visa application is then only successful with a probability, qOBCt .
Probability of a Successful Visa Application
qOBCt =
V ∗
uHMt
(4.4.1)
At the lower bound, qOBCt = 0, all new visa applications are rejected making the
worker illegal as the visa cap is reached. At qOBCt = 1 all new visa applications
are accepted, therefore all migrants are legal. The constraint is not binding when
0 < qOBCt < 1. The introduction of this constraint does not stop new migrants but
introduces illegal migration. An illegal migrant faces worse labour market conditions
compared to those employed legally as they have access to a higher wage, employment
benefits, and job security. When this constraint is imposed, it leads to a lower worker
surplus, and a downward pressure on the wage.
4.4.2 Reducing Migration
Under this policy, the governments are aware that the migration rate is increasing
to a level that they believe is too high. There is an emigration rate, γ that they
deem to be acceptable since too much migration causes labour market problems in
Home and Foreign. An argument based on a perceived shortage of workers in Home
would hamper the planned economic recovery and ‘protecting’ the labour market
32To implement the occasionally binding migration policies, we use dynareOBC (Holden, 2019)
as described in Holden (2016).
33Mandelman and Zlate (2012) include a border patrol force, however this a shock to the model
rather than a constraint.
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in Foreign. In Foreign there would be a swell of labour supply. Return migration
depends on the job finding probability which could be slow. The enforcement of the
migration restrictions affect the probability of a match being made, henceforth the
probability of finding employment.
Probability of Permitted Migration
pOBCt =
γN¯
nMt
(4.4.2)
When the constraint binds at pOBCt = 1, migration is unrestricted and legal migration
is dependent upon the number of visas issued. When the constraint binds at the
lower end, pOBCt = 0, the acceptable migration rate is set to zero and no further
matches are made.
Matching Efficiency under Migration Policy Enforcement
mMt = pOBCtaM(uHMt )Γ
M (vMt )1−Γ
M (4.4.3)
There exists a border force employed by the government, bf it , which is mobilised to
patrol the borders to prevent illegal crossings. The scale of deployment for migrants
to overcome is given by
Border Force Deployment Efficiency
bft = (1− pOBCt)
(
bfHt + bfFt
)
(4.4.4)
When the constraint is binding at pOBCt = 1, there is no extra efficiency in deployment,
i.e. bft = 0. However, when the constraint binds, to a varying extent, the border force
deployment increases proportionally. The scale of deployment increases emigration
costs.
4.4.3 Illegal Migration Constraints
So far the constraints have assumed that all illegal migrants would be employed.
Under this policy, a share of illegal employed migrants are removed from employment.
This occurs when the perceived level of illegal immigration is too high. The new
definition of the employed migrant stock is34
nMt = nLt + nINt + nIJt (4.4.5)
34This is different from the effective migrant stock which includes (1− λHt )uHt .
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Where nMt is the total number of employed migrants, nLt is the number of migrants
employed legally, nINt is the migrants employed illegally, and nIJt is the number of
migrants who were previously illegal which the border force is in the process of
deporting. This form of existing match destruction is a decision that is exogenous
to the firm or worker and is different from the separation rate ρmn . The number of
illegal migrants who have pre-existing matches destroyed is determined by rOBCt .
rOBCt =
γIN¯
nMt
(4.4.6)
Where γI determines the proportion of steady state illegal immigrants that the
government tolerates. When the number of illegal migrants increase, rOBCt de-
creases. Henceforth, the number of illegal migrants who have had their employment
exogenously destroyed is given by
nIJt = (1− rOBCt)nIt−1 (4.4.7)
This has an effect on the firm in Foreign as their total workforce is now nM − nIJ .
The border forces also prevent new crossings of a proportion of illegal matches. The
destruction of new matches is determined by the proportion of illegal migrants ℵt.
New Matches Destroyed
mDt = mMt ℵt (4.4.8)
The sum of migrants who have had old and new employment matches destroyed
denoted by MDt .
Total Destroyed Matches
MDt = nIJt +mDt (4.4.9)
Following the match destruction, the would-be migrants return to Home as unem-
ployed agents. The definition for the number of unemployed household members
searching for a job at the beginning of the period described by equation 4.3.8 is
modified to include the matches exogenously destroyed.
uHt = 1− (1− ρHn )nHt−1 − (1− ρMn )nMt−1 +MDt (4.4.10)
We have separated these two types of match destruction to allow deportation of
employed migrants by the Foreign border force and destruction of new matches by
both forces, to vary at a different rate. They are, however, along the same theme so
presented jointly.
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4.4.4 A Note On OBCs
The use of OBCs in applied models is minimal and one of the main contributions
of this paper. The algorithms discussed so far in section 4.4 have introduced OBCs
as probabilities. By definition, a probability is double bounded by 0 and 1. These
constraints create profound changes in the labour market dynamics.
In the code, the double bounded constraint for equation 4.4.1 is written as
qOBCt = max
[
0,min
[
V ∗
uHMt
, 1
]]
(4.4.11)
As the policy only categorises migration as legal and illegal, the effects are shown
through ℵt which affects the model as shown in section 4.3. Once migration is
constrained by the second policy, as described in section 4.4.2, the probability, pOBCt
is introduced by
pOBCt = max
[
0,min
[
γN¯
nMt
, 1
]]
(4.4.12)
This policy affects the job-finding probability for migrants (equation 4.3.13) where
j =M . As there are now additional costs to emigration, pt is introduced to equation
4.3.29. Finally we introduce the extension of match destruction by using rOBCt . Even
though the introduction of these constraints to the model appears limited, there is a
significant effect on the model dynamics.
rOBCt = max
[
0,min
[
γIN¯
nMt
, 1
]]
(4.4.13)
4.5 Calibration and Estimation
Using the baseline model in section 4.3, we calibrate some model parameters and
use Bayesian estimation techniques to study the business cycle characteristics of
a resource cursed country, and an oil-consuming country. First, we present the
calibration and estimation of the non-linear model where data is used for Venezuela
for Home and the United States for Foreign. We estimate the baseline model without
any constraints for accuracy purposes. In sections 4.5.4 we analyse the business cycle
contributions.
4.5.1 Calibration
The parameters used in the model are shown in table 4.1. These include parameters
that have been taken from the literature or calibrated, calculated to the steady state
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targets of values in the national accounts, and some parameters are implied by the
steady state of the model.
The values for discount factor and depreciation are adjusted for an annual
frequency as we take the model to annual data. The discount factor for Foreign is
standard for a developed economy in the literature. For Home, the discount factor
is calculated by adding the steady state premium as calculated in Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2017) of 9.23%, which the steady state value of the premium shock, ψr.35
The capital elasticity of substitution in the final good producing firms in Home
are taken from Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018), and for Foreign is standard from the
literature. The values for inputs of the oil-consuming firms are taken from Arora and
Gomis-Porqueras (2011). The depreciation rate for Home is taken from Garcia-Cicco
et al. (2010) and for Foreign from Albonico et al. (2014). The adjustment costs for
investment and vacancies are taken from Bodenstein et al. (2018). The difference in
wages between legal and illegal migrants is taken from Borjas and Cassidy (2019)
with a value of ∆W = 0.65. The share of illegal immigrants is calculated from data
where an estimated 12.1 million (2014) (Baker, 2017) of the 42.4 million (United
States Census Bureau) migrants are illegal, ℵ = 0.285. Due to asymmetries between
the countries, they differ in size and openness to trade. The ratio of oil exports to oil
production is an average of the barrels of oil exported to barrels of oil produced (in
millions) during the observation years. We calibrate the openness to trade parameter
for Home, γH to 0.3. Steady state calibration requires, γHGDPH = γFGDP F . In
calibrating the model there are a number of steady state values that are targeted in
the model which are presented in the middle panel of table 4.1 and the lower panel
shows values that are determined by the steady state.
4.5.2 Data
We use annual data from Venezuela and the United States for the period 1920-1995.
The data series are transformed to per capita real terms with 1968 and 2006 base
years respectively, and detrended using the Hamilton (2018) filter to estimate the
baseline model presented in section 4.3.36 Estimation uses the cyclical component of
eight data series. The data for Venezuela is sourced from Baptista (1997) includes
GDP, oil production in millions of barrels, oil price, government consumption and
private consumption. We use Venezuelan oil price rather than the world oil price as
it directly relates to Venezuelan oil production. Data for the United States is sourced
35Equivalently β = 11+rF+ψr
36Data available is 1920-1995, in filtering the cyclical component of the business cycle the first
three data points are lost.
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Table 4.1 Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Model Parameters
Home Discount Factor β 0.8813 Intertemporal Elasticity σci 1.0000
Foreign Discount Factor βF 0.9600 Inverse Frisch labour supply ϕi 2.0000
Firm Labour Market
Production Function α 0.3200 Job Destruction Rate ρHn 0.0500
αO 0.3600 ρFn 0.0500
αF 0.3300 ρMn 0.0700
Share of Oil in Production νF 0.0500 Replacement Rate ub
w
0.4000
EoS between Oil and Capital τF 0.4400 ubF
wF
0.4000
Depreciation δH 0.1255 ubM
wM
0.1000
δO 0.1255 Remittances ξ 0.9900
δF 0.1170 EoS Open Economy θ, θF 1.0100
Adjustment cost of capital κx 1.0000 Relative size of Home n 0.1500
Oil Sector Labour Elasticity βO 0.2350 Openness to Trade γH 0.3000
Oil Sector Employment AC ξlo 230 Matching Technology Γj 0.5000
Oil Sector Investment AC ξko 230
Vacancy Adjustment Costs ϕjv 3.0000 Wage Differential ∆w 0.6500
Emigration Costs ω1 0.5000 Emigration Costs ω2 2.0000
Steady State Targets
Oil to GDP yOPO
GDP
0.2800 Ratio of Oil Exported y
O
F
yO
0.9500
Interest Rate Premium ψr 0.0930 GC to GDP GHGDP 0.0700
Foreign GC to GDP GF
GDPF
0.0800
Implied by Steady State
Scale on Hours ϕ0 0.7576 Remittances ϱΞ 0.0313
ϕ0F 0.9482
Bargaining Power ϑH 0.9742 Matching Efficiency aH 0.8142
ϑF 0.9680 aF 0.8144
ϑM 0.7766 aM 0.7542
AC denotes adjustment costs; EoS denotes elasticity of substitution; GC denotes government
consumption; and H = Home, F=Foreign, M=Migrant. The upper panel shows the model
parameters, the middle panel shows the steady state targets (see appendix for data sources), and
the lower panel shows the parameters implied by steady state.
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Balke and Gordon (1989) which includes
GDP, and defence spending. The world interest rate uses the UK real interest rate.37
37The UK real interest rate is designed to represent the world interest rate and is calculated using
the nominal interest rate published by the Bank of England minus the inflation rate as published
by Office for National Statistics (ONS) as in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Drechsel and Tenreyro
(2018).
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Fig. 4.1 Data Observables
The eight observables used in the Bayesian estimation of the baseline DSGE model as described
in section 4.3. The data presented is the cyclical component of the Hamilton filter applied. The
horizontal axis identifies the year of the observation. The series have 73 observations at an
annual frequency, 1923:1995 inclusive. The vertical axis shows deviation from trend. Measurement
equations are xobst = xt − xss where xobs is the observation of variable x, xt is the actual value at
time t, and xss is the steady state or expected value of variable x.
The time period 1920-1995 captures the rise and fall of Venezuela as explained
by Bello et al. (2011) where in 1920 the ratio of Venezuelan GDP per capita to
United States GDP per capita was approximately 20% to 90% in 1958. This has
since returned to below 30% as shown in figure C.3. Figure 4.1 plots the observables
used in estimation. Venezuelan GDP appears to have more volatile cycles that the
USA. The cycle of Venezuelan oil production towards the end of the sample begins to
be dependent less on the price and due to the nationalisation of PDVSA as explained
in Restuccia (2018). We can see the volatility in particularly the oil price towards
the end of the sample which relates to the world energy crisis of the 1970s was
followed by the oil crises in the 1980s. Venezuelan private consumption is exhibits
more cycles than GDP of either Venezuela or the United States which provides
support for developing economies having highly volatile consumption relative to GDP.
Venezuelan government consumption is quite high and procyclical as a consequence
of macroeconomic populism and is explained in Moshiri (2015). The world interest
rate is exogenous to the model. The effect of World War Two on United States
defence spending causes the very distinct increase above trend.
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4.5.3 Bayesian Estimation
We estimate eight persistence parameters and standard deviations of the shocks plus
model parameters of the DSGE model with Bayesian methods, more specifically
the MCMC algorithm, using the data presented in section 4.5.2.38 Table 4.2 shows
the mean values for priors and posteriors, 5th and 95th percentiles, prior shape,
and deviation of the posterior (obtained after 3,000,000 iterations). We choose
standard priors for the persistence parameters and standard deviations. The priors
for sensitivity of debt deviations and the oil price deviations with respect to the
interest rate used in the interest rate equation 4.3.84 are taken from Drechsel and
Tenreyro (2018).
Table 4.2 Bayesian Estimation: Priors and Posteriors
Parameter Description Prior Mean 90% HPD Interval PDF PstDev
Autoregressive Parameters
Home TFP ρa 0.8500 0.9814 0.9679 0.9958 β 0.1000
Foreign TFP ρa
f 0.8500 0.9967 0.9937 0.9997 β 0.1000
Oil TFP ρa
o 0.8500 0.7239 0.5598 0.8865 β 0.1000
Interest Rate ρψ
r 0.7000 0.7209 0.6380 0.8024 β 0.1000
Defence Spending ρbf
f 0.7000 0.6430 0.5235 0.7632 β 0.1000
Oil Price ρp
o 0.8500 0.2584 0.2138 0.3046 β 0.1000
Government Consumption Home ρg
c 0.7000 0.7334 0.5772 0.8800 β 0.1000
Consumption Preference ρψ 0.7000 0.7173 0.6687 0.7679 β 0.1000
Model Parameters
Oil Price Elasticity ϕo 0.1990 1.4943 1.4869 1.5000 Γ 0.1500
Debt Elasticity ϕd∗ 1.5000 1.4380 1.3846 1.4931 Γ 0.5000
Standard deviation of shocks
Home TFP σa 1.0000 11.3660 9.8281 12.9209 Γ−1 0.5000
Foreign TFP σaf 1.0000 3.7339 3.2124 4.2312 Γ−1 0.5000
Oil TFP σao 1.0000 1.0247 0.8820 1.1676 Γ−1 0.5000
Oil Price σpo 1.0000 14.9607 14.9099 15.0000 Γ−1 0.5000
Defence Spending σgc 1.0000 0.4272 0.3267 0.5230 Γ−1 0.5000
Interest Rate σψr 1.0000 4.6107 3.6559 5.5298 Γ−1 0.5000
Government Consumption Home σbff 0.5000 0.3924 0.3379 0.4451 Γ−1 0.5000
Consumption Preference σψ 1.0000 29.1494 28.0767 30.0000 Γ−1 0.5000
Results from the Bayesian estimation after 3,000,000 iterations. The first column describes the
estimated parameter and column two shows the corresponding symbol. Column three gives the
mean priors. Columns four to six show the mean, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posteriors. Column
six shows the distribution function and the final column shows the deviation of the posterior.
Distribution Functions: β Beta, Γ Gamma, and Γ−1 Inverse Gamma.
38We do not estimate the persistence parameters or standard deviation of defence spending in
Home or government consumption in Foreign.
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The autoregressive parameters differ from the estimates which suggests they are
data driven. The interest rate is reactive to the existing deviations from steady
state debt levels and the oil price. The standard deviations for the variables apart
from government consumption and defence spending is sizeable. The literature
on macroeconomics of emerging/developing economies acknowledges that private
consumption is very volatile relative to output which the results from estimation
are quite large. The size of the interest rate deviation is significantly large which is
expected given the observable plot.
4.5.4 Historical Decomposition
In figures 4.2 and 4.3 we see the historical decomposition of private consumption
and GDP in Home.
Fig. 4.2 Historical Decomposition of Private Consumption in Venezuela
The line shows the cyclical component of real price of Venezuelan oil per capita. The bars show the
contribution of each of the shocks to the changes of the series at a given time. These estimates are
a result of the estimation of the baseline model. Blue - Home TFP, Light green - Foreign TFP, Red
- Oil TFP, Dark blue - Oil Price, Pink - Home Government Consumption, Dark green - Foreign
Defence Spending, Yellow - Home Consumption Preference, Light blue - Interest Rate, Brown -
Foreign Government Consumption, and Turquoise - Home Defence Spending.
The changes in consumption are driven mostly by productivity in Home, preference
shocks, oil price, and productivity in Foreign. It is recognised that consumption is
highly volatile in Home. For GDP, productivity in Home is expectedly the biggest
source but also private consumption is a large driver. Of significance is also Foreign
productivity and oil price. The effect of interest rate and government expenditure is
minimal. In terms of the economics, consumption is procyclical albeit in developing
economies highly volatile relative to GDP. Since oil price is a driver of the business
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Fig. 4.3 Historical Decomposition of Venezuelan GDP
The line shows the cyclical component of real price of Venezuelan oil per capita. The bars show the
contribution of each of the shocks to the changes of the series at a given time. These estimates are
a result of the estimation of the baseline model. Blue - Home TFP, Light green - Foreign TFP, Red
- Oil TFP, Dark blue - Oil Price, Pink - Home Government Consumption, Dark green - Foreign
Defence Spending, Yellow - Home Consumption Preference, Light blue - Interest Rate, Brown -
Foreign Government Consumption, and Turquoise - Home Defence Spending.
cycle, it follows that oil price is also a driver of private consumption. The relationship
between Foreign TFP follows the same reasoning as Foreign is the larger economy and
hence their demand for the domestically produced good. Oil production has minimal
effects on either. Labour income is mostly from the Home final good producing firm
and labour supply easily switches between oil production and final good production.
The majority of oil is consumed in Foreign. The effect of the interest rate is perhaps
small due to the model specification and that only three periods of sovereign debt
defaults are experienced during the sample (1983-1988, 1990, and 1995-1997, 1998).
The sample ends at 1995, and all of the sovereign defaults are towards the end of
the sample.
The historical distribution of oil price is shown in figure 4.4 . Productivity in
Home is a large contributor but interestingly, productivity in the oil-producing
firm is not. This suggests a demand driven market. The interest rate has a more
predominant presence than in either private consumption or production in Home
which is similar to the findings in Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018). This can be due
to the fact only a small proportion of oil is consumed in Home and that the price
of oil in Home is determined by the marginal product of oil in Foreign and the real
exchange rate. The relation to the national economy and Foreign TFP can change
the demand for oil. These figures have shown that government expenditure is not a
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Fig. 4.4 Historical Decomposition of the Venezuelan Oil Price
The line shows the cyclical component of real price of Venezuelan oil per capita. The bars show the
contribution of each of the shocks to the changes of the series at a given time. These estimates are
a result of the estimation of the baseline model. Blue - Home TFP, Light green - Foreign TFP, Red
- Oil TFP, Dark blue - Oil Price, Pink - Home Government Consumption, Dark green - Foreign
Defence Spending, Yellow - Home Consumption Preference, Light blue - Interest Rate, Brown -
Foreign Government Consumption, and Turquoise - Home Defence Spending.
large driver in the business cycle but productivities of Home and Foreign are however,
the model specification limits full analysis.
The results suggest that oil prices should be taken account of in the analysis of
developing oil-producing nations. It provides a significant contribution to each of
the variables presented.
4.6 Results
We take the values from calibration and estimation to evaluate the role of oil prices
on the macroeconomy and the labour market in the baseline two-country model.
We then introduce the migration policies in subsequent sections to show the effects.
In section 4.6.1 we discuss the economics of a positive and negative oil price shock
to the baseline model in Home and Foreign and the asymmetries. In sections 4.6.2
to 4.6.4 we show the results from a positive and negative oil price shock and the
economic effects of the migration restrictions.
The use of migration constraints enables us to separate the effects of emigration
from those of a negative oil price shock. The impulse responses plot the responses of
the models with and without constraints. In sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4, the responses
of illegal and legal migration are compared to the model with constraints on legal
migration (section 4.6.2). For each model, the presentation of the positive and
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negative shocks enable the illustration of the effects from the double bounded
constraints.
4.6.1 Baseline Model
We begin our analysis with the baseline model where there are no constraints on
migration. The impulse responses to a one standard deviation to the oil price are
shown in figure 4.5. The upper panel shows the response to a positive shock to the
oil price, and the lower panel a negative shock to the oil price.
In the baseline model all migration is legal. Those who want to migrate to find
employment are free to. From the upper panel, a positive shock to the oil price
increases output in the final good producing and oil-producing sectors in Home. In
comparison to a TFP shock, where there would be a degree of risk sharing that would
have positive effects for Foreign, there is a contractionary effect in Foreign. The price
of the input for the oil-consuming firm has increased, which reduces demand and
hence decreases output as per Kim and Loungani (1992). Oil production increases
since higher price entices the firm to supply more, however as oil demand in Foreign
falls, this results in higher domestic consumption. The change in output for Foreign
is much smaller than GDP due to the increase in price of the oil imports and weaker
real exchange rate. In Home, there is a greater increase in the production of the final
good than the production of oil due to the fall in demand.
As a result of the final good producers in Home and the oil-producing firms
increasing output, there is an increase in investment in capital stocks which raises
the demand side of the economy also. Due to the expansionary effects being greater
in the final good producing firm, the increase in labour supply shifts there. The firms
post more vacancies to meet labour demand. There is a tightening of the labour
market due to the increase number of vacancies and there are fewer unemployed
workers native to Home. As a result of the tightening of the labour market, there is
a higher probability of finding employment for the worker and lower probability for
filling a vacancy for the firm in Home. This puts upwards pressure on wages.
For residents in Home, there is an increase in employment at Home including the
number of hours supplied to the firms. Due to the favourable employment conditions
in Home, there is a reduction in migration flows and the search intensity switches to
Home.
Resulting from the narrowing wage premium of Foreign over Home, and fewer
migrants being employed in Foreign, there is a decrease in remittances. However,
as labour income has increased sufficiently in Home, there is still an increase in
consumption levels. As a result of lower wages and labour hours by migrants, there
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is a decrease in labour income, and even though there is a decrease in remittances,
there is a fall of consumption by migrants. The increase in labour market tightness
is caused by the reduction in number of searchers. An increase in labour market
tightness puts an upward pressure on the wage level. There is a sharp decrease of
household taxes on impact of the price shock however this increases soon after. This
is due to the increase in debt levels and price of debt in the government budget
constraint. The overall debt dynamics concur with Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).
Even though the effects on wages and labour market tightness are similar for
migrants and the workers in Home, the causes differ. Initially the productivity for
Home workers decrease due to the higher labour supply, while for migrants the
decrease is cause by the decrease in output. The following increase in Home is caused
by more positions being filled by workers, thus allowing a decrease in hours per
worker. For migrants, the increase is due to a lower labour supply which increases
their individual productivity and from fewer vacancies being posted.
For households in Foreign, the negative effects on the economy reduce employment
levels and labour hours supplied to the firm. Their labour market status is either
employed or unemployed in Foreign. The reduction in labour market tightness is due
to the increased number of searchers. Natives and migrants are imperfect substitutes,
therefore the two labour markets are only weakly linked. The number of vacancies
posted by the firm for natives and migrants both decrease, but migrants are able
to switch their search to Home. The reduction in wage is also due to the lower
marginal product of labour. Notably, the wage is only affected for a short period.
Due to the lower labour income for Foreign households, they reduce their final good
consumption. On impact there is large increase in taxation, but this quickly falls to
below steady state levels. The government in Foreign is unaffected by the weakening
of the real exchange rate as the debt is denominated in the domestic price level.
Due to the contractionary effect of the positive oil price shock on production in
Foreign, there is also a reduction in their investment levels. The decrease is significant
but short lasting. There is only a small reduction in per capita capital stocks, in
part due to the stochastic growth. Fewer residents in Foreign (residents in Foreign
include migrants), increase the value of per capita stocks ceteris paribus. The fall in
labour demand reduces the labour supply to the firm.
Using the endogenous quantity of oil produced via supply and demand channel
and endogenous price shows the effect on Home. As the price increases, there is a
significant decrease in oil demanded from Foreign, hence only a small increase in
production. Though the decrease in demand is small relative to the change in price.
The demand side is dominant because the change in production is minimal. Home
consumption increases to meet the excess supply.
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Fig. 4.5 A model without constraints
IRFs for a 1SD shock to oil price in the model with no constraints or conditions on migration. The
top panel shows a positive oil price shock, the bottom panel a negative oil price shock.
The results are mostly mirrored in the lower panel of figure 4.5. However, due
to the low level of diversification of Home the negative effects are greater than the
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positive.39 There is still a greater effect on the Home economy in terms of GDP and
the final good producing sector than in Foreign.
As a result of the reduction in oil price, there is an increase in demand from
abroad but a small reduction in supply. The increased Foreign demand reduces
domestic consumption.
On the supply side, there is a reduction in demand for the Home final produced
good. There is a decrease in employment and labour hours by the household. There
is a significant increase in unemployment with a large shift of search intensity to
Foreign. There is a reduction in labour market tightness which puts downwards
pressure on wages, even though there is a small initial increase in the productivity of
labour. There are significantly fewer vacancies posted.
For migrants there is a resulting wage fall due to the reduction in labour market
tightness and labour productivity. The initial increase in wage is due to the expan-
sionary effect of the economy before migration increases. The reduction in wage
in Home is greater than for migrants and the employment prospects allow for an
increased wage premium and hence remittances.
Workers native to Foreign gain in employment, and an increase in wages due
to labour market dynamics and increased productivity. Increased productivity is
smaller than the wage but is more persistent. There is an increase in labour market
tightness resulting in an increase in probability of finding employment and reduction
in filling a vacancy. There are fewer searchers and an increased number of vacancies
to help fill the labour demand. Due to higher levels of labour income the households
increase consumption.
Asymmetries of an oil price shock
As acknowledged by Hamilton (2003), oil price shocks are not symmetrical. Rather
positive oil price shocks have greater economic effects than negative ones in oil
consuming countries. From this we expect that the negative price shocks have a
smaller effect on Foreign rather than a positive oil price shock. The effects on the
oil producing nation is not researched to the same extent. However, Venezuela, and
other developing oil-exporting nations experience asymmetries following oil price
shocks as shown by Moshiri (2015) who uses data from 1970-2010. Negative oil price
39As there is no heteroskedasticity in oil price shocks in the DSGE model, the mirroring of results
of magnitude can be expected.
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shocks lead to prolonged contractions in the economy while oil price increases do not
see prolonged expansions.40
We analyse here the asymmetries in the baseline model and then describe any
changes when the migration policies are implemented in the following sections. The
asymmetries for both oil-consuming and exporting nations is based on the size and
length of the effects of oil price shocks. The oil producer experiences greater effects
when there is a shock to the oil price because of how much the country is dependent
on it. Where shocks are risk-sharing, the shocks in Home do not affect Foreign
significantly due to the size asymmetry. However, risk-sharing shocks in Foreign can
have a significant effect in Home.
While the asymmetry between a positive and negative shock is small, there are
considerable asymmetries between Home and Foreign. For instance, the responses
to GDP on both the demand and supply sides, as well as labour market effects are
much greater for Home than Foreign. On the labour market, this includes migrants.
The imperfect substitutability of workers is noticeable in Foreign as the oil price
shock affects each differently. The effect of the shock on final good production, and
GDP, has a prolonged effect on Home than Foreign. This is due to the path of oil
production which has not started to return to steady state.
The asymmetries become more apparent the stricter migration policies become.
However, a double bounded constraint is somewhat misleading, as there are no
restrictions on return migration, or migration of Foreign natives to Home.
4.6.2 Legal and Illegal Migration
In this section we present the results which introduces illegal migration to the model.
As the constraint is a probability, the lower bound is zero, and upper bound is one
as described in equation 4.4.1. Illegal migration is only used to classify migrants and
introduce the classification to the model. When the upper bound is reached, all new
migrants are legal and conversely a lower bound implies all new migrants are illegal.
As there was no illegal and legal migration in figure 4.5, there is only a solid line in
these sub-plots.
The impulse responses to a positive oil price shock are shown in the upper panel
of figure 4.6. The core analysis is the same as in the model without constraints. Of
the responses presented, we now include the responses for legal and illegal migration
in additional to total migration. Following the positive oil price shock, the decrease
in employment of migrants is comparable to the baseline model, only insignificantly
40However, the asymmetries would only be more apparent if the parameters were to re-estimated
following a negative oil price shock or the use of a GARCH model to estimate the difference in
volatilities.
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smaller decrease in migration. Though, when this is split into legal and illegal
migration the sizes and dynamics differ slightly. There is a greater decrease in the
number of illegal migrants. A lower migrant stock enables more migrants to be legal,
the reason why illegal migration reduces the most, which is unsurprising as their
wage is even lower. This reduces the fraction of new illegal migrants to zero when
the lower bound is reached. When there are favourable employment opportunities
at Home the net payoff is greater to remain. Legal migration, however, ends up
increasing for a short time as illegal migration is zero.
The noticeable change on migration comes when the migrants know that there are
now negative effects with illegal migration. Once the wage difference is introduced
to 4.3.27, the incentive to migrate is reduced. In the baseline model, and this
model with illegal migration, the increase to the migrant wage decreases initially
following the lower productivity but then increases as the reduction in number of
workers outweighs the reduction in firm productivity. The eventual increase in the
productivity is insignificantly less in the model with constraints. When there is illegal
migration, the weighted average wage is lower. The response presented is to wMt ,
not weighted by the share of illegal migrants, ℵt, but firms make their employment
decisions knowing the wage differential and net costs which is lower, hence more
vacancies are posted.
Following a negative price shock, the main business cycle results from the model
continue. In terms of the labour market for migrants, there is an initial increase
determined in wage by the increase in productivity of the firm in Foreign. However,
this effect lasts only a short time before turning negative and a smaller decrease
relative to the baseline model. This then reduces the number of vacancies posted by
the firm relative to the baseline model. In contrast, the wage for workers native to
Foreign, increases by the same amount and does not differ from the baseline model.
These results show support for the difference in wage as a factor in the decision of
the migration process.
As in the positive shock, the change to migration is insignificantly less than the
baseline model and the exact paths of legal and illegal migration differ. This is
determined by the large increase in migration which the new migrants are increasingly
likely to be illegal. The significance of this increase of illegal migrants illustrate how
even a lower wage for illegal is still an incentive to migrant over the labour market
conditions in Home.
The introduction of a constraint shows the first distinctive asymmetries between
a positive and negative oil price shock, The response of illegal migration is greater
following a negative oil price shock and legal migration follows a different path
depending on when the bounds are reached. The response of the migrant wage differs.
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Fig. 4.6 A model with legal and illegal migration
IRFs for a 1SD shock to oil price.
This model introduces the requirement of a visa for employment. Migrants are either illegal or legal
which depends on the probability of attaining a visa qOBCt . At qOBC = 1, all migrants are legal
and at qOBC = 0, all migrants are illegal.
The top panel shows a positive oil price shock, the bottom panel a negative oil price shock. The
solid line shows the model with constraints, the dashed line without constraints.
Following a positive shock, there is only a small decrease to the baseline model,
relatively insignificant, however, after a negative shock, the decrease is smaller. The
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distinct asymmetry of legal and illegal migration between a positive and negative
oil price shock occurs due to the constraints reaching the bound and differences in
labour flows. The response of illegal migration is larger following a negative oil price
shock, however, it is slightly less persistent, so returns to approximately the same
deviation after 20 periods. For legal migration, the response is marginally small, and
returns to steady state levels sooner. As migration increases, and the number of
visas are taken up, more migrants are illegal. Illegal workers receive a lower wage,
which is more favourable to the hiring firm. As a result of this constraint, legal
migration actually decreases due to the dominance of illegal migration. This form of
migration policy is not supporting migration constraints, only showing the effect of
lower wages, and the decisions of the firm based on labour demand.
4.6.3 Deterring Migration
We introduce the second constraint on migration that reduces the probability of
finding employment and increases the migration costs. The impulse responses are
shown in figure 4.7. In steady state, a match is determined by the destruction rate,
ρjn, and the steady state level of employment. There is a steady state reduction
in the matching efficiency and hence probability of finding employment when this
constraint is imposed and less than one. The effects of this constraint on migration
are more pronounced than the one that introduced illegal migration. There is also
an increase in emigration costs due to an increase in the efficiency of border force
patrols. Of note, a one standard deviation shock to the oil price does not reach either
bound for pOBCt .
First, we consider the response to a positive shock to the oil price. The reduction
of final good production in Foreign is less under the model with migration restrictions
and returns to steady state levels quicker. There is no significant difference in the
production of the final good in Home. As a result of the smaller reduction in output
for Foreign, the wage for workers native to Foreign returns to steady state slightly
quicker, though the initial response is unchanged. Additionally, there is less of a
reduction in labour market tightness which eases the downward pressure on wages,
and soon returns to a tightening of the labour market which contributes to the
upward pressure on wages. There is a smaller reduction in employment and smaller
increase in unemployment.
The labour market implications for migrants is different. The increase in employ-
ment in Home is insignificantly lower under the model with constraints, with the
unemployment rate decreasing marginally more. However, due to the constraints on
migration and increased migration costs, the change in search intensity is lower. On
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impact the response is approximately two thirds of the baseline model. There is a
significantly smaller decrease in the number of migrants. Fewer vacancies are posted
initially, however, due to the cheaper labour, firms eventually post more vacancies
relative to the baseline model. The wages are significantly lower than the model
without constraints, or presence of illegal migration. As migration does not reduce as
much, migrant labour hours increase, which means that their productivity decreases
(rather than increases) and hence the decrease in wage. The migrants experience an
increased job finding probability relative to the baseline model as a result of the size
of increase in vacancies being posted relative to the decrease in unemployed workers
searching in Foreign. As a result from fewer migration opportunities, there is an
increased number of workers searching for employment in Home. Since the decrease
in illegal migration is large, there is an increase in legal migration as the remaining
migrants are permitted visas.
The effect of the constraints on migration actually have a small positive effect
on Foreign output which is often why migration constraints are tightened during
periods of economic downturn. As the emigration, and employment, of Home agents
has fallen, there is a smaller reduction in output. There is an increase in the number
of labour hours dedicated to the oil producing firm, as labour hours for the final
good producing firm increase less in the model with constraints.
The response to both legal and illegal migration are smaller than the previous
version of the model, as was total migration. The decrease in illegal migration will
be greater than legal, as the number of searchers in Foreign reduces, more migrants
will be legal. Legal migration increases when illegal has decreased enough, and the
labour market conditions are favourable again.
Interestingly, the constraints imposed in Foreign begins to impact on Home. Even
though the changes are insignificant, the increase in employment in Home is lower,
though this is compensated by an insignificantly higher number of working hours.
There is an insignificant effect on the final good producers in Home, with total
unemployed workers native to Home increasing.
Following a negative oil price shock, the positive effects for the Foreign economy
are less, for the firms and the household. For the households native to Foreign, they
experience a lower level of increase to consumption and employment which negatively
affects their utility. For the oil-consuming firm, they lose out in both labour supply
and insignificantly lower levels of capital inputs.
For migrants, there are overall negative effects caused by the constraints. One
positive is that there is an increase in wage, however, this is due to an increase in
their productivity from fewer migrants being employed and their individual hours. In
the baseline model, migration resulted in a decrease in the marginal product which
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Fig. 4.7 Constraints on Migration
IRFs for a 1SD shock to oil price. There are constraints on legal and illegal migration. Migrants
are either illegal or legal which depends on the probability of attaining a visa qOBCt . At qOBC = 1,
all migrants are legal and at qOBC = 0, all migrants are illegal. When pOBC = 1 there is no effect
on the matching efficiency or increased emigration costs. At pOBC = 0 there are no new matches.
The top panel shows a positive oil price shock, the bottom panel a negative oil price shock. The
solid line shows the model with constraints, the dashed line without constraints.
now increases. Due to fewer searchers in the labour market, and a lower probability
of the firm filling a vacancy, there is less of a downward pressure on the wage as
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demonstrated by the labour market tightness loosening less. Additionally, as the
wage of migrants has increased, the costs associated with employing that worker have
increased. The negative effects include a lower probability of finding employment.
There is a lower increase in illegal migrants and legal migrants. The increase in
legal migration is only short lasting, it eventually falls below steady state due to the
constraints on migration which reach the bounds.
There is an increase in total unemployment for Home because there are fewer
employed migrants. The change in Home employment is insignificantly less than
in the case of no constraints. It is labour hours that increase in Home with a
large effective loss of labour hours by migrants compared to the baseline model,
approximately an 80% reduction in the peak increase.
The asymmetries are further highlighted in this model, most notably in the paths
of legal and illegal migration, the labour market dynamics for migrants, and the
economy in Foreign. The gain from a negative oil price shock is smaller without the
replicable increase in migrant labour supply. The migration decision is impacted by
the efficiency of border force deployment. The results from a negative oil price shock
presented imply negative effects as a result of migration policies in Foreign, and no
noticeable gain.
4.6.4 Match Destruction
Until now, it is assumed that illegal migrants have been able to take up employment
only that the number of matches is lower and illegal migrants experience poorer
labour market conditions. Under this policy, prior to employment commencing
or after a period of time, some illegal migrants are removed from employment as
described in section 4.4.3. This introduces profound changes to the labour market for
migrants. For the oil-consuming firm in Foreign, the labour they are supplied with
by migrants, lMt , is reduced by the exogenous destruction of the previous period’s
illegal migrants and some of the new matches. The effects of the final constraint are
shown in figure 4.8. In this model following the negative oil price shock, the gains for
Foreign are smaller. There is an increase in destruction of matches, and an increase
in the border patrols which increases the cost of emigration further.
The models presented so far in this section have had only small differences for
some variables, now they are more pronounced. One reason for this, in Foreign
particularly, is that there is a lower steady state due to the marginally smaller total
labour force. The steady states for the case with jailed migrants results in lower
wages for migrants and lower output for the oil-consuming firm. There is also a
significant impact on Home.
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Firstly we consider the results from a positive oil price shock. Largely the results
do not differ to those under the previous model, however, migrants experience
more issues due to the exogenous destruction of matches. The decrease in migrant
employment is approximately 40% smaller on impact due to fewer matches being
made. Hence the decrease in labour hours, (nMt − nIJt )hHt , is a small fraction of the
model without constraints. There is a greater decrease to illegal migration than
legal, as the reduction in migration enables more migrants to be legal. There is a
further decrease to the wage level which also negatively affects remittances. Migrants'
consumption levels show a larger decrease. There is a smaller increase to labour
market tightness, which together with lower changes to productivity, keeps the wage
below steady state levels, and firms end up placing fewer vacancies.
As the labour market in Home tightens, there is an upward pressure on the wage.
The increase in employment is marginally less because there are fewer illegal migrants
from the previous period that had employment or matches destroyed. The economy
in Foreign returns to steady state levels slightly quicker than in the previous models.
The consequences of this constraint are more significant following a negative oil
price shock. For the firms and workers native to Foreign, the gains from the negative
oil price shock in production and consumption are reduced to the point that they fall
below steady state values. Firms have to continue posting vacancies until the labour
demand is met. As the vacancies are unfilled due to poorer matching efficiency, the
firm has to continue with the vacancy posting costs which diverts financial resources.
On the demand side, there are lower levels of consumption, investment and henceforth
capital stocks. Though the responses to employment and unemployment are small
for the workers native to Foreign, employment falls below its steady state value. As
a result of the smaller increase to output, less oil is demanded.
For migrants, employment increases but is significantly lower relative to the
baseline model. The migrant labour hours are most important to the firm in Foreign.
As a result of the destruction of some new and existing matches plus the number
of individual working hours, the labour supply by migrants actually falls. This is
costly to an economy that pays to post vacancies, only to have them destroyed. As
labour hours per migrant worker decrease, the marginal product of labour increases,
beyond that of the increased firm productivity. The effect of increased productivity,
increases the wage. Such is the change in the labour market for migrants, that the
probability of filling a vacancy is reduced immediately after the shock. There is still
a decrease in labour market tightness, but this is significantly less than the baseline
model. Workers native to Foreign see an insignificant decrease in their wage. Since
employment does not increase as much in this model, there is a decrease in labour
income which causes lower consumption levels.
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Fig. 4.8 Match Destruction
IRFs for a 1SD shock to oil price. There are constraints on legal and illegal migration. Migrants
are either illegal or legal which depends on the probability of attaining a visa qOBCt . At qOBC = 1,
all migrants are legal and at qOBC = 0, all migrants are illegal. When pOBC = 1 there is no effect
on the matching efficiency or increased emigration costs. At pOBC = 0 there are no new matches.
Previous illegal migrants remain in employment with probability rOBCt , and new matches made by
the firm are destroyed by based on the share of illegal migrants and efficiency of the border force
deployment. The top panel shows a positive oil price shock, the bottom panel a negative oil price
shock. The solid line shows the model with constraints, the dashed line without constraints.
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The implications on the labour market for workers in Home has been relatively
insignificant under the previous constraints, but now there is negative effects. The
unemployment rate includes migrants jailed, this shows a large increase in the number
of unemployed agents. As there are more searchers in Home, there is an increased
probability of the firm filling a vacancy, and a greater decrease in labour market
tightness which puts downward pressure on the wage. By removing the migrants
from employment, there are wasted labour hours, nIJt hHt , from the Home household,
causing disutility without any gain.
The issue with legal migration decreasing for a while is due to the bounds being
reached. For a short time, there are no more new legal matches. It is not until
migration reduces and the number of searchers in Foreign decrease.
Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 have compared the impulse responses of a positive and
negative shock to the oil price to the baseline scenario of no constraints as shown in
figure 4.5. As a general conclusion, there are positive effects on the Home economy
following a positive oil price shock and negative effects following a negative oil price
shock. However, in Foreign, a positive oil price shock causes negative economic
effects, and negative price shock has positive effects. Migration and oil prices are
related to the business cycle. In particular, the oil price is a strong driver of the
business cycle to the Home economy. The deviation in oil price from its steady state
does affect the interest rate.
From the results we have shown the impact of migration policies following a
non-risk sharing shock. When there is a positive oil price shock, the restrictions on
migration, excluding match destruction, can have positive effects for both countries.
However, these effects are limited, and in some cases statistically insignificant. For
instance, employment and output return to steady state levels quicker in the model
with weak immigration policies. The most significant change is the reduction in
illegal migration and wage of migrants, which is increasingly negative due to the role
of heterogenous labour markets.
After a negative oil price shock, the policies are harmful for Foreign especially,
with migrants experiencing the extremes. The tougher the migration policies, the
more noticeable the negative effects on Home are. Mostly, when migrants are unable
to find employment in Foreign, they must remain unemployed in Home. The scenario
of match destruction reflects extremes of migration policy can be harmful to the
economies.
The results show (weak) support for migration policies when there are negative
economic conditions in Foreign, as it provides an additional deterrent to migrants.
But the constraints imposed in Foreign during positive economic conditions, that
negatively affect the probability of finding employment for migrants, do not have
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support. Though migration policies are defended as being important to protect the
economy, they can be counterproductive.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have put forth a model with endogenous migration from a resource
cursed country. The migration decision is based on the job finding probability which
relates to the business cycle and migration constraints. To resemble migration policies,
we have used three occasionally binding migration policies to reflect the current
challenges that migrants face. This, and the endogenously determined demand and
supply of oil are the contributions of this paper to the literature. To assess the role of
emigration, we have used a negative oil price shock. Our model allows the diversion
from a standard two-country model and migration by use of a non-risk sharing shock.
The use of constraints allows us to (partially) distinguish the effects of migration
from those of the oil price. The results presented in this paper show that there are
mixed effects to the Home economy from emigration. Following a negative oil price
shock, the supply of oil falls as does the production of the domestically produced
good which leads to a large fall in GDP due to the lower levels of investment, hence
capital stocks. There is an increase in migration which reduces the increase in
unemployment. Remittances allow consumption smoothing for the household in
Home due to their countercyclical profile and provide an opportunity for risk sharing.
Lower levels of migration reduce total remittance flows and increase unemployment
in Home. With the migration constraints in place, unemployment in Home increased.
The reduction in household income through labour income and remittances kept
private consumption below equilibrium for longer and hence prolonged the fall in
output and GDP of Home.
For the government, they receive lower levels of per capita taxes, but because of
the increased interest rate, the price of debt increases. As their access to financial
markets reduces, the only way to maintain the desired government consumption
levels is to increase taxes. The debt levels increase in per capita terms ceteris paribus
as there is emigration of workers. The one period form of debt does not allow full
replication of the problems that the government would face. However, increased
payments on debt and lower taxes from households, would increase the likelihood of
default.
For Foreign there is an increase in production, employment, wages, and investment
resulting from a less expensive capital input of oil. In addition, terms of trade become
favourable. The migration restrictions reduce migration flows, which reduces total
labour supply to the firm.
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The role of the migration policies are significant, as they decrease migration and
reduce the income of migrant workers. We have presented results to a positive and
negative oil price shock to demonstrate the effects of the upper and lower bounds on
the constraints and business cycle as a driver of emigration.
First, we imposed a limit on visas issued which introduced illegal migration to
the model. This constraint decreased the number of legal migrants. However, the
overall employment of migrants remained relatively unchanged.
The second constraint is based on reducing immigration by ways of increased
efficiency of the border force and a reduction in the job finding probability. This
began having a detrimental effect of the economy in Foreign. A reduced labour supply
and the effects were worse in Home due to the increased number of unemployed
agents. The overall levels of migration significantly decreased, as too has the search
intensity in Foreign.
The final constraint imposed, created destruction of matches of new migrants and
existing illegal ones. This had a greater significant negative effect on the economy
of both Home and Foreign relative to the model without constraints. A decrease in
migration results in a decreased labour supply to Foreign, a decrease in remittances
and an increase in unemployment in Home. Due to the imperfect substitutability of
migrant and native workers to Foreign, not all employment can be recovered from
the Foreign workers.
There are policy implications for migration and business cycles. From a migration
perspective we have seen that migration policies during an economic contraction in
Home have negative effects as unemployment remains high, and there are lower levels
of total remittances. During the economic expansion in Foreign, these migration poli-
cies restricts additional labour supply which in turn prevents as large of an economic
expansion as is possible. Not only do these policies create expenditures that could be
used for government consumption or lower taxes. They create illegal migration that
makes migrants worse off, generates lower tax revenue for the government in Foreign,
and makes Foreign natives no better off as the workers are imperfect substitutes.
For countries which are heavily dependent upon commodities as a main source of
exports and an industry that is sizeable for the economy is of a concern due to the
high volatility and significant effect on the economy. Whereas a Home productivity
shock is much less volatile. A shift to diversified exports is required as the reliance
on non-renewables needs to change. Without diversification, the high volatility will
continue which has detrimental effects on growth, investment, income distribution,
and educational attainment (van der Ploeg (2011), Aizenman and Marion (1999), and
Flug et al. (1998)). Reducing the dependency on commodities allows for progression
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and towards a more macroeconomically stable and sustainable economy. In addition,
the reduction of the resource curse can promote democracy peacefully.
The role of macroeconomic populism is significant in the resource curse and in our
analysis. For instance, Norway is a developed economy (non-OPEC nation) with oil
production contributing to 20-25% of GDP and around 50% of exports (Bergholt et al.,
2017). However, in contrast to Venezuela the non-oil economy of Norway is highly
developed. Crucially, the revenues from oil are saved into a sovereign wealth fund so
that future generations can gain from the wealth, the economy is protected during
price fluctuations, and helps support fiscal spending during economic contractions
which is the opposite to macroeconomic populist countries.41 If Venezuela had the
same features as Norway, the economic and political problems that they currently
experience would unlikely be happening.
The research in this paper has introduced occasionally binding constraints into
the emigration literature to create occasionally binding migration policies. The
effects of the constraints on migration are negative for both the host and sending
economies after a negative oil price shock. Migration was a way of reducing the
economic burden of unemployed workers in Home and making them productive as a
worker in Foreign. As many Venezuelan emigrants plan to return to Venezuela in
the future, or be a temporary rather a than permanent migrant, the restrictions are
making the economic problems worse in the short term. While Venezuela is facing a
number of other problems at the moment, this model has enabled us to illustrate
the effects of migration and migration policies on the business cycle. We have not
analysed the role of sovereign default as the current debt dynamics do not allow for
full representation, an area for future research.
41The Government Pension Fund Global is a sovereign wealth fund that invests in international
assets and does not have any pension liabilities https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/about-the-fund/
.
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Appendix C
C.1 Data Sources
Table C.1 lists the raw data used in analysis and the source. We use annual data
for two reasons. Firstly, quarterly data is not available for some variables, but most
importantly, the data that is available does not cover the full length of a business
cycle. The data used in the estimation covers a time when politics was less influential.
Table C.1 Data Source
Data Source
Oil Price US Department of Energy
US CPI OECD
Remittances in Venezuela World Bank (GFDD.OI.13)
Venezuela-US Migration Department of Homeland Security
Office of Immigration Statistics
Venezuela-Latin America Migration International Organisation for Migration
US Population US Census Bureau
National Intercensal Tables
US National Income Account Bureau of Economic Analysis
US GDP Pre 1929 Balke and Gordon (1989)
US Defence Spending Pre 1929 United States. Bureau of the Census (1975)
Venezuela Economic Data pre 1995 Baptista (1997)
Venezuela GDP post 2000 World Economic
Outlook Database
C.2 Migration in Venezuela 1905-1993
In section 4.1, we described recent trends of migration of Venezuela. Venezuela was
long a host of migrants due to the attraction of employment within the oil sector.
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The change in migration has been driven by the a large number of migrants returning
to their home nation. Venezuelans who have migrated have long since been regarded
as highly skilled, in addition, a large number of (recent) Venezuelans emigrants
moving to Latin American nations move to countries with similar socialist tendencies,
hence the seemingly disproportionate migration flow to Bolivia. The emigration to
Colombia is largely due to its location. As a part of its history of a migrant host, in
figure C.1 we show migration to Venezuela. The data before 1960 is the estimated
migratory movement and the data from 1960 is the number of residences granted
by the migration department.1 Migration has been very volatile in Venezuela, and
is heavily related to the business cycle. As shown in the data, and model, the oil
prices is one of the main drivers of the business cycle and hence a driver of migration.
The predictions of future migration is modelled by Bahar and Barrios (2018) using
variables oil price, oil production, and foreign aid/remittances shows the relationship
of oil price and production to migration.2 In the fiscal year for 2018, Venezuelans
Fig. C.1 Migration in Venezuela
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104 Migration in Venezuela 1905-1993
Annual migration in Venezuela (10,000s of people). For the years before 1960, the figures are for
migratory movement. From 1960 to 1993, the figures are the number of residences granted by the
migration department.
Source: Baptista (1997)
1These figures have been taken from Baptista (1997). Annual data is not available for intervening
years
2https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/12/10/how-many-more-migrants-and-
refugees-can-we-expect-out-of-venezuela/
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submitted the highest number of affirmative asylum applications 28,485 in the USA.
This is ahead of Guatamala (10,177), and El Salvador (9157).
For the fiscal years 2015 to 2018, Venezuela experienced some of the highest visa
refusal rates which was comparative to those that were under travel bans imposed
by the current administration. At 74%, this was the same as Libya and behind only
Somalia, Iran, Yemen, and Syria.
C.3 Default and devaluation
We take data from each of Venezuela’s four most recent defaults periods and the
corresponding devaluation date as shown in table C.2.3 In addition to the extraction
of the table presented in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017), we note the devaluation
date and the oil price.
Table C.2 Sovereign Default Episodes (1980-present)
Start of End of Data Devaluation Oil Price∗∗
Default Default Source
1983 1988 BC, table 6 $58,51,55,52,23,31,26
1990 1990 BC, table 6 $35
1995 1998 BC, table 4 $22,27,23,14
2005 2005 CG, table 2 03/2005∗ $56
2017 08/2018∗∗∗ $ 44.09, 58.39
Data source: BC: Beers and Chambers (2006) ; CG, Chambers and Gurwitz (2014)
∗ In real terms. See figure C.4, own calculations
∗∗ On January 1, 2008, Venezuela introduced a new currency that eliminated three zeros from the
national currency. The Bolivar was replaced with the Bolivar Fuerte.
∗ ∗ ∗ On August 20, 2018, Venezuela replaced the Bolivar Fuerte with the Bolivar soberano which
was a 96% devaluation.
C.4 Remittances
Data suggests that remittances sent to Venezuela are countercyclical, indicating
that in times of economic struggle there is an increase in remittances. Particularly
illustrated by the sizeable increase since 2000, shown in figure C.2. Prior to 2000,
the economy had been fairly strong, a change in the migration profile of Venezuela
from host to sender significantly increased the size of remittances received.
3Included in the table is the current default period.
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Fig. C.2 Remittances received in Venezuela 1990-2017
Remittances received by households in Venezuela for years 1990-2017 inclusive (current US$ Millions).
There is a significant rise in the 18 years with two notable peaks. First in 2003, in an economic
downturn and the political unrest including the coup and reinstatement of the then President Hugo
Chavez. PDVSA workers went on strike, eventually the 18,000 of the strikers were sacked. These
workers were replaced but the strike had shrunk production. The recent increase of 2015-present is
due to the ongoing economic and political crisis previously discussed.
Data source: World Bank
C.5 Relative GDP Per Capita
As discussed in section 4.5.2 and elsewhere in this paper, the economic state of
Venezuela was at times quite good. Figure C.3 shows the relative GDP of Venezuela
to the United States of America.
C.6 Oil Prices and Production
Venezuela is a member of OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries).
In figure C.4, we show the Crude Oil price in US$ per barrel in real and nominal
terms. The price has been deflated by the US CPI.
Due to the nationalisation of the oil industry, PDVSA, oil production has been
driven by government interests rather than market forces. Figure C.5, shows Venezue-
lan oil production, vs OPEC oil production (less Venezuela).
The gap between the two blue lines is relatively constant from 1970 onwards. The
reason for the large decline in the 1980s was the oil glut following the energy crisis
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C.6 Oil Prices and Production
Fig. C.3 Relative GDP Per Capita - Venezuela to the USA
The relative GDP per capita of Venezuela to the USA during the period of observation 1920-1995.
GDP per capita is measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars as calculated by Bolt and
Zanden (2014), the relative figures are the author’s calculations using the data for Venezuela and
the USA.
Fig. C.4 U.S. FOB Costs of Venezuela Crude Oil Dollars per Barrel
The blue line shows the real pice of Venezuelan crude oil in US$ per barrel. The original line shows
the nominal price. “Free on Board” in this case is when the buyer is responsible for transporting
and insuring the good (oil) and the seller makes it delivers it to a given port for a given price.
Source: Oil Price: US Department of Energy ; CPI: OECD
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Fig. C.5 Crude Oil Production Daily Average
Logged daily average of crude oil production for OECD, OECD non-Venezuela, and Venezuela.
The left hand axis is the scale for production of oil by OPEC countries. The solid line is for all
OPEC countries, and the dashed line is all the OPEC countries excluding Venezuela. The orange
line is scaled on the right hand axis is the logged production of oil production in Venezuela.
Date source: OPEC
in the 1970s. There is a weakly similar pattern in production of the solid orange,
and dashed blue line. However, this has diverged in the beginning of the century in
particular. The nationalisation finalised in 1976, however the process had started
many years previous, causes a pronounced decline from 1970. The decline by other
OECD countries doesn’t begin until 1979.
C.7 Additional Model Equations
C.7.1 Adjustment Costs
The investment costs for the final good producing firm,
∂ι(xt, xt−1)
∂xt
= ι(xt, xt−1)
xt
− κxϕx
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)(
xt
xt−1
)
(C.7.1)
∂ι(xt+1, xt)
∂xt
= κxϕx
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)(
xt
xt−1
)2
(C.7.2)
The investment costs for the oil-consuming firm
∂ι(xFt , xFt−1)
∂xFt
= ι(x
F
t , x
F
t−1)
xFt
− κxFϕxF
(
xFt
xFt−1
− 1
)(
xFt
xFt−1
)
(C.7.3)
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∂ι(xFt+1, xFt )
∂xFt
= κxFϕxF
(
xFt
xFt−1
− 1
)(
xFt
xFt−1
)2
(C.7.4)
The investment costs for the oil-producing firm.
∂ι(xOt , xOt−1)
∂xOt
= ι(x
O
t , x
O
t−1)
xOt
− κxOϕxO
(
xOt
xOt−1
− 1
)(
xOt
xOt−1
)
(C.7.5)
∂ι(xOt+1, xOt )
∂xOt
= κxOϕxO
(
xOt
xOt−1
− 1
)(
xOt
xOt−1
)2
(C.7.6)
C.7.2 Terms of Trade
(pHHt)
θ−1 = v + (1− v)(tott)1−θ (C.7.7)
(pFHt)
θ−1 = v(tott)θ−1 + (1− v) (C.7.8)
rer1−θt =
(vf + (1− vf )(tott)1−θ)
(v + (1− v)tot1−θt )
(C.7.9)
(pHFt)
θ−1 = vf + (1− vf )(tott)1−θ (C.7.10)
(pFFt)
θ−1 = vf (tott)θ−1 + (1− vf ) (C.7.11)
Using C.7.9, we define the real exchange rate as:
rer1−θt =
pHFt)θ−1
(pHHt)θ−1
rer1−θt =
(
pHHt
pHFt
)1−θ
rert =
pHHt
pHFt
C.8 Baseline DSGE Model
C.8.1 Home Household
µHt =
(
ψHt c
H
t −
ϕ0
1 + ϕ(h
H
t )(1+ϕ)
)−σ
(C.8.1)
wwHt = ϕ0(hHt )ϕ (C.8.2)
hrsHt = hHt nHt (C.8.3)
hrsHt = lHt + lOt + lMt (C.8.4)
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lMt = hrsHt nMt (C.8.5)
C.8.2 Foreign Household
µFt =
(
(cFt )−
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
F
t )(1+ϕ)
)−σ
(C.8.6)
mplFt = ϕ0(hFt )ϕ (C.8.7)
hrsFt = hFt nFt (C.8.8)
C.8.3 Labour Market
mHt = aH(uHHt )Γ
H (vHt )(1−Γ
H) (C.8.9)
mFt = aF (uFt )Γ
F (vFt )(1−Γ
F ) (C.8.10)
mMt = aM(uHMt )Γ
M (vMt )1−Γ
M (C.8.11)
nHt = (1− ρhn)nHt−1 +mHt (C.8.12)
nFt = (1− ρfn)nFt−1 +mFt (C.8.13)
nMt = (1− ρmn )nmt−1 +mMt (C.8.14)
uHt = 1− (1− ρHn )nHt−1 − (1− ρMn )nMt−1 (C.8.15)
uHHt = uHt λHt (C.8.16)
uHMt = uHt (1− λHt ) (C.8.17)
u˜Ht = 1− nHt − nMt (C.8.18)
u˜HHt = u˜Ht λHt (C.8.19)
u˜HMt = u˜Ht (1− λHt ) (C.8.20)
uFt = 1− (1− ρFn )nFt−1 (C.8.21)
u˜Ft = 1− nFt (C.8.22)
γHt =
mHt
vHt
(C.8.23)
γFt =
mFt
vFt
(C.8.24)
γMt =
mMt
vMt
(C.8.25)
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ζHt =
mHt
uHHt
(C.8.26)
ζFt =
mFt
uFt
(C.8.27)
ζMt =
mMt
uHMt
(C.8.28)
θHt =
vHt
uHHt
(C.8.29)
θFt =
vFt
uFt
(C.8.30)
θMt =
vMt
uHMt
(C.8.31)
ΥHt =
1− ϑh
ϑh
ηHt (C.8.32)
ΥFt =
1− ϑf
ϑf
ηFt (C.8.33)
ΥFt =
1− ϑm
ϑm
ηMt (C.8.34)
ΥHt = (wwHt − wHt )hrsHt + (1− ρhn)β
µHt+1
µHt
ΥHt+1 (C.8.35)
ΥFt = (wwFt − wFt )hrsFt + (1− ρfn)βf
muFt+1
µFt
ΥFt+1 (C.8.36)
ΥMt = (wwMt − wMt )hrsHt + (1− ρmn )βf
µFt+1
µFt
ΥMt+1 (C.8.37)
ηHt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
H
t )1+ϕ + (wHt hHt − ubh) + (1− ρhn)β
µHt+1
µHt
ηHt+1(1− ζHt+1) (C.8.38)
ηFt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
F
t )1+ϕ + (wFt hrsFt − ubf ) + (1− ρhn)βf
µFt+1
µFt
ηFt+1(1− ζFt+1) (C.8.39)
ηMt = −
ϕ0
(1 + ϕ)(h
H
t )1+ϕ + (wMt hHt − ubm) + (1− ρmn )β
µHt+1
µHt
ηHt+1(1− ζMt+1) (C.8.40)
γHt (ΥHt − κH) =
∂(vHt , vHt−1)
∂vHt
+ βµ
H
t+1
µHt
∂(vHt+1, vHt )
∂vHt
(C.8.41)
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γFt (ΥFt − κF ) =
∂(vFt , vFt−1)
∂vHt
+ βf µ
F
t+1
µFt
∂(vFt+1, vFt )
∂vFt
(C.8.42)
γMt (ΥMt − κM) =
∂(vMt , vMt−1)
∂vMt
+ βf µ
M
t+1
µMt
∂(vMt+1, vMt )
∂vMt
(C.8.43)
C.8.4 Home Firm
yHt = at(kHt−1)α
H (lHt )1−α
H (C.8.44)
kHt = (1− δ)
kHt−1
gHt
+ ι(xt, xt−1) (C.8.45)
tqt = β
µHt+1
µHt
(
αHpHHt+1
yHt+1
kt
+ (1− δ)tqt+1
gHt+1
)
(C.8.46)
1 = tqt
∂(xt, xt−1)
∂xt
+ βµ
H
t+1
µHt
tqt+1
∂(xt+1, xt)
∂xt
(C.8.47)
mplHt = (1− αH)pHHt
yHt
nHt
(C.8.48)
pHHtmpl
H
t = wwHt (C.8.49)
C.8.5 Foreign Firm
yFt = aFt (IFt )α
F (lFt )1−α
F (C.8.50)
IFt =
[
νF (yOFt)
ΦF + (1− νF )(kFt−1)Φ
F
] 1
ΦF (C.8.51)
kFt = (1− δF )
kFt−1
gFt
+ ι(xFt , xFt−1) (C.8.52)
tqFt = βf
µFt+1
µFt
(
αFpFFt+1
yFt+1
kft
+ (1− δF )tq
F
t+1
gFt+1
)
(C.8.53)
1 = tqFt
∂(xFt , xFt−1)
∂xFt
+ βf µ
F
t+1
µFt
tqFt+1
∂(xFt+1, xFt )
∂xFt
(C.8.54)
mpkFt =
αf (1− νf )pFFtyFt (kFt−1)ϕ
f−1
(IFt )ϕf
(C.8.55)
mplFt = (1− αF )χLpFFt
yFt
hFt
(C.8.56)
mplMt = (1− αF )(1− χL)pFFt
yFt
lMt
(C.8.57)
pFFtmpl
F
t = wwFt (C.8.58)
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pFFtmpl
M
t = wwMt (C.8.59)
LFt = (hFt )χ
L(lMt )1−χ
L (C.8.60)
pOFt = p
O
∗t
αf (νf )pFFtyFt (yOFt)ϕ
f−1
(IFt )ϕf
(C.8.61)
yOFt =
 pOFt(IFt )ϕf
νfαfyFt p
F
Ft
 1ϕf−1 (C.8.62)
yOt = yOht + y
O
Ft (C.8.63)
C.8.6 Oil Producer
yOt = aOt (kOt )α
O(lOt )β
O (C.8.64)
mplOt = βO
yOt
lOt
(C.8.65)
mpkOt = αO
yOt
kOt−1
(C.8.66)
pOHtmpl
O
t = wwHt + ξ(lOt )diff + β
µHt+1
µHt
ξ(lOt+1)difflag+1 (C.8.67)
pOHtmpk
O
t = rOkt + ξ(k
O
t )diff + β
µHt+1
µHt
ξ(kOt+1)difflag+1 (C.8.68)
kOt = (1− δO)
kOt−1
gHt
+ xOt (C.8.69)
pOHt = rertp
O
Ft (C.8.70)
ξ(lOt ) = lOt
ξ(lO)
2
(
lOt
lOt−1
− 1
)2
(C.8.71)
ξ(lOt )diff =
ξ(lOt )
lOt
+ ξ(lO)
(
lOt
lOt−1
− 1
)
lOt
lOt−1
(C.8.72)
ξ(lOt )difflag = −ξ(lO)
(
lOt
lOt−1
− 1
)(
lOt
lOt−1
)2
(C.8.73)
ξ(kOt ) = kOt
ξ(kO)
2
(
kOt
kOt−1
− 1
)2
(C.8.74)
ξ(kOt )diff =
ξ(kOt )
kOt
+ ξ(kO)
(
kOt
kOt−1
− 1
)
kOt
kOt−1
(C.8.75)
ξ(kOt )difflag = −ξ(kO)
(
kOt
kOt−1
− 1
)(
kOt
kOt−1
)2
(C.8.76)
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C.8.7 Adjustment cost functions
ι(xt, xt−1) = κxxt
1− ϕx2
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)2 (C.8.77)
∂(xt, xt−1)
∂xt
= ι(xt, xt−1)
xt
− κxϕx
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)(
xt
xt−1
)
(C.8.78)
∂(xt+1, xt)
∂xt
= κxϕx
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)(
xt
xt−1
)2
(C.8.79)
ι(xFt , xFt−1) = κxx
f
t
1− ϕx2
((
xft
xft−1
)
− 1
)2 (C.8.80)
∂(xFt , xFt−1)
∂xFt
= ι(x
F
t , x
F
t−1)
xft
− κxϕx
(
xft
xft−1
− 1
)(
xft
xft−1
)
(C.8.81)
∂(xFt+1, xFt )
∂xFt
= κxϕx
(
xft
xft−1
− 1
)(
xft
xft−1
)2
(C.8.82)
κ(vHt , vHt−1) = κHv vHt
1 + ϕHv2
(
vHt
vHt−1
− 1
)2 (C.8.83)
∂(vHt , vHt−1)
∂vHt
= κ(v
H
t , v
H
t−1)
vHt
+ κHv ϕHv
(
vHt
vHt−1
− 1
)
vHt
vHt−1
(C.8.84)
∂(vHt+1, vHt )
∂vHt
= −κHv ϕHv
(
vHt
vHt−1
− 1
)(
vHt
vHt−1
)2
(C.8.85)
κ(vFt , vFt−1) = κFv vFt
1 + ϕFv2
(
vFt
vFt−1
− 1
)2 (C.8.86)
∂(vFt , vFt−1)
∂vFt
= κ(v
F
t , v
F
t−1)
vFt
+ κFv ϕFv
(
vFt
vFt−1
− 1
)
vFt
vFt−1
(C.8.87)
∂(vFt+1, vFt )
∂vHt
= −κFv ϕFv
(
vFt
vFt−1
− 1
)(
vFt
vFt−1
)2
(C.8.88)
κ(vMt , vMt−1) = κMv vMt
1 + ϕMv2
(
vMt
vMt−1
− 1
)2 (C.8.89)
∂(vMt , vMt−1)
∂vMt
= κ(v
M
t , v
M
t−1)
vMt
+ κMv ϕMv
(
vMt
vMt−1
− 1
)
vMt
vMt−1
(C.8.90)
∂(vMt+1, vMt )
∂vMt
= −κMv ϕMv
(
vMt
vMt−1
− 1
)(
vMt
vMt−1
)2
(C.8.91)
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C.8.8 Adding Up
kt = kHt + kOt (C.8.92)
xt = xHt + xOt (C.8.93)
rKt = αHpHHt
yHt
kHt−1
(C.8.94)
C.8.9 Open Economy
1
(1 + rt)
= βµ
H
t+1
µHt
pFHt+1
pFHt
1
gHt
(C.8.95)
1
(1 + rft )
= βµ
F
t+1
µFt
pFFt+1
pFFt
1
gFt
(C.8.96)
(pHHt)
θ−1 = v + (1− v)(tott)1−θ (C.8.97)
(pFHt)
θ−1 = v(tott)θ−1 + (1− v) (C.8.98)
rer1−θt =
(vf + (1− vf )(tott)1−θ)
(v + (1− v)tot1−θt )
(C.8.99)
(pHFt)
θ−1 = vf + (1− vf )(tott)1−θ (C.8.100)
(pFFt)
θ−1 = vf (tott)θ−1 + (1− vf ) (C.8.101)
yHt + yOHt = v
h(pHHt)
−θ(cHt + xt + κ(γHt ) + κ(vHt , vHt−1) + ξ(lOt ) + ξ(kOt ) + gHet )
+(1− n)
n
vf (pHFt)
−θ(cFt +x
f
t +κF (γFt )+κ(vFt , vFt−1)+κM(γMt )+κ(vMt , vMt−1)+cMt +gFet)
(C.8.102)
yFt = (1−vf )
(
pFHt
rert
)−θ
(cFt +x
f
t+κF (γFt )+κ(vFt , vFt−1)+κM(γMt )+κ(vMt , vMt−1)+cMt +gFet)
+ n1− n(1− v
h)(pHHt)
−θ(cHt + xt + κ(γHt ) + κ(vHt , vHt−1) + ξ(lOt ) + ξ(kOt ) + gHet )
(C.8.103)
d∗t = (1 + rt−1)
gdpt−1
gdpt
pFHt
pFHt−1
d∗t−1
gt
+ tbalt (C.8.104)
1 + rt = (1 + rft + ψrt )
(
exp
(
ϕb(d∗t − d∗)
)
− ϕo
(
pOFt − pFo
))
(C.8.105)
gdpt = pHHty
H
t + pOHty
O
Htp
O
∗t (C.8.106)
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gdpFt = pFFty
F
t − pOFtyOFtpO∗t (C.8.107)
tbalt = 1− c
H
t + xt + κγHt + κ(vHt , vHt−1) + ξ(lOt ) + ξ(kOt ) + gHet
gdpHt
(C.8.108)
C.8.10 Miscellaneous
ζ
M
H
t =
ζMt
ζHt
(C.8.109)
λt =
mHt
mHt +mMt
(C.8.110)
Ξt = ΞϱΞ
(
wMt
wHt
)ρΞ
(C.8.111)
cmt + Ξt + TaxMt = wmt lmt (C.8.112)
C.8.11 Fiscal Authority
gHet = g
H
ct + bf
H
t + pOHty
O
Ht (C.8.113)
bfHt = (bfH)1−ρ
bf (bfHt−1)ρ
bf + εbft (C.8.114)
gHct = (gHc )
1−ρgc (gHct−1)
ρg
c
+ εg
H
c
t (C.8.115)
gHet + (1 + r
F
t−1)pFHtd
∗
t−1 = taxt + pFHtd
∗
t
(C.8.116)
gFet = g
F
ct + bf
F
t (C.8.117)
bfFt = (bfF )1−ρ
bf (bfFt−1)ρ
bf + εbft (C.8.118)
gFct = (gFc )
1−ρgc (gFct−1)
ρg
c
+ εg
F
c
t (C.8.119)
gFet + (1 + r
F
t−1)pFFtd
∗
t−1 = taxFt + pFFtd
∗
t (C.8.120)
C.8.12 Shocks and Population Growth Rates
aHt = ρa
H
aHt−1 + εa
H
t (C.8.121)
aFt = ρa
F
aFt−1 + εa
F
t (C.8.122)
ψHt = ρψ
H
ψHt−1 + ε
ψH
t (C.8.123)
gHt =
nHt + uHHt
nHt−1 + uHHt−1
(C.8.124)
gFt =
nFt + uFt + nMt + uHMt
nFt−1 + uFt−1 + nMt−1 + uHMt−1
(C.8.125)
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aOt = ρa
O
aOt−1 + εa
O
t (C.8.126)
pO∗t = ρ
pO∗ pO∗t−1 + ε
pO∗
t (C.8.127)
ψrt = ρrψrt−1 + (1− ρr)ψr + εrt (C.8.128)
End of baseline model
C.9 Steady State
hH = 1.00 (C.9.1)
hF = 1.00 (C.9.2)
rF = 1
βf
− 1 (C.9.3)
ψr = 0.093 (C.9.4)
rH = rF + ψr (C.9.5)
β = 11 + rH (C.9.6)
gH = 1 (C.9.7)
gF = 1 (C.9.8)
nH = 0.85 (C.9.9)
nM = 0.10 (C.9.10)
nF = 0.95 (C.9.11)
uH = 1− nH − nM (C.9.12)
uF = 1− nH (C.9.13)
mH = ρHn nH (C.9.14)
mF = ρFnnF (C.9.15)
mM = ρMn nM (C.9.16)
γj = γj (C.9.17)
λH = m
H
mH +mM (C.9.18)
uHH = uHλH (C.9.19)
uHM = uH(1− λH) (C.9.20)
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u˜H = 1− nH − nM (C.9.21)
u˜HH = u˜HλH (C.9.22)
u˜HM = u˜H(1− λH) (C.9.23)
u˜F = 1− nF (C.9.24)
vH = m
H
γH
(C.9.25)
vF = m
F
γF
(C.9.26)
vM = m
M
γM
(C.9.27)
ζH = m
H
uHH
(C.9.28)
ζF = m
F
uF
(C.9.29)
ζM = m
M
uHM
(C.9.30)
hrsH = (nH + nM)hH (C.9.31)
hrsF = nFhF (C.9.32)
aH = 1 (C.9.33)
ψH = 1 (C.9.34)
tqH = 1
κHx
(C.9.35)
tqF = 1
κFx
(C.9.36)
lH =
(
1− l
M
l
− l
O
l
)
hrsH (C.9.37)
lO = l
O
l
hrsH (C.9.38)
lM = nMhH (C.9.39)
Lf = (hrsF )χ(lM)1−χ (C.9.40)
rk = 1
β
− (1− δH) (C.9.41)
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kH =
(
rk
α(lH)1−α
) 1
α−1
(C.9.42)
yH = aH(kH)α(lH)1−α (C.9.43)
mplH = (1− α)y
H
lH
(C.9.44)
yO = y
O
yH
yH (C.9.45)
kO = α
O
αH
yO
yH
kH (C.9.46)
βO = mplH l
O
yO
(C.9.47)
k = kH + kO (C.9.48)
gdp =
yOF
yO
yO
yH
+ 1
 yH (C.9.49)
yOF =
yOF
yO
yO (C.9.50)
yOH = yO − yOF (C.9.51)
rKF =
1
βF
− (1− δF ) (C.9.52)
Numerical solver for aF and kF for for pOF = 1 and mpkF = rFk .
pOF =
αf (νf )pFFyF (yOF )ϕ
f−1[
νF (yOF )Φ
F + (1− νF )(kF )ΦF
] (C.9.53)
mpkF = α
f (1− νf )pFFyF (kF )ϕf−1[
νF (yOF )Φ
F + (1− νF )(kF )ΦF
] (C.9.54)
Where
yF = aF
(
νF (yOF )Φ
F + (1− νF )(kF )ΦF
)αF
ϕF (LF )1−αF
Υj = κ
j
v
γj
+ κj (C.9.55)
wj = wwj −
(
1−
(
1− ρjn
)
βi
) Υj
hi
(C.9.56)
ηj =
wj − hj − ubj − ϕ01+ϕ(hj)1+ϕ
1− (1− ρjn)(1− ζj)βi (C.9.57)
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j
Υj + ηj (C.9.58)
ξ(lOt ) = 0 (C.9.59)
ξ(lOt )diff = 0 (C.9.60)
ξ(lOt )difflag = 0 (C.9.61)
ξ(kOt ) = 0 (C.9.62)
ξ(kOt )diff = 0 (C.9.63)
ξ(kOt )difflag = 0 (C.9.64)
xH = δHkH (C.9.65)
xO = δOkO (C.9.66)
xF = δFkF (C.9.67)
x = xH + xO (C.9.68)
k = kH + kO (C.9.69)
rer = pHH = pFH = P FF = PHF = tot = 1 (C.9.70)
d∗ = 0 (C.9.71)
tbal = d∗ − (1 + rH)d∗ (C.9.72)
geH = ge
H
gdp
gdp (C.9.73)
bfH = bf
H
geH
geH (C.9.74)
gcH = geH − bfH (C.9.75)
geF = ge
F
gdpF
gdpF (C.9.76)
bfF = bf
F
geF
geF (C.9.77)
gcF = geF − bfF (C.9.78)
tax = ge (C.9.79)
taxF = geF (C.9.80)
taxF = taxF
1
1 + nM + uHM (C.9.81)
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taxM = taxF
nM + uHM
1 + nM + uHM (C.9.82)
Ξ = ΞϱΞ
(
wM
wH
)ρΞ
(C.9.83)
cH = (1− tbal)gdp− x− κHγH − κ(vHt , vHt−1)−GH − ξ(kO)− ξ(lO) (C.9.84)
cF = (1−tbal)(gdpF−yOF )−xf−κFγF−κ(vFt , vFt−1)−κMγM−κ(vMt , vMt−1)−GF−cM
(C.9.85)
µH =
(
ψcH − ϕ01 + ϕ(h
H)(1+ϕ)
)−σ
(C.9.86)
µF =
(
cF − ϕ
f
0
1 + ϕf (h
F )(1+ϕF )
)−σF
(C.9.87)
ι(xt, xt−1) = κxxh (C.9.88)
∂(xt, xt−1)
∂x
= κx (C.9.89)
∂(xt+1, xt)
∂x
= 0 (C.9.90)
ι(xFt , xFt−1) = κxxf (C.9.91)
∂(xFt , xFt−1)
∂x
= κx (C.9.92)
∂(xFt+1, xFt )
∂xF
= 0 (C.9.93)
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Motivated by the increasing size, economic and political importance of migration,
this thesis has presented three, but separate essays related by the topic of migration
in open economies. To fill key gaps in the literature, this thesis has answered some
questions that are untouched or relatively unexplored in empirical and theoretical
macroeconomics. What are the effects of migration on natives, how does an exoge-
nous migration shock affect the macroeconomy, how does brain waste affect the
macroeconomy, and what are the implications of migration policies on a host and a
sending country?
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the effects of immigration following a shock to
simulate the relaxation of immigration policies using theoretical and empirical
models. Chapter 4 examined the effects of immigration, emigration, the emigration
decision and migration policies with the use of occasionally binding constraints. The
empirical models employed in chapters 2 and 3 introduced two new net migration
time series into the literature. These analysed the effects of increases in net migration
to the macroeconomy in Germany and Canada respectively. The datasets were used
in the estimation of the DSGE models. The DSGE models put forth were of small
open economies, however, they contrasted firstly in their profile of per native and per
migrant in chapter 2 to per capita terms in chapter 3, and secondly in the use of skill
levels and of search and matching frictions in chapter 3 . The final essay presented a
two-country model using search and matching frictions, with an endogenous migration
decision dependent on the labour market conditions. The emigration decision was
affected by migration policies introduced by the host country. The model used in
chapter 4 extended the analysis to include the business cycle characteristics of a
resource cursed country and use an extensive dataset for Venezuela and the United
States that is unused in business cycle analysis.
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There are a series of general policy implications that can be taken from the three
papers. Firstly, immigration has a positive effect on the macroeconomy. The models
have presented native and migrant workers as imperfect substitutes or heterogeneous
agents, to match with the microeconomic literature. When there is household transfer,
or transfer between labour markets, the process shows how migrants fill gaps in the
labour market. The positive effects are experienced in the theoretical and empirical
models. For both Germany and Canada, a migration shock is small but (statistically)
significant to the business cycle. The models do not find evidence of negative effects
for natives in relation to immigration that is suggested by anti-immigration politicians
and journalists. The modelling of workers as imperfect substitutes could be one of
the reasons in the theoretical model. However, the empirical analysis of the wage
level included in the national accounts is either positive or statistically insignificant
on impact. The gains from immigration are only fully realised when immigrants are
employed to their full skill level as demonstrated in chapter 3. When this does not
occur, there are still positive effects since the size of the labour force has increased.
The final paper of this thesis examined the migration process as an endogenous
decision made based on the labour market conditions, which showed that migration
policies had negative effects for both the host and sending economies. The host
country suffered due to unfilled vacancies, and the sending country by having a
higher number of unemployed workers and a lower level of remittances. Overall,
emigration has positive and negative effects on the macroeconomy and is largely
dependent on the type of shock to the business cycle - risk sharing or otherwise.
5.1 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications
Chapter 2 presented a novel model where variables were either in per native or per
migrant terms rather than standard per capita business cycle literature and two
SVARs to use migration and macroeconomic data from Germany. The results from
the empirical models showed that migration has a positive effect on the macroeconomy
in per capita and per native terms, which emphasises that migration is positive to the
macroeconomy for natives and total working-age population. The responses using the
different datasets were in the same direction and of similar magnitude, however, in
per native terms the peak was slightly later. The response to migration in variables
for which the response is statistically significant is generally positive, including an
expansion on output. The effects of fiscal policy are interesting as the rules employed
can offer different explanations. If fiscal policy is assumed to be countercyclical,
as in the DSGE model, government spending would decrease as output increases.
Taxes would go up rather than saying migration decreases government spending.
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The insignificant response of government debt requires more research. The results
from the DSGE model matched those from the SVAR; though it is not possible to
compare the wage level with the SVAR due to the two types of wage level. The
model showed that migration was more than an increase to population growth rate,
as depicted in the Solow model. Migration increased the growth rate of the migrant
households, then the native household resulted in expansionary output effects which
resulted from an increase in labour supply. Both households experience a decrease
in utility due to the increase in labour hours; for natives the change is insignificant.
Natives first experience an increase due to the increase in consumption, before it
is outweighed by the increase in labour hours. Interestingly, the absence of habit
formation on consumption and labour created a greater change in utility, due to the
period changes rather than the small two-period change. From these models, there
are some policy implications. The size of the migration shock is relatively small,
such that there is not a significant impact on the business cycle and no support is
found for negative effects on natives following an increase to migration in the short
or long-run. The design of the model has limited analysis to two labour markets,
however, as both models show expansionary effects from increase in migration, and
given Germany's ageing population, migration can be viewed as a positive necessity
as alluded to in VBW (2015).
Chapter 3 examined immigration and the effect of brain waste in a migrant
host nation. The DSGE model put forth is of a small open economy with capital-
skill complementarity. The baseline model of brain waste featured three types
of households: a high-skill native, low-skill native, and a migrant household that
comprised of high and low-skill migrants. The high-skill migrants experienced two
levels of brain waste designed to represent the most recently landed and landed
migrants. The model included an option for skill-downgrading, rather than being
unemployed as the migrants have less access to unemployment insurance than
natives. The use of models with and without brain waste that enabled calculations
of potential gains to the macroeconomy if brain waste was to be eliminated. The
results from the scenario with brain waste show a small positive response to the
economy following the increase to migration for the macroeconomy. The SVAR
showed similar positive responses to the macroeconomy. However, the purpose of the
DSGE model was to examine the potential gains from eliminating brain waste. Using
steady state calculations and the impulse responses, in the absence of brain waste
there is a significant gain to be found. Particularly for migrants, who have higher
levels of labour income, job security, unemployment insurance, and consumption
levels. Even though a high-skill migration shock creates some negative labour market
responses, there is an overall gain due to the higher employment levels in steady state
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which originates from the participation and unemployment rates. From this model,
policy implication show that migration has a positive effect to the economy but the
brain waste of migrants limits the positive effects. The results support the fiscal
programmes to have migrants' status fully recognised and that targeted migration
programmes are most efficient when migrants have their skills fully recognised. Under
the assumption of imperfect substitutability of migrant and native workers, there are
positive or insignificant impacts from migration for natives. The modelling of capital-
skill complementarity has a role in analysing the effects of high-skill migration as
industries advance with technology (Lewis, 2011). Given that migration is predicted
to be the only source of population growth by 2030, migration can be viewed as
necessary to continue economic growth and maintain the working-age population.
Chapter 4, the final essay in this thesis looked at emigration from a develop-
ing economy using a two-country model with occasionally binding constraints on
migration. This was the only model to use endogenous migration decision of the
three essays, which enabled the analysis the effects of emigration and of a migration
decision due to labour market factors net of migration costs. It used a unique dataset
in this area of research, as a time series of Venezuela has not been used in the
estimation of DSGE models. Two sets of policy implications can be taken from this
model. Concerning migration, the policies implemented have shown to hamper both
economies in the case of a non-risking sharing shock. If the migration decision is
based on the labour market conditions, not just wage, deviation from steady state,
then migration is likely to be temporary. Indeed, the number of Venezuelans who
consider their migration to be temporary is significant so imposing these barriers
has negative effects for both. If applied to the current situation in Venezuela, a
greater distribution of migrants across the rest of Latin America will help ease the
burden on Colombia, in particular, as their economy cannot quickly absorb all the
new workers. Whereas the introduction of migration barriers will prevent Venezuelan
residents leaving. This will keep unemployment persistently high and make the
already relatively scarce resources even more so. Migrants would be able to send
remittances, which already features consumption goods rather than money.
The use of real business cycles in developing economies has been questioned,
however, in this model it allows the focus to be on migration and the business
cycle of oil production. If the business cycles of commodity dependent countries are
considered, which is relevant since there are a number of Latin American countries
as well as other developing economies worldwide, then policy makers can use the
analysis to help protect their economy from the booms and busts originating from
commodity prices. The resource curse and macroeconomic populism tied in, and
the results from the business cycle analysis show that dependence on the economy
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needs to shift away from goods that have highly volatile prices, and a development
of the domestic economy to reduce the dependence on imports. The dollarisation of
debt worsens their economy, though this model has not fully replicated the sovereign
debt issue as the model uses one period debt. Lessons can be taken from the case
of Norway, which is a highly developed economy where oil revenues are one of the
biggest contributors to GDP, during the transition. Instead of using the revenues
when the commodity prices are high to enhance the booms, governments should
invest the revenues to support the economy when there are negative price shocks,
the economy can be supported with these funds.
A further general conclusion that can be taken from each of the chapters is that it
is beneficial to the host economy to fully incorporate migrants into the labour market,
and the macroeconomy by allowing them equivalent financial market interaction as
natives. When the migrants have the same labour market status as natives, there
are macroeconomic gains to be found including GDP, consumption, investment, and
for the fiscal budget. For developed economies, migration is or in the near future be
the only source of population growth, migration will be a vital source of filling gaps
in the labour market.
5.2 Limitations and Future Research
The three papers presented in this thesis have made their own contribution to the
literature, however, each has its limitations and potential for further development.
For the purpose of analysing from a per native perspective, the data used an
approximated native population in chapter 2. However, the time series of a native
population can be argued as questionable since what exactly defines a long-term
resident? The naturalisation of citizens was used to represent the process, but there
are a number of other European labour market members resident in Germany that
would consider themselves as long-term residents. This would suggest that by the
paper’s definition of native households, is that the migrant population is larger, and
the native plus long-term residents is smaller than it should be. Fiscal policy was
based on the countercyclical rules used in the Bundesbank's GEAR model; however,
there was no a robustness teast of those or any of the other policy rules that Germany
has previously used. One drawback is the relatively short migration time series
that is available. While it is detailed, there is not a significant number of years
that precedes the arrival of the A8 countries, even though the opening of the labour
market was staggered with the use of work permits. Future research could expand
research into the specifics of fiscal policy of migration across countries.
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Chapter 2 used data from Germany that recently has predominantly low-skilled
migrants, or those working in low-skill occupations. Future research could contrast
this with a country that had predominantly high-skill migration. As outlined in
the introduction to this thesis, the effects of migration can be country specific
due to relative size of net migration and demographics of the average immigrant.
High-skilled migrants are likely to assume native and labour market characteristics
much quicker and other socio-economic characteristics. This problem for the process
of assimilation is highlighted by Stähler (2017) following the European migration
crisis of 2015-16 that had largely low-skilled immigrants. One of the increases in
population that has risen in recent years is Germans and non-Germans migrating to
Germany due to the United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union. These
migrants are likely to be high-skilled. This will be of a relatively small size, but
closer examination on this topic would be of interest as it is replicable to a number
of other European countries. The DSGE model shows the process to when migrants
become long-term residents, however, there is not much evidence on this, or research
in Germany. Based on the limitation of fiscal policy, an opportunity would be to test
the effects of the other policy rules. We have used a countercyclical fiscal policy rule
that are dependent on government debt and output, would the effects of a migration
shock be replicable in another model and the rule could be more tailored to Germany.
Chapter 3 presented an extensive model of search and matching frictions, capital-
skill complementarity, skill-downgrading, and fiscal policy running a balanced budget.
The primary aim of the paper was to demonstrate the effects of brain waste on an
economy however, the model did not use a proactive form of fiscal policy that reflected
attempts by the government to reduce the effects of brain waste or illustrate the loses
to the government from lower level of taxes and social security contributions from
migrant workers. Taxation was lump-sum and household invariant. The government
budget consisted of unemployment insurance to households and constant government
spending that is subject to a shock. To incorporate fiscal policy that tackles brain
waste, it could be modelled by way of vacancy subsidies to encourage firms to support
migrant workers similar to the fiscal stimulus as suggested by Campolmi et al. (2011).
The fiscal effects of brain waste were not fully explored, which is a notable factor
since lower wages for firms imply lower social security contributions, taxes and
other sources of fiscal revenues. Further opportunities for research include enabling
migrants to gain qualifications in the host country via on-the-job-learning. In the
paper, the short extension presented allowed migrants to invest in physical capital
for use by the firms. However, this does not fully reflect a high-skilled household as
the migrant household features a significant proportion of low-skilled workers whose
labour supply and investment decisions are different from those of high-skill workers.
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One of the limitations of chapter 4 is that the model assumes no migration to the
Home country other than return migration. During the oil boom years, Venezuela
indeed received many migrants from other Latin American countries and Spain.
However, adding a third country to incorporate this dimension would introduce
complexities beyond the scope of the paper and making the Home country the
destination of migrants would not match the use for migration policies. The policies
are rather narrow and depend only on the labour market, net of migration costs
which in current format are insignificant. On the business cycle aspect of chapter 4,
limitations exist on the government debt analysis due to existing limited research in
the areas of liability dollarisation for governments in DSGE literature. There are
a considerable number of political implications and problems that are difficult to
model for example nationalisation of the oil industry and changing policies. However,
this has shown a contrast to the emigration literature with a shock that is not a
traditional business cycle form. There is an absence of risk sharing following an
oil price shock which is the significant difference. Migration policies allowed us
to introduce occasionally binding constraints for the first time in this area of the
literature.
Chapter 4 has the possibility to be extended in several ways for both migration
and business cycles. Future research could examine the effects of fiscal policy in a
resource cursed country. The fiscal policy is used in a limited capacity, with primarily
exogenous expenditures and lump-sum taxes. However, as described by the role
of a resource curse, there are governments who use the high commodity prices to
increase government spending. In which there is an opportunity to evaluate whether
fiscal expenditures dependent on the oil price and contribution of oil rents, is a valid
assumption. Further, show whether the implementation of a sovereign wealth fund
model as in Bergholt et al. (2017) for emerging economies, with a focus on government
consumption, investment and transfers, would be beneficial during the transition to a
diversified economy. This would help to further explore the debt dynamics. In terms
of migration research, debt bonded migration and liquidity constrained migrants
which is an explored in the microeconomics (for example, Djajic and Vinogradova
(2013) and Djajic and Vinogradova (2014)). There are a number of possibilities
which the business cycle perspective of emerging or developing economies could come
from this paper. Including the analysis of “sudden stops” and effect of foreign direct
investment. Whereby making capital mobile between the developed and developing
economy which would be interesting due to Latin America’s extensive use of foreign
capital as evidenced in Taylor (1999). This would provide a connection to migration
as immobile capital is what keeps the developed economies further advanced (and
drive migration) under the world systems theory. Further financial frictions could be
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explored, which closely associate developing economies with RBC models as shown
in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) for Argentina and Mexico, and Tatan (2013) for Turkey.
The model examined the asymmetries introduced by positive and negative oil price
shocks however, oil price exhibits heteroskedasticity which has not been recognised
in the DSGE model. This would have been more suited to a model where the focus
was on the oil price dynamics rather than migration as is the case in chapter 4.
Nevertheless, using other econometric techniques to analyse the effects of a positive
versus a negative oil price and supply shock would provide opportunity for future
research in this area. Fernández et al. (2017) use an annual dataset for 1977-2014
from the World Economic Outlook for Venezuela in analysing terms of trade, world
shocks and business cycles across 138 countries. This is a shorter sample, but covers
more of the downturn in the economy, the results show that for oil exporting countries,
(27 in the sample), the share of the variance in trade balance explained by world
shocks is 28% compared to 15% for oil importers. It would be interesting to compare
the results using the more recent dataset.
Each of these papers have shown that it is important for the host economy to full
incorporate migrants into the labour market and to recognise their skills. In doing so,
the macroeconomy gains. An additional conclusion is that natives are not negatively
affected by immigration which agrees with the wider literature on migration, both
empirical and theoretical. This chapter has shown that there are more areas to be
explored in the macroeconomics of migration.
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